Does Edward Said’s (1978) criticism of what he called “Orientalism” apply to the field of modern Chinese Studies?

The author argues that the relationship between China and the so-called “West” is not one of post-colonial dominance. One remarkable manifestation is the fact that Chinese intellectuals since the mid-80s established an elaborate field of the study of foreign Chinese studies and in doing so reversed the “Western Gaze”. In newer developments Chinese institutions are starting not only to observe but influence foreign Chinese studies, which forces us to review the concept of “Orientalism” in the Chinese context. By discussing these trends, the paper wants to invite a debate on the paradigms of current Chinese studies and whether or not they must change in light of the so-called rise of China.
Orientalism and Current Chinese Studies

By
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1. Orientalism and Chinese studies

Does Edward Said’s (1978) criticism of what he called “Orientalism”¹ apply to the field of modern Chinese Studies? By discussing this question, this paper wants to invite a debate on the paradigms of current Chinese studies and if they must change in light of the so-called rise of China.

The definition of the complex concept of “Orientalism” by Said can be described as threefold: it is first a mode of knowledge production about the so-called “Orient”. “Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient […] is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism” (Said 1978: p. 2). However secondly, at the core of this knowledge production lies the premise of a fundamental difference between “the Orient” and “the Occident” on the one hand or “the East” and “the West” on the other. Said assumes that “the Orient” is not found or explored by Orientalists, rather created. “Orientalism” constructs the “Orient” as a monolithic and unchanging other to “the West” and therefore creates the idea of “the West” as well. The third and arguably the most important (Hallaq 2018) aspect of “Orientalism” is that knowledge production and the creation of “the Orient” does not happen out of sheer inquisitiveness but based on a power dynamic between “Orient” and “Occident”. Orientalism emerges out of a positional superiority of “the West” against “the East” (colonialism) and is at the same time a mode of upholding this superiority. By ignoring or suppressing pre-colonial history, the orientalists; as self-proclaimed experts, became the sole representatives of the colonialized societies. The representation followed a line of repeated negative as well as racial and sexual fuelled stereotypes of backwardness and inferiority.

Orientalism depends for its strategy on this flexible positional superiority, which puts the “Westerner” in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand (Said 1978: p. 9; emphasis added).

¹ I will hereafter write “Orientalism” in quotation marks to make clear that it refers to a complex concept. When I am referring to Saids written book with the same title, I will write it in italics – Orientalism.
In the second part of his book, Said looks at the post Second World War academic field and concludes that “Orientalism” did not end with the abolishment of European Imperialism but is rather an ongoing tradition and a knowledge formation that pre-structures modern scholarly work about “the Orient”. He identifies the contemporary field of area studies, which has now shifted its centre to US-universities, as the direct successor of 19th-century “Orientalism”. This shift went alongside the other shift in positional superiority since the US became the dominating power in “the Orient” and replaced European powers in that role (Said 1978: p. 285). “In any event, the new Orientalists took over the attitudes of cultural hostility and kept them” (Said 1978: p. 290).

Said analysed a great number of disparate European and US texts about “the Orient” to reveal the author's relative entanglement with orientalist ideas and explaining how “Orientalism” is transmitted into scholarly work and by that matter reproduced. Therefore, Orientalism is a study about the relationship between knowledge and politics and how it relates to the scholarly field of the humanities. It tries to explain the hegemony that “the West” willed over “the East” but also the hegemonical power that “Orientalism” developed in western academia.

In the now 40 years of its reception, almost every aspect of Said's Orientalism became the object of harsh criticism: His account of “Orientalism” as a mode of knowledge production is considered too broad as well as too arbitrary. He is accused of selecting texts and authors in a self-fulfilling way by picking the ones that suit his assumptions and ignoring the ones that do not. Therefore, “Orientalism” is considered a misrepresentation of the scholarly field of oriental studies, which in the eyes of its defenders is much more nuanced and comprised of different approaches. Much as “Orientalism” is supposed to have imagined “the Orient”, Said is blamed for imagining a euro-US “Orientalism” that in this form never existed (Varisco 2007: p. 22).

