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Mapping China is a young professional network and NGO dedicated to the political science-based analysis of contemporary China. Mapping China was founded in 2016 as an academic network connecting Masters and Doctoral students as well as young professionals working on China with a social science approach to foster exchange and knowledge among the new generation of China analysts and observers. Although founded, based and registered as a non-profit (a so-called e.V.) in Germany, Mapping China now connects students and young professionals from all over the world. Mapping China offers students and young professionals a publication platform for their own academic work on China in order to engage in an academic discussion within a wider audience early in their academic career.

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This peer-reviewed Journal is explicitly aimed at publishing work written by early-career researchers with an interdisciplinary background in Area Studies, Political and Social Science and/or in International Relations who have been working on or want to work on China and who are looking to publish their first research results for a wider audience.
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NOTE OF THE EDITORS

By Straton Papagianneas and Julia Tatrai

Mapping China was founded in 2016 as an academic network connecting Masters and Doctoral-level students as well as young professionals working on China with a social science approach to foster knowledge exchange among a new generation of China analysts and observers. Although founded, based and registered as a non-profit (a so-called e.V.) in Germany, Mapping China now connects students and young professionals from all over the world.

In December 2017 the inaugural issue of Mapping China Journal (MCJ) was published focusing on integration processes and challenges linked to Chinese engagement in three regions of the world: Asia-Pacific, Africa, and the EU. The numerous submissions to this project and subsequent exchanges reflect the willingness of a new generation of young China scholars to participate in the dynamic discourse on contemporary China. The second edition of Mapping China Journal (2018) offered a fresh take on the developments and challenges under the current leadership of the People’s Republic of China.

This year’s MCJ does not have any specific focus to include an even wider range of topics and writers. Topics covered in the 2019 edition cover different roles of the party-state in China such as state-owned enterprises, political translation and the cadre management system. Other contributions take a closer look at security, orientalism and ontological security.

Holly Snape studies the paradigm shift that has taken place in the civil service and cadre management systems since 2012. She argues that politicisation is being institutionalised to such an extent that it has shifted the balance between political and professional values. Being “red” has become of paramount importance in Xi Jinping’s New Era.

René Kluge discusses whether Edward Said’s Orientalism is applicable to the wide field of Chinese Studies. Distinguishing between Chinese studies in the West and Chinese studies in China, Kluge argues that the later increasingly influence the former and that this paradigm shift needs to be further analysed given the increasing importance of China’s role in academic communities.
Staying in the realm of politics and ideology, Chen Zhang studies three phases of political translation in the PRC. She uses Critical Discourse Analysis to examine the English translations of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin. She finds that, despite relaxation of the political climate after Mao, politics and ideology kept dominating translation practices.

In his paper on shifting mutual perceptions between China and India, Lukas Nagel interviewed exchange students from both countries. The often negative media coverage in both countries is contradicted by the usually positive discourse by Chinese and Indian elites. To gain a deeper insight into ontological security and identity formation, Nagel’s fieldwork sheds light on discourse and historical issues between China and India.

Jackson Neagli recounts the upheaval of economic reform in the 1990s, when after Deng’s 1992 southern tour major reforms took place among China’s State Owned Enterprises. He applies Margaret Pearson’s state and society framework to the economic history of this period to examine how the relationship between the Chinese state and its SOEs changed. He argues that despite economic deliberations and pluralistic tendencies, state-society relations in the 1990s remained primarily clientelist.

Last, Xiaoxue Jiang Martin looks at China’s increasing A2/AD abilities in the Asia-Pacific. Drawing on a wide range of sources, she argues that this development has negative impacts on the security situation in the region and is resulting in a closer cooperation between American allies before addressing possible US counter strategies.

As usual, the MCJ 2019 is the product of the cumulative effort of our Editorial Advisors, the Editorial Team, the Proof-Readers, the Editors and the Authors. All of them volunteered their time and without their support this third edition of the MCJ would not have been possible. We are grateful for all the dedicated people investing time and effort into increasing the visibility of young scholars in the discourse on China and hope they like the final product as much as we do!
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This paper argues that the amended Civil Servants Law, which went into force in 2019, is part of a fundamental shift in the way Chinese civil servants are managed and incentivised. It finds that similar trends are also evident in the Communist Party of China’s regulations for managing leading cadres. Changes, such as those to prioritize “political quality,” will likely have important long-term implications for China’s civil service, from the way its members are recruited to the way they implement policy, creating possible tensions between political and professional considerations in determining their behaviour. The implications of this shift do not stop here. Underlying this shift is a clear change in the relationship between the Party and the government, for example, with the former’s Organization Department absorbing the State Bureau for Civil Servants and the Party playing a more direct role in managing the people who make up the government. In other words, the changes in the personnel system are suggestive of an approach to governing China that is different to that of any other time since the introduction of “Reform and Opening.” The paper draws on documentary research, tracing changes in the personnel management systems over the last two decades. It examines formal and informal systems and institutions, covering Party organs and regulations as well as government organs and state law, and political discourse and drives to perceive systemic changes in the way Party and government workers are governed.
A Shifting Balance between Political and Professional Responsibility: Paradigmatic Change in China’s Civil Servant and Cadres Management Systems