Said is also criticized for not discussing the rich efforts by exponents of the colonialized societies to establish counter-discourses of self-representation. The passivity with which “the Orient” had to accept the “Orientalism” of “the Occident” is seen as Said’s invention by omission. Presumably, this is also the reason why Arab intellectuals accepted Orientalism only reluctantly (Macfie 2002: p. 127-129). There is no mentioning of cooperation, approval, opposition, or resistance from “the East” in Orientalism (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2015: p. 113).
Critics also took issue with Said's understanding of “Orientalism” as a phenomenon spanning the late 18th century up until the 1970s and beyond. This is considered to be a rather ahistorical account of western knowledge production. By ignoring the changes in the colonized as well as the colonial societies over the last century and a half, the concept of “Orientalism” is diluted. The Cold War led to a completely new dichotomy between “East and West” under different political paradigms (Varisco 2007: p. 84).

In hindsight, Said's account of “Orientalism” is flawed and gave rise to the use of “Orientalism” as an at times ideological political slogan (Hallaq 2018). However, the lasting impact of his attack on Western scholarship cannot be ignored. His sweeping criticism of a whole academic field became extremely popular and is widely accepted as the starting point of post-colonial criticism (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2015: p. 94). Said was able to show that the exploitation by colonial powers was not solely based on economic and military strength but had a discursive level. The possible heritage of knowledge in the service of colonialism forced scholars in general to rethink their relationship with institutions and power as well as the political implications of their academic work. Orientalism inspired an array of scholarly work trying to identify and purge whole fields of study from (post)colonial stereotypes. Even harsh critics of Said state that his was a necessary criticism and justified:

It is necessary to stress that in many ways Said hardly scratched the surface of the vast sewerage of racist and ethnocentric writing, art, and cinema that for so long has severed an imaginary East from the dominating West (Varisco 2007: p. 18).

Post-colonial criticism has had a ground-breaking as well as problematic influence on the humanities. Additionally, both followers and critics still refer to Orientalism, which has become a seminal text for the field. Therefore, it is relevant to ask whether Chinese studies should be included in Said’s “Orientalism”.

Said himself did not discuss orientalist engagement with China. He justifies this omission with the historical term of “the Orient” that stood for the experience of the French and British world with Islam and the Arabs. For Said, “the Orient” stretches from what is now called the Middle East and the Levante to India (Said 1978: p. 4). Involvement with China influenced European culture significantly. However, in his view, it is justified that this phenomenon can be discussed separately from “the oriental experience”. For the US, however, China and “the Far East” was always a much
more integral part of “the Orient”. His explanation for not discussing China in the second part of *Orientalism* is that after the Second World War, only Arabic and Islamic studies refused to challenge the dogmas of Orientalism in their field, while Asian studies were revolutionized by the *Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars* (CASS) during the 1960s (Said 1978: p. 301). This assertion is questionable: the CASS was a group of mostly graduate students and young scholars who came together to oppose the Vietnam War and to criticize the instrumentalization of their scholarly work for political purposes. Even though some members later became well known Asian Scholars, CASS did not represent the academic mainstream of the field. Moreover, they were not aiming for a thorough reconceptualization of Chinese studies in general.  

Said’s exception of China (and Japan) from “the Orient” is another example of his arbitrariness and as a hindsight justification for keeping the scope of his undertaking manageable. Strictly following his outline of the concept of “Orientalism”, it is hard to argue why China, or the European-US experience of China should not be part of it. Historically, China was more often than not included in the concept of “the Orient” or, as a geographical counterpart to Europe, mostly subsumed under the term “Asia” (Macfie 2002: p. 14). China was as much “the other” to the European west as was the Middle East.

Even though Said explicitly excluded modern Chinese Studies from his criticism, the well-known US-China scholar Benjamin Schwartz delivered an early defence in 1980 against “Said’s attack on area studies” (Schwartz 1980: p. 100). He agrees with Said that the concept of “the Orient” is a shapeless and oversimplified term. However, he believes that the pitfalls of Orientalism do not apply to modern area studies in general and the China field in particular because these disciplines do not rely on abstract ideas but concrete research that maps out specific local conditions.