By
Holly Snape, Ph.D

1. Introduction
In December 2018, the amended Civil Servants Law (CSL) institutionalized the use of a person’s “political quality” (zhengzhi suzhi 政治素质) as one of the two basic measures of suitability for recruitment into the Chinese civil service. In the Regulations on Selecting and Appointing Leading Party and Government Cadres, similarly fundamental changes were made in 2014 and 2019 emphasizing such cadres’ “politics” and “virtue.” Civil servants and other types of cadres make decisions and implement policy for China’s Communist Party (CPC) and government. Adjustments to the systems for appointing, evaluating and managing these people are therefore an important form of political change. Examined over time, these systems can reveal much about the direction of political developments and flag up possible future implications for decision making and policy implementation. This paper argues that following the 18th National Party Congress in 2012, a reverse paradigm shift has been underway in the Chinese civil service and cadre management systems. Politicization is being institutionalized to such an extent as to fundamentally change the balance between political and professional values and to reconfigure the Party-government relationship. Similar changes are also observable in other elements of the CPC’s personnel management system.

Much valuable research has been done on the cadre responsibility system (Edin 2003) the nomenklatura system (Burns 2006) and civil service reform (Jing & Zhu 2012; Burns & Wang 2010). This paper seeks to add to that work in three ways: First, by tracing shifts in recent years, it

1 The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and incisive comments and suggestions, and colleagues at the School of Government, Peking University, for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
2 Civil servants and cadres can be one and the same thing, but not all cadres are civil servants.
demonstrates how some of the findings of that research are no longer true. For example, as Burns and Wang (2010) point out, before reform in the early 1990s, ‘individual performance was formally assessed using politically oriented criteria, not work achievements’ but ‘reforms sought to refocus the evaluations on work performance’ (p. 72). Today, as this paper will show, this refocus is being reversed.

Second, instead of focusing on one system—the state’s system of legislation on civil servants or the Party’s regulations on personnel management—the paper attempts to cover a broader range of formal and informal systems and institutions: government organs and state law, Party organs and Party regulations, and political discourse and drives. In this way it seeks to perceive systemic changes in the way Party and government workers are governed.

Third, it is underpinned by a conceptualization of the regime as comprised of government and Party rather than collapsing the two under the concept of the “party-state” (Zheng 1997) and thereby highlights changes in the relationship between the two that are of deep importance to personnel management. It finds a growing trend for using and institutionalizing nebulous political indicators in such systems. It suggests this may risk creating a tension between, on the one hand, the need to develop a highly professional, able, and efficient body of civil servants and cadres, and, on the other, the invocation of “politics” and “virtue” to evaluate and manage these people.

The paper traces the changes in these systems over the last two decades. It begins, in the next section, by introducing the concept of “political responsibility” and proposing its potential tension with professional responsibility. In section three it examines changes in specific systems. It looks first at shifts in the Party and state organs as well as other arrangements for civil service management and then at the signs that foreshadowed these changes. The latter includes CPC drives and discourse used to galvanize and govern civil servants and cadres, and their percolation into government documents. Second, it examines the CSL, which first went into force in 2006 but was subject to major amendments in 2018. Third, it examines the Regulations on Selecting and Appointing Leading Party and Government Cadres, introduced in 1995, first amended in 2002, and amended twice under Xi Jinping in 2014 and 2019. The paper concludes with a discussion of these findings and of the possible implications of the increasing reach of “politics” in governing the country’s governors.
2. Political Responsibility

In an online database of CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping’s speeches, the term “political responsibility” (zhengzhi zeren 政治责任) appears over 180 times. As a simple frame of reference, in the entire works of Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, which cover his decade as General Secretary, the term appears only a handful of times. The same is true for Jiang Zemin 江泽民, whose three volumes contain only four uses of the term.

2.1. Who, for What, and to Whom?

Responsibility can only be understood when we know three things: who is responsible, for what, and to whom? The discussion here of “political responsibility”, as it is used by Party leaders and in regulations, suggests the common difficulty of clearly establishing the latter two of these basic questions. This section proposes that two recent developments related to the term are notable. First, it is being used increasingly within the political system from the top down. Second, its meaning is relatively ambiguous, but is increasingly attached as a tag to specific “professional” (yewu 业务) tasks, for example public service provision. This makes the changes to personnel management systems discussed below all the more likely to pose difficulties for civil servants and other cadres in balancing the need to demonstrate “political quality” with the need to fulfil specific professional tasks that are tagged with the “political responsibility” label.

Before the 18th National Party Congress in 2012 “political responsibility” was used mainly in reference to “a sense of political responsibility.” For example, in 2004, Hu Jintao exhorted the delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC) to have a stronger ‘sense of political responsibility in representing the people when exercising the power to manage the state’ (Hu 2016). In the Party Charter, which was rewritten in 1982, a “sense of political responsibility” was institutionalized as a basic requirement of leading cadres. Such cadres must have:

‘a powerful dedication to the cause of revolution and sense of political responsibility, along with the organizational ability, level of education, and knowledge needed to competently perform leadership work.’ (Party Charter 1982).

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This is based on a search in May 2019. See http://jhsjk.people.cn. Related terms are also used often, such as “political task” (zhengzhi renwu 政治任务), which in May 2019 got over 100 hits.
Aside from the important addition of “practical experience” to the list in 1992, these requirements have remained the same in each version. However, a sense of responsibility differs from an actual responsibility. Under past administrations, the term was occasionally used to refer to the actual, if vague, “responsibility” of Party members in relation to Party building.4 With very few exceptions, when used to refer to more than a sense of responsibility, it was reserved for use in such a context.5

In contrast, the notion of “political responsibility” as more than just a “sense of” has been proliferating rapidly since the 18th National Party Congress. Since then, not only has the term been used much more often, it has been used in respect to myriad issues. Below are three examples:

(1) In 2016, Xi Jinping (2016) stated that:

‘institutes of higher education are at the frontier of ideological work. The Party secretaries and administrators in charge of universities, and faculties (or departments) must assume political responsibility and leadership responsibility, and diligently implement the ideological work responsibility system.’

(2) In 2018, on environmental conservation, he exhorted:

‘all localities and departments must strengthen their Four Consciousnesses,6 resolutely protect the Party Central Committee’s authority and collective leadership, and resolutely assume the political responsibility of building an eco-civilization.’ (Xi 2018a).

(3) In a speech at the New Year Tea Party with the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Xi (2018b) told his audience that the CPPCC must:

‘assume the political responsibility of acting on the Central Committee’s demands regarding its work and of pooling the wisdom and energies of the sons and daughters of China, at home and overseas, for realizing the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’

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4 In the resolution issued at the 17th Central Committee’s fourth plenary session in 2009, Hu Jintao announced that “improving Party building under new circumstances is a major political responsibility (zhongda zhengzhi zeren 重大政治责任) of the whole Party.”

5 Jiang Zemin used the term to exhort Party committees and governments to attend to the ‘reemployment of laid-off workers’ referring to this as ‘a major political responsibility.’ However, it is used in this way only once in all three thick volumes of the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin.

6 The Four Consciousnesses are discussed in greater detail in section three. They are often translated as ‘consciousness of the need to maintain political integrity, think in terms of the big picture, follow the leadership core, and keep in alignment with the central Party leadership.’
In each of these examples, “political responsibility” is something that can be “borne” or “assumed” (danfu 担负). It is not just a “sense.” In example (1) to what, exactly, “political” refers, is unclear. It suggests “responsibility for political matters,” and the target audience—those to assume responsibility—must infer the meaning of this from rules, conventions, or signs in the political system. In examples (2) and (3) it is simply added to a responsibility for doing something else. It is attached like an adjective, and “political” seems to essentially mean “important.”

In a political language system where policies and measures frequently come with extraneous modifiers like “great,” “important,” and “major,” “political” can communicate genuine importance. It also carries the implied meaning that—since the responsibility in question is regarded to be one of “political” significance, perceived failure in such a task might be regarded as a “political” failure and perhaps be punished differently to another kind of policy failure. Indeed, ambiguity over “to whom” a person (or organization) is responsible for a task can have the effect of heightening the sense that they are ultimately accountable to the CPC rather than, say, to their department or to local citizens. This is particularly important when it comes to the government-Party relationship.

In addition, when measures of success or failure are, to a great extent, left to the discretion of some higher-up arbitrator—the relevant CPC committee, for example—the knowledge that a task is “political” potentially comes with trepidation about getting it “wrong.” This may result in a special, more palpable and intimidating sense of authority being wielded over the audience.

The concept “political suffusion” (fan zhengzhi hua 泛政治化) is useful to understanding the causes and effects of tasks and responsibilities being “suffused” with politics (Yang 2009). Political suffusion essentially refers to tasks being designated or described to lower levels of government as “political” by a higher level of government or by any level of the Party. Yang Xuedong (2009) argues that suffusion is generally intended to get certain tasks done and is facilitated by the concentration of the power to allocate resources in the hands of the higher authorities and the Party head of a government department. Yet its potential consequences include a reliance on top-down pressure to ensure policy implementation as well as cosmetic “political credit-seeking projects” (zhengji gongcheng 政绩工程) and a weakening of alternative types of incentive mechanisms and enforcement systems for ensuring the professionalism and efficacy of civil servants (or cadres’) work, such as law and ethical codes (Yang 2009). This would be of less consequence if “political responsibility” were only used in the speeches of leaders as an exhortation to action but, combined
with the institutional developments examined in section three, this expanding invocation of the “political” is accompanied by a more fundamental problem.

2.2. Political and Professional Responsibility—Hand in Hand or Antithetical?
Summarized by Jing and Zhu (2012) there has long been a debate on neutrality and the technical rationality of a civil service versus a politicized or value-laden approach. Yet, as section three will show, the changes instituted since the beginning of Xi Jinping’s first term as general secretary do not constitute a simple shift to requiring that civil servants hold certain political values and follow those values in their work. Instead, the system taking shape requires that they actively and clearly intimate, perform, or otherwise express those values in their everyday work. In other words, civil servants must not only be believers in socialism with Chinese characteristics and be loyal to the CPC but must also also be *demonstrably*, even *measurably*, so.

At the same time, they must also fulfil specific tasks and responsibilities that carry a “political responsibility” tag. While civil services under all kinds of political system may involve a constant balancing act between the political and professional, the institutionalization of political indicators to govern the behaviour of civil servants may skew this balance to such an extent that it creates deep implications for the outcomes of their work.

This may particularly be the case in the Chinese context where sufficient rule of law is lacking and the “political” is frequently invoked through top-down drives. It may cripple policies or warp policy outcomes as civil servants and other cadres struggle to find a balance between demonstrating their loyal-to-the-Central-Committee-core “political quality” and using the necessary means to succeed in fulfilling a sector-specific, “professional” task tagged as a “political responsibility.”