Said’s omission and the defence of Schwartz and others may have curbed the influence of post-colonial criticism in the field of Chinese studies compared to other area studies. However, starting from the 90s, *Orientalism* inspired a range of works analysing European and US- knowledge production about China. Most of them explicitly cite Said or refer to the concept of “Orientalism. Qian (1995) researches how a certain vision of China influenced modern US poetry from the 1910s and 1920s. Karen Leong (2005) explores the gendering of Orientalism in the 1930s and 1940s. Adrian Chan (2009) retraces ”Orientalism” back to questions of cosmology between European

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Among others, Daniel Vukovich’s *China and Orientalism* (2012) stands out. In it, he directly channels Said to criticize western knowledge production about the People’s Republic of China as driven and fuelled by political interests and biases. However, he does not blame the history of colonialism for the biases but the background of the Cold War. What western depictions of China willingly are pushing aside is not the precolonial history of China but the history of the Chinese Revolution since 1949. In Vukovich’s view, contemporary Chinese studies are formed by the paradigm of the modernization theory. Therefore, it is actively negating positive aspects of modern Chinese revolutionary history to depict China as a transitional state in need of western neoliberal reforms. Vukovich subsequently undertakes a Said-style deconstruction of Cold-War-shaped narratives about modern China.

These exemplary studies do substantiate the assumption that the popular and academic perception of China and that images of China are not free of colonial projections and problematic stereotypes. However, most studies are historical in their outlook and do not deal with the fundamental question of how to engage the study of China beyond “Orientalism”. Said saw this as the main problem but shied away from answering it:

> Perhaps the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a non-repressive and non-manipulative, perspective. But then one would have to rethink the whole complex problem of knowledge and power. These are all tasks left embarrassingly incomplete in this study (Said 1978: p. 24).

How can area studies proceed and avoid the pitfalls of “Orientalism”? For current China studies, this problem is posed in a very distinguished way. That is because the relationship between “the West” and China is not one of dominance anymore. In Said’s definition the prerequisite for “Orientalism” is the positional superiority of “the West” over “the East” and in case of China, this
superiority is crumbling or even has become non-existent. 1978, the publication year of Orientalism also marked the beginning of the rise of China to a world superpower.

The reform and opening process established the PRC as a major actor in global capitalism. It started in the early 80s with dismantling peoples’ communes, privatising urban land and intensified after the political crisis of 1989 through price liberalizations and renewed emphasis on the market economy. At the end of the 90s most former state-owned companies were privatized. The enormous rural labour force, coming as migrant workers in the cities, were a massive asset for China’s industry and greatly fostered the export-oriented economy (Wang 2016: p. 185-186). Since 2010 China has been the largest exporter of goods (Li 2016: p. 21). In 2005 China overtook the US as the largest contributor to global economic growth, was already the largest energy consumer, and the largest producer of renewable energy (Li 2016: p. 4). Since 2016, China imports more goods from European countries than it exports to them and has become the leading contributor of foreign direct investments in Europe (Li and Cheong 2019: p. 151-153). In the Pacific-Region, the US is no longer the primary military force, having receded this position to China (Lendon 2019). In remissions of fears in the 1950s that the US could lose competition with Soviet Russia, US-media spoke of a “new Sputnik-Moment” (Gardner 2017). The Belt and Road Initiative will expand Chinas worldwide economic, political, and military influence even further (South China Morning Post 2018). However, the shift in positional power between China and “the West” is not only limited to economic and military power but also comprises something called epistemological power – the field of knowledge.

2. The study on foreign Chinese studies

Said (1978) states that “Orientalism” had “no corresponding equivalent in the Orient” (p. 205). There was no academic self-representation by the colonialized culture and no analysis of “the Western other” from the viewpoint of the colony. Only this unequal access to the dominant discourse enabled western orientalists to act as the sole representatives of the oriental culture. Said’s study was viewed as revolutionary among other things because it broke this scientific monopoly that “the West” wielded over “the Orient” and reversed the perspective to scrutinize western academia through the eyes of a post-colonial intellectual (see Varisco 2007: p. 35). The question is whether Chinese studies had a corresponding equivalent in China.