3. Structural Change and Institutionalization
This section examines changes in the systems for managing civil servants and leading cadres. It explains how these systems are placing greater emphasis than at any time since the early 1990s on political and virtue-related indicators.
3.1. Structural Change, Drives, and Discourse

Two main trends are perceptible in the overall structures and systems that affect civil servant and cadre management. The first is a closer blending of Party and government; the second is a strong focus on reshaping people’s behaviour and institutionalizing these changes.

In March 2018, the CPC Central Committee released a ‘Plan on Deepening Party and State Institution Reform.’ This plan broke with the custom of a long line of institutional reform plans introduced by the State Council solely for government organs. It announced that there would no longer be a stand-alone government body in charge of civil servants. The existing State Bureau of Civil Servants was to be swallowed up by the CPC’s Central Organization Department, and the latter would ‘take over all work related to the management of civil servants’ (CPC Central Committee 2018). This move potentially unravels the reforms of the early 1990s which followed Zhao Ziyang’s proposal, in his report to the 13th National Party Congress in 1987, of creating a clear distinction between political and career civil servants. Although that distinction was never technically made, research has shown that to a certain extent the thinking behind that proposal was put into practice (see Edin 2003; Jing & Zhu 2012). In his report Zhao spoke of “Party-government separation” (Dangzheng fenkai 党政分开). The changes taking place today are quite the opposite.

The Plan states that the aim of putting all civil servants under the control of the Organization Department by allowing the latter to devour the State Bureau of Civil Servants is:

‘to better implement the principle that the Party manages cadres, strengthen the Party’s concentrated, unified leadership of the ranks of civil servants, and better coordinate cadre management, to build and refine a unified, standardized and highly efficient civil servant management system’ (CPC Central Committee 2018).

It adds that the Organization Department will retain the name of the State Bureau of Civil Servants in its relations with others.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) This is important to note if we are to understand the relationship between Party and government which in turn, I argue, is crucial to understanding Chinese political processes.
This plan tells us what the main responsibilities of the Central Organization Department are to be in its management of civil servants. They include ‘the unified management of civil servant recruitment and allocations, assessment and rewards and punishments, training, wages, and welfare, etc.’ (CPC Central Committee 2018). Particularly notable is the Plan’s clear statement that the Organization Department will be responsible for drafting civil servant management policies and laws and regulations, as well as organizing their implementation, and ‘guiding the development of the ranks of civil servants nationwide and their performance-based management’ (CPC Central Committee 2018). This effectively brings every aspect of the management of civil servants directly, openly, and in an institutionalized way under the control of the Party’s Organization Department. This is fundamental to understanding the changing professional-political balance as the Organization Department is first and foremost concerned with the latter.

These changes were foreshadowed by shifts apparent in other central-level official documents. Beginning in around 2016, in the Premier’s annual Government Work Report (GWR) and other documents issued at the “Two Sessions” there was a gradual increase in references to the Party’s political drives for managing cadres. Prior to this, such content had been relatively uncommon in government documents for decades. In the 2016 GWR, Li Keqiang stated that:

‘[the government] will practice the Three Stricts and Three Honest (sanyan sanshi 三严三实), strengthen its political consciousness, big picture consciousness, core consciousness, and keeping-in-line consciousness (zhengzhi yishi, daju yishi, hexin yishi, kanqi yishi 政治意识、大局意识、核心意识、看齐意识), and strengthen its conduct and capacity-building to create a high-calibre, professionalized civil service’ (State Council 2016).

Similar content also appeared in the NPC report and the CPPCC report. This was in the run-up to the 18th Central Committee’s sixth plenary session later in 2016, at which Xi Jinping’s position as “core” was formally affirmed (State Council 2017).

This trend toward greater inclusion of political content on such drives within the system of institutionalized government documents has continued to grow. The 2017 GWR, in its opening few paragraphs, affirms that all regions and all government departments had been steadily

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8 This is commonly explained as the requirement that a person is ‘strict with themselves in practicing self-cultivation, using power, and exercising self-discipline; and honest in their thinking, work, and behaviour.’
strengthening the Four Consciousnesses (State Council 2017). Generally, the opening section of this carefully, consistently structured annual report gives a broad overview of the domestic and international context and of achievements and challenges.

The 2017 Report demonstrates a clear contrast with this conventional framework. By blending Party with government content, it suggests a greater intensity of such drives within the government system and, more importantly, blurs already unclear boundaries between Party and government with the former taking over authority formerly delegated to latter.9

Political drives have been gradually and systematically institutionalized over the two Xi administrations, first through the body of regulatory CPC documents and, more recently, through government regulatory documents and laws and regulations. The most important of these include the drive to strengthen the Four Consciousnesses; the drive to ensure observance of the Two Protects (liang ge weihu 两个维护) and the education campaign10 entitled ‘Don’t Forget the Original Purpose, Keep in Mind the Mission.’ Such drives give a vague shape to guide understanding of what is meant by terms like “political quality” and “political dependability,” discussed in the following two sub-sections.

3.2. Civil Servants Law

The amended CSL (hereinafter “CSL” refers to the amended 2018 version) was promulgated in December 2018 and went into force in June 2019. At the time of its promulgation, while much commentary within China focused on its creation of more opportunities within the civil service for promotions, a few scholars turned their attention to another important matter: its ‘fundamental point’ is to ‘strengthen the Party’s leading position and role vis-à-vis civil servants and its ability to supervise them’ (School of Rule of Law and Government 2019).

The CSL makes important adjustments to the very definition of a civil servant and to the purpose of legislating on them. To the old definition it adds that they are ‘an important component of the ranks of cadres, the central force of the socialist cause, and public servants of the people.’ The

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9 These trends are also evident in judicial system reports and are discussed in an insightful article by Susan Finder (2019).
10 This refers to the protection of the General Secretary’s core position, and the protection of the Central Committee’s authority and centralized, unified leadership.
11 In Party parlance this is not referred to as a “campaign” or an “activity” (huodong 活动) but simply as “themed education” (zhuti jiaoyu 主题教育).
purpose of the Law, aside from managing, protecting, and overseeing, is no longer expressed as to build ‘high-calibre ranks of civil servants, foster diligence and integrity, and raise work efficiency’ but instead as being to: ‘promote civil servants’ correct and complete performance of duties, and build a body of civil servants who have firm conviction [in socialism with Chinese characteristics], serve the people, are diligent and practical, are willing to take things on, and are clean and honest, that is high-calibre and professionalized.’

Three particularly important changes are notable here. First, ‘firm conviction [in socialism with Chinese characteristics]’ is institutionalized as a purpose of this basic law. Second, it introduces the notion of there being a ‘correct’ way for civil servants to fulfil their duties. Here, in Article 1, ‘correctly’ (zhengque lüzhi 正确履职) as opposed to some other adverb or, as in Article 2 ‘in accordance with law,’ is interesting. Third, it states the aim of building a professionalized civil service.

Article 7, which stresses a person’s “virtue,” can be interpreted as institutionalizing a fundamental change in determining who is chosen to become a civil servant and who thrives within the service. This new emphasis, according to the institutionalized definition of “virtue” reveals the introduction of a much stronger political character to the new rules.

The old version of the law reads ‘the appointment of civil servants shall follow the principle of merit and of both virtue and ability (de cai jianbei 德才兼备) and shall attach importance to concrete work achievements.’ This same article in the CSL now reads ‘the appointment of civil servants shall be based on virtue and ability, treating virtue as first priority (de cai jianbei, yi de wei xian 德才兼备、以德为先), on merit irrespective of origins, on dedication and righteousness, and shall foreground political criteria (tuchu zhengzhi biaozhun 突出政治标准), and attach importance to concrete work achievements.’ To recognize and understand the significance of these changes certain context is needed.

First, examining a cross-section of related rules and regulations highlights that the change is both new and repeated systematically across different formal documents. While the rules on appointment and management of cadres and civil servants have long required ‘both virtue and

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12 In translating quotes from the Civil Servants Law, I have prioritized consistency in wording and closeness to the original text, including in terms of order—which is often telling of importance—over the smoothness of the English.
ability,’ the addition of ‘treating virtue as first priority’ is new. The Party Charter has, since it was rewritten in 1982, been amended seven times. It has always included the principle that the Party selects and promotes cadres based on their having ‘both virtue and ability.’¹³ However, it was not until the 2012 amendments, made during the 18th National Party Congress that this emphasis on “virtue” was incorporated into the Party Charter by changing the principle to that of ‘their having both virtue and ability, treating virtue as first priority.’¹⁴ The Party Charter is the CPC’s most important institutional document, and as such this inclusion represents a kind of institutionalization of the principle. Its inclusion in the CSL demonstrates a major step to spread and deepen the practical implications of this institutionalization in the Party system to the civil service.

Second, we must understand de 德 or “virtue” in the context of the CPC-led political and ideological system. This is the first in a list of five qualities that are to be comprehensively assessed in appointing, promoting, influencing the pay, and other incentives of civil servants. The list has remained unchanged since the first Civil Servants Law was promulgated in 2005 and can also be found in other laws and regulations on Party and government personnel.

Before that first law was introduced, there were regulations on civil servant assessments. The 1994 version of those regulations—the Interim Regulations on State Civil Servant Assessments—stipulated that “virtue” (de 德) refers to displays of [a person’s] political, ideological (sixiang 思想), and moral character.¹⁵ The 1994 regulations were replaced in 2007 with the Provisional Regulations on Civil Service Assessments. The latter adjusted the definition to read, “virtue” refers to ideological and political quality as well as displays of personal integrity, professional ethics, and social virtue.’¹⁵

This principle of prioritizing “virtue” in the appointment of civil servants is reflected in the way they are to be assessed, which will not only influence who can become a civil servant in the first place, but will also affect the behaviour of civil servants nationwide in performing their duties and in making decisions on and implementing policies. The old Civil Servants Law stated that

¹³ The Party Charter, since it was essentially rewritten after the Reform and Opening began, has come to be amended at each National Party Congress. The seven times referred to here were in 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017.
¹⁴ This idea seems to have first appeared in 2009 in the 17th Central Committee’s fourth plenary session resolution on Party building, but the developments that followed under the 18th Central Committee cannot be assumed to follow in a linear progression.
¹⁵ De shi zhizixiang zhengchi zhi ge ren pingde, zhiye dan de, shen hui gengde de guan xian de biaoxian 德，是指思想政治素质及个人品德、职业道德、社会公德等方面的表现.
assessments should ‘comprehensively assess a civil servant’s virtue, ability, diligence, achievements, and honesty, giving greatest weight to concrete work achievements.’ Today, the latter clause of the CSL has been changed to read ‘giving greatest weight to political quality (zhengzhi suzhi 政治素质) and concrete work achievements.’