Chinese studies as a subcategory of area studies is to be understood as a specialised interdisciplinary field of research, rather than a scientific discipline (Holbig 2015). Scholars usually have an academic
education in one discipline such as literature studies, history, or sociology but only engage in their research with phenomena of a specific “area”. This definition of “area” does not necessarily have to be a geographical area. Therefore, it provides the possibility of transnational studies. However, it is still the unspoken condition of area studies as an academic field that the scholar themselves is not part of that area. Said (1978) calls this “exteriority” (p. 21). Chinese intellectuals, who were since the 1920s aware of the existence of western Chinese studies, (Mu 2014) described it by the term 汉学 or 中国学, as opposed to the study of China by the Chinese themselves which is called 国学. Here is an example of a definition of Chinese studies from a Chinese perspective:

Sinology [汉学 汉学] are foreigners, mainly Europeans and US-Americans who are studying Chinese culture and introduce it to the people in their country. It comprises of travel and missionary reports as well as the academic sinology and the modern Chinese studies [中国学 中国学]. Sinology is, therefore, over 600 years old. […] Right now, it is prevalent, but it should not be confused with national studies [国学 国学] (Mu 2014, own translation).³

The 1980s saw a peak in engaging with western knowledge in general. And in Chinese academia, it was established what could be translated as “the study of foreign Chinese studies” 海外汉学研究 (Zhang 2018) or 国外中国学研究 (Liang & Du 2019) who describe it as “the re-study of foreign academic research”.⁴ The interest in foreign Chinese studies was so extensive that it was called 汉学热 [Chinese studies fever] (Mu 2014).

An essential part of the Chinese study of foreign Chinese studies are translations of western Chinese studies, but also original research is being undertaken. In 2018 the Jiangsu People's Publishing House celebrated the 30th anniversary of 海外中国学研究丛书 [The Series on Foreign Chinese Studies]. The series comprises of over 180 volumes with translations of numerous Chinese studies scholars, including Benjamin Schwartz (see Ma 2018). 中国学者

³ Original Chinese quote: 汉学(Sinology)是外国尤其是欧美国家学者研究和介绍中华文化的学问，历经近百年化汉学、传教士汉学、学院派汉学以及侧重研究中国现实问题的“中国学”(China Studies)等几大阶段，至今已有6 00 年多年历史。……“汉学”当热，然不可将之混同为“国学”(Mu 2014)
⁴ Original Chinese quote: 国学界对国外有关中国近代、现代、当代哲学社会科学领域研究成果的再研究 … (Liang & Du 2019)
*Lun Meiguo Zhongguoxue* [Chinese Scholars on U.S.-American Chinese Studies] (Zhu 2008), is an anthology with articles reflecting on Chinese studies as a scientific methodology. By now, there are three journals dedicated to foreign Chinese studies: *Shijie Hanxue* 世界汉学 [Chinese Studies Worldwide], *Guoji Hanxue* 国际汉学 [International Chinese Studies] and *Faguo Hanxue* 法国汉学 [French Chinese Studies].

Moreover, *Shijie Hanxue dahui* 世界汉学大会 [the *World Conference on Sinology*] was founded in 2007 and now hosted at the Renmin University in Beijing on a binary basis.⁵

Before 1949, western and Japanese Chinese studies were sometimes seen as a threat to the national sovereignty of China. For example, the Chinese historian Chen Yuan 陈垣:

> When I read a Japanese article about Chinese history, I feel like someone dropped a bomb in my desk, and I feel obliged to surpass them on the scientific field.⁶ (Chen Yuan in Zhong 2010, para. 9, own translation)

However, after the Chinese studies fever, the appraisal became more nuanced: Chinese studies are seen as a mode of exchange between China and the West and as a vehicle for Chinese development. The existence of foreign Chinese studies is seen as proof of the cultural importance of China and an instrument of further strengthening this importance (Zhang 2005). “The research and commentary of overseas sinologists help us to examine our own culture from a new external standpoint” (Zheng 2006, own translation, p. 96).⁷

However, some voices do not want to entrust the exploration of their own culture to the foreign Chinese Studies alone. Mu Dousheng, warns against a hanxuehua 汉学化 [sinologisation] of their national studies. Chinese people should still research their own culture but without the sheer objective approach of science. National studies should serve the national cause and be conducted with a patriotic impetus:

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⁵ See the historical subpage of the official website of the conference: [http://hantui.ruc.edu.cn/sinologies/Eng/Index/index.html](http://hantui.ruc.edu.cn/sinologies/Eng/Index/index.html) (World Conference on Sinology).