Political quality is not only to be emphasized in assessments but has also been added to the list of basic criteria that civil servants must fulfil. While the 2007 Civil Servants Law demanded ‘good character’ as a criterion, this was changed in 2018 to ‘good political quality and moral character.’ Further the list of obligations of civil servants adds ‘consciously accepting the leadership of the CPC,’ ‘taking the lead in practicing the Core Socialist Values,’ and being an exemplar of ‘familial virtue’ (jiating daode 家庭道德).

But what does “political quality” mean? As with “political responsibility,” I argue that part of this term’s importance comes from its vagueness: the term is at the same time both indeterminate and mutable—while it is undefined, the power of definition is concentrated at the current centre at any given time—and yet it must be somehow demonstrated or performed through the behaviour of individuals.

Perry Link’s (2013) work illustrates effectively how certain official formulations can be ‘abstract enough that they can accommodate different or even opposite interpretations’ (p. 246). Citing Liu Binyan, Link gives the example of ‘bringing large and medium-sized state enterprises to life’ being ‘a question of politics,’ and explains that this could be used by people with ‘fundamentally different assumptions’ to suit their own purposes. Lexically, “political quality” is similarly vague and therefore might technically be put to an equivalent use.

However, it is unthinkable that under the present administration the term would open to interpretation based on “fundamentally different assumptions.” The reason for this is the broader political context. While not explicitly defined, “political quality” must be directly assessed, and therefore those charged with implementation must overcome its indeterminacy and mutability. Assessors and assessees must understand what “political quality” means at any given moment, based on the political context, according to the political discourse and drives mentioned above. Arguably, the function of placing the onus on the assessor and assessee to infer what is being assessed in itself creates a test of “political correctness” on the assessor’s and assessee’s part and therefore creates an internalization of the search for “political quality” up and down the system.
3.3. Regulations on Selecting and Appointing Leading Party and Government Cadres

This sub-section examines changes in the way leading cadres are managed, particularly under the Xi administration as compared with previous administrations. It examines new changes instituted in 2014 and 2019 by comparing all four versions—1995, 2002, 2014, and 2019—of the Regulations on Selecting and Appointing Leading Party and Government Cadres. Ling Li (2019) has argued convincingly that there has been a ‘paradigm-change in the disciplinary regime of the Party’ including ‘the reversal of the depoliticization process of the Party’s disciplinary regime’ (p. 47). This section finds that a paradigm-change is also underway in the selection and appointment of cadres. It should be noted that this is important not only in terms of who is selected and appointed but also in terms of who is not, both in the Party and in government. It finds a new stress on “virtue,” “political criteria”, and “political dependability”; a shift in how potential candidates are observed that requires them to express “political dependability” in their everyday work; an imperative to study and demonstrate one’s having studied the “thought” of the current top leader; an emphasis on “faith”; and a reduction in the space for creative interpretation of central-level policy.

Changing the “Thought” and Principles

The opening line of the 2019 version is a new addition. It states, ‘these regulations are designed to uphold and strengthen the Party’s all-embracing leadership.’ It also adds the purpose of ‘implementing the Party’s new-era organizational line and cadre work principles (fangzhen方针) and policies,’ suggesting a shift from those of the previous “era.”

On the principles that must be upheld in selecting and appointing leading cadres, in v.2014, Article 2.3 adds the requirement for ‘virtue and ability, treating virtue as first priority’ (de cai jianbei, yi de wei xian德才兼备、以德为先). This followed the institutionalization of the same wording in the Party Charter and proceeded its addition in the CSL. Following the pattern of the Charter and the CSL, the ‘virtue and ability’ part of this the principle was used in v.1995 and v.2002, but the ‘treating virtue as first priority’ part does not appear in either version. The trend that this demonstrates toward highlighting the “virtue” of leading cadres is strengthened further in v.2019, where it is moved up to Article 2.2.16

16 Order is often telling of priority in Chinese political documents and discourse.
Leading the Leaders

Two important changes are made in v.2019 regarding the nature of the leading bodies (lingdou banzi 领导班子) that the Regulations are to help form. In v.2014, Article 3 states, ‘the selection and placement of leading cadres must be suited to building leading bodies into leadership collectives that will uphold the Party’s basic theory, basic line, basic program (jiben gangling 基本纲领), basic experiences, and basic demands.’ First, a crucial line is added in v.2019 at the beginning of this statement to read, ‘the selection and placement of leading cadres must put political standards first (ba zhengzhi biaozhun fang zai shouwei 把政治标准放在首位).’ This is unprecedented, appearing in none of the previous versions. It also leaves “political standards” open to interpretation, although the people who must enforce these regulations are expected to, and likely do, understand what is intimated by this.

Second, on what leading bodies are to do, in v.1995 they are to ‘implement the Party’s basic line, wholeheartedly serve the people, and have the ability to lead modernization’; in v.2002 they are to ‘uphold the Party’s basic theory, basic line, and basic program, wholeheartedly serve the people, and have the ability to lead socialist modernization’; in v.2014, they are to ‘uphold the Party’s basic theory, basic line, basic program, basic experience, and basic demands’; and in v.2019 they are to ‘uphold the Party’s basic theory, basic line, and basic policy (jiben fanglüe 基本方略).’ The replacement of the “basic program” (jiben gangling 基本纲领) with the “basic policy” (jiben fanglüe 基本方略) as the aim of leadership by the leading bodies is of deep significance.