⁶ Original Chinese Source: 每当我接到日本寄来的研究中国历史的论文时，我就感到像一颗炸弹扔到我的书桌上，激励着我一定要在历史研究上赶过他们 (Chen Yuan in Zhong 2010, para. 9)

The value of sinology is not endless. It is essentially a kind of ‘western learning’. It is westerners using western values and academic paradigms to study Chinese culture. To them, Chinese culture is just their object of research. It does not relate to their own life, and they have no emotions invested. [...] However, Chinese people cannot be the spectators of Chinese culture. [...] It is the spiritual lifeblood of people and nation (Mu 2014, para. 5, own translation).8

This is just a glimpse of a vast body of scholarly and translational work conducted under the scope of the Chinese study of foreign Chinese studies: “by now concerning every research topic in almost every discipline in Chinese academia; there are translations of corresponding research by foreign Chinese scholars” (Zhang 2005, para. 6, own translation).9 This phenomenon is worth much further exploration than the topic of this paper allows. In any case, it challenges the assumption that Said’s prerequisite for “Orientalism” does actually exist in China as Chinese intellectuals established a counterpart to western studies of China.

3. Chinese influence on Chinese studies

One could even go one step further; the active engagement by China with foreign Chinese studies is not confined to a passive perception but rather a deepening degree of influence and even interference in the field of Chinese studies. There are many examples of how the PRC is trying to influence western academic learning. While China is in some instances banning western textbooks in their universities (Chen & Zhuang 2015), most western students of the Chinese language are using textbooks developed and published in the PRC, a primary factor in promoting the use of the simplified characters and the Hanyu Pinyin transcription system. Since 2005 the PRC has established over 1,500 Confucius Institutes (CI) worldwide. The CIs are partly funded by the Office of Chinese Language Council International or Hanban 汉办 and adhere to Chinese law. They are part of the Chinese propaganda set-up. If the western partner school or university is financially dependent on the CIs for parts of their curriculum, it might be difficult for the institution to allow research and teachings critical of China (see Peterson

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8 Original Chinese source: 然而，汉学虽有重要价值，但亦不可无限拔高。汉字在本质上是一种“西学”，是西方人用西方价值观念、学术范式来研究中华文化的学问。对汉学家而言，中华文化仅仅是学术研究的客观对象，很难内在于自己的生命。…而中国人注定做不了中华文化的旁观者。因为，…是我们整个国家和民族的精神命脉。 (Mu 2014, para. 5)

9 Original Chinese source: 现在几乎在中国学术的任何一个学科的主要研究方向，都可以找到相关的海外汉学的译作 (Zhang 2005, para. 6).
2017, p. 72). In 2017 the National Association of Scholars conducted a prominent study on CIs and recommended that all US universities close their CIs (Peterson 2017, p. 148).

An incident in 2017 concerning the Cambridge University Press shocked the whole discipline. The publishing house for the reputable journal China Quarterly willingly and upon request by Chinese authorities erased a batch of over 300 articles from their Chinese website. The articles were seemingly chosen by keywords such as “Tiananmen“ and “Xinjiang“. One of the most important journals in western Chinese studies became thereby an agent of Chinese propaganda (see Balding 2017).

Greitens & Truex (2018) were able to show that direct repression of foreign scholars by Chinese authorities is happening. Forms of repression include complication or hampering access to research facilities like universities, archives, and libraries, pressuring Chinese contact persons and even denial of visas. However, the scale of these direct repressions where perceived to be much bigger than the actual accounts of repression. This disparity caused 68 percent of questioned Chinese scholars to identify self-censorship as a concern for the field, worrying that scholars might change the direction of their research or publication in fear of repressions.