The “basic program” was added to v.2002 and continued to appear in v.2014. It refers to the “program” introduced in 1997 at the 15th National Party Congress by Jiang Zemin for constructing a Chinese socialist economy, Chinese socialist politics, and Chinese socialist culture. It was described in Jiang’s 1997 report as being ‘an important part of Deng Xiaoping Theory.’ In contrast, the Party’s “basic policy” refers to the fourteen points enumerated in 2017 in Xi Jinping’s political report at the 19th National Party Congress. The Chinese wording itself suggests an important difference, with “program” (gangling 纲领) suggesting an overarching set of principles or approach and “policy” (fanglüe 方略) connoting something more specific and detailed that has already been laid out for those who are to follow it.

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17 In Chinese there are different ways of expressing “policy.” A common way of expressing this is “zhengce.” Zhengce tends to be narrower and more concrete, while fanglüe is broader and carries a stronger connotation of strategy.
On constructing Chinese socialist culture, the basic program expresses the need to develop a culture that ‘looks to modernization, to the world, and to the future,’ that necessitates ‘arming the Party and educating the people with Deng Xiaoping Theory,’ and that ‘continues the principle (fangzhen 方针) of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought collide to serve the people and socialism, with the focus on building academia and the arts and making them thrive’ (Jiang 1997). The general “spirit” of this is one of exploration and possibility.

In contrast, the “basic policy” begins its list of 14 points with ‘Point One, Upholding Party Leadership Over All Work,’ which opens with the phrase ‘Party, government, military, people, education, and all points of the compass, the Party leads everything.’ The lines that follow add clarity: The Four Consciousnesses must be strengthened and the Party Central Committee’s authority must be ‘consciously protected.’ The amorphous notion of Party leadership over everything is given a more definite shape by these two elements.

Each of the remaining 13 points also underline the Party’s leadership over everything, for example, under point six, ‘we must exercise Party leadership at every point in the process and over every dimension of law-based governance’ and ‘promote a combination of rule of law and rule of virtue (dezhi 德治).’ Essentially, we can understand that the current Central Committee—and particularly its “core”—has the last word on this “basic policy.” Combine this with the difference in the CPC lexicon between a “gangling” and “fanglüe” and we find that the emphasis on exploration based on the general concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics introduced under the influence of a top leader who is no longer in power has shifted to one of sticking to a pre-mapped-out framework in a way that strictly adheres to the thinking of the current Central Committee and its core.

This poses two significant challenges. First, with a relatively concrete framework that must be followed in line with the thinking of the Central Committee and its core, leadership bodies must determine what that thinking is. Essentially it is a constant work-in-progress, and because its creators are incumbent power-holders, the adjudicators of whether or not a leadership body’s decisions are in line wield a more direct and instant kind of power of adjudication.

Second, given the emphasis on “political standards” and strengthened demand for “Party leadership,” the leadership bodies of different kinds of units must be seen to be giving greater weight to these vague demands in their decision-making. Crucially, this is the case even if to do so conflicts with the professional demands of the specific functions of the organ they are leading.
Stressing the Political in Selection Criteria

In Chapter 2 of the Regulations v.2019 adds the statement that first and foremost Party and government leading cadres ‘must have firm faith.’ Easily overlooked, this is telling of a strengthened emphasis on the need to convey or project a belief in “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”—the defining feature of which, as Xi likes to stress, being CPC leadership. Also added to the CSL, this demand for ‘faith’ (信念) can be better understood by referring to another key document.

The Code of Conduct for Intraparty Political Life Under New Circumstances was introduced in 2016 at the 18th Central Committee’s sixth plenary session. It states in no uncertain terms, ‘irresolution over ideals and faith is the most dangerous kind of irresolution; a slip in ideals and faith is the most dangerous way to fall.’ It then lays out its demands: ‘All Party members must view belief in Marxism and faith in socialism and communism as a lifelong pursuit.’ To strengthen this faith they must study: ‘Party organizations at every level shall…make such study an important criterion for evaluating the performance of leading bodies and cadres.’ What this creates is the need for leading and aspiring leading cadres to demonstrate their faith in a palpable or measurable way. Failure to do so may mean being passed over or even demoted. Again, it should be noted that there is no explicit statement of how this faith is to be assessed although it might be assumed that the Four Consciousnesses are a helpful guide and the and the Two Studies, One Do (两学一做) form the basis of this study.

Changes to the selection criteria demonstrate a deeply significant shift in the role of ‘guiding thought.’ An amendment to the Regulations in 2019, at the beginning of Xi’s second term, incorporated ‘the conscious upholding’ of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era into the list of criteria for selecting all leading cadres. This is fundamental to understanding “political responsibility” because while in the past leading cadres have always been expected to adhere to the guidance of past top leaders, now they must adhere to that of the current leader.

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18 To study the Party Charter, Party regulations, and the General Secretary’s policy addresses and to meet Party standards.