Those are substantial acts of interference in western academia by China; however, there are also more subtle connections between Chinese studies and Chinese politics. The president of the Renmin-University Ji Baocheng said this in the opening speech of the First Conference of World Sinology:

A harmonious world needs to draw from every beneficial cultural resource available. The multitude of similar elements in different cultures has provided the basis for today’s dialogue. [...] The reason why a harmonious world can exist is because of the differences. [...] The term ‘Sinology’ has itself the notion of difference as its premise, which inspires the consensus and the dialogue between the cultures. [...] A harmonious world must be a world of dialogue. However, the premise of the dialogue has to be ‘let the other be himself’ and do not force him to become the object of your description (Ji 2007, para. 8, own translation). 10

10 Original Chinese Source:“一个和谐的世界，需要汲取一切有益的文化资源。而不同文化所包含的诸多相似元素，早已为今天的对话提供了基础。… 一个和谐的世界，可以表征于同噜、同听、同美；而一个和谐的世界之所以然，却又恰恰是存在差异和不同。… “汉学”之为谓，本身就是以差异为前提。本身就启发着文化间的共识和对话。… 一个和谐的世界，还必须是一个对话畅通的世界。但是对话的前提是‘让他成为他者’，而不是强使他者作为我们所描述的对象 (Ji 2007, para. 8).
Harmonious World (和諧世界 hexie shijie) was at the time the guiding principle for Hu Jintao's foreign policy. A stable and peaceful world order with the US as hegemonic power was in the best interest of China to ensure the ongoing development of the domestic economy. The newfound economic power was to be used to further China’s influence in the world but not to the degree that trading partners would be upset. In concrete foreign policy, China often tried to maintain diplomatic and economic relations with all sides (see Zheng & Tok 2007).

Ji Baocheng puts foreign Chinese studies in relation to the concept of a harmonious world. Scholars of Chinese studies through their research are to further the dialogue between different cultures. By exploring cultural difference, they are to promote understanding of these differences and delivering justifications for them. Ji is trying to instrumentalize foreign Chinese studies as a vehicle for justifying Chinese particularities and China’s special path. The Chinese path in modern history frequently meant deviating from values like democracy and political rights. In the context of the harmonious world, these differences are not to be judged but accepted. The job of the Chinese scholar is to explain and locate them historically.

The demand to not violate other cultures by objectifying them with one’s description is one of the main points of Said’s orientalist criticism; Ji’s speech shows how easily it can be turned around.

4. Conclusion

Whether or not one agrees with all aspects of Said’s account of “Orientalism”; in light of it, scholars in the field of area studies should be inclined to reflect deeper about the political implications of their research. The arguments for including current Chinese studies in these reflections are more convincing than to exclude it altogether. However, it is credible that the “China” that is currently being researched is very different from the passive object of the colonial gaze that Said calls “the Orient”. China is on par with developed countries of the so-called “western world”, and its intellectual community is very much aware of what to them is “foreign Chinese studies”.

Under these circumstances, China watchers and people engaged in Chinese Studies have to answer for themselves under which premises they will carry out their knowledge production. Does the question of “Orientalism” disappear now that China is on a par with the West? Or are orientalist stereotypes still being efficacious and inherited? Is Said’s “Orientalism” still the right mode to analyse knowledge production about China or do we need a completely different methodology?
Seeing as the so-called rise of China was mainly a capitalist project, carried out by a rather small neoliberal elite with questionable results for most parts of the Chinese workforce, I would suggest a set of paradigms that incorporates the conflicts between capital and labour interests. The concept of uneven knowledge production seems to be more relevant than ever. However, it is hardly convincing to define frontiers in the globalized world along the lines of nations and cultural areas. When discussing how the Chinese government represses western scholars, it also has to be mentioned that it represses its own intellectual community much more severely.

Reframing Said’s account of “East and West” with concepts of class was approached in the past (e.g., see O’Hanlon & Washbrook 1992) as well as recently (e.g., see Wemheuer 2016). So far, the response has not been as extensive as Said’s original account. However, the historical constellation of the rise of China as a capitalist superpower may be the right time to revisit this approach.

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