19 This change was also institutionalized as a basic criterion for Party leading cadres in the amended 2017 version of the Party Charter.
In the past there was a kind of temporal buffer creating the space for interpretation of the guiding thought. Under Jiang Zemin, in v.1995, no mention was made of Jiang’s “thinking” and only indirect reference was made to that of Deng Xiaoping; cadres were expected to have sufficient grasp of ‘Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and *the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics.*’ Only in v.2002, after Deng Xiaoping’s passing and at the end of Jiang’s second term as General Secretary, was a grasp of Deng Xiaoping Thought and Jiang’s own Important Thought of Three Represents required of leading cadres. In early 2014, a little over a year after Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as General Secretary, adherence to Hu’s Scientific Outlook on Development was required of leading cadres. Yet in 2019 the time buffer was removed and the space for interpretation was narrowed. Today, “political responsibility” must be understood according to the growing body of thought of the current “core.” The same change is also incorporated into the new CSL in the form of the “guidance” to be followed in the civil service.

To illustrate this, we can compare v.1995’s brief list of criteria and v.2002’s list, which adds the requirement to ‘stress study, politics, and righteousness,’ with those of 2014 and 2019. V.2014 adds the demand that leading cadres ‘maintain a high level of oneness with the Party Central Committee in thought, politics, and action.’ V.2019 adds the Four Consciousness and the Two Protects.

Changes that reflect the discourse of the need for “rule of virtue” in addition to “rule of law” can be observed over time in the criteria on ‘using correctly the power entrusted by the people.’ While v.2002 adds ‘doing things *according to law,*’ in contrast, v.2014 makes two important additions on “virtue”: ‘[leading cadres must] uphold principles and have the courage to grasp and to manage’ (*gan zhua gan guan* 敢抓敢管); and must ‘strengthen their moral cultivation; stress Party-ness (*Dangxing* 党性), attach importance to character, and be an exemplar; and lead others in practicing core socialist values.’

Finally, v.2014, as the first new version of the Regulations introduced under Xi, adds a large new section institutionalizing permission for the rules to be broken in certain circumstances. Most notable for the purpose of this paper is the fact that the first paragraph added begins with ‘outstanding cadres to be promoted by rule-breaking (*poge* 破格) should have exceptional quality (*suzhi* 素质) in terms of virtue and ability.’ In v.2019, four characters are added before ‘virtue and ability,’ stating rule-breaking promotions can only be made for those who are ‘politically dependable’ (*zhengzhi guoying* 政治过硬).
Observing the Everyday, Changing the Selection Process

In v.1995, the selection process basically involved the Party committee (or leadership group) at the same level, or a higher organization department, presiding over a “democratic recommendation” process. When leading bodies were reaching the end of their terms, Party committees (or leadership groups) or organization (or personnel) departments were, ‘on the basis of democratic recommendation,’ to ‘collectively research and decide on persons for observation and assessment’ (kaocha duixiang 考察对象).

In 2014 a new Chapter 3, entitled “Motions” (dongyi 动议), was slotted in before the chapter on democratic recommendation, institutionalizing the addition of several steps before the latter stage is reached. This includes the requirement that organization (or personnel) departments analyse and judge (fenxi yanpan 分析研判) leading bodies based, in part, on ‘circumstances known about and understood from day-to-day [observation].’ Based on this, they are to make initial suggestions on the ‘positions, criteria, scope, methods, and procedures, etc.’ of promotions and appointments. These suggestions are reported to the main leading members of the Party committee (or leadership group) to be ‘mulled over’ (yunniang 酝酿).

This preliminary stage became more detailed in v.2019. First, added to the list of initial suggestions was ‘preferences on candidates’ (renxuan yixiang 人选意向). Second, was the striking paragraph: ‘Organization (personnel) departments should deepen their everyday understanding of cadres, using a knowledge of facts to understand people, putting the effort in regarding the everyday, to understand cadres in every regard, from different perspectives, and from close up.’ Then, ‘based on having an everyday understanding of things,’ they are to analyse and judge the leading bodies and leading cadres to provide ‘a basis and reference’ (yiju cankao 依据参考) for the Party committees (or leadership groups) as they are selecting and placing people. This explicit requirement for cadres to be ‘understood’ on an everyday basis has at least two important effects. First, it creates the explicit requirement for cadres to demonstrate on a daily basis the abovementioned political dependability, “virtue,” readiness to protect the General Secretary’s core status, and so on. Second, it creates a layer between the original process of selection and appointment whereby if, for example, the organization department finds in the ‘everyday’ a reason to deem a potential candidate unsuitable it can reflect this in its ‘basis and reference’ to the Party committee and thereby preclude a person’s appointment. This effectively gives organization
departments more direct and institutionalized ways of influencing outcomes within Party organ or government agency.

Another element of this shift in the selection process is the complete deletion in 2019 of the requirement in Article 2.5 (v.2014) that the selection and appointment of leading cadres is to follow the principles of ‘democracy, transparency, competitiveness, and selection of the best’ ([minzhu, gongkai, jingzheng, zeyou 民主、公开、竞争、择优]).

In 2019, continuing a tug-of-war over the wording by which the practice is institutionalized, democratic recommendation again became only something that ‘should’ be done as opposed to something that ‘must’ be done (v.2014). The original regulations (v.1995) state ‘the selection and appointment of Party and government cadres should, through democratic recommendations, entail putting forward persons for assessment.’ In 2002 the ‘should’ was changed to ‘must,’ but this ‘must’ was again changed back to ‘should’ in 2019, undoing the previous change that had made democratic recommendations mandatory.

In addition, in v.2019 the emphasis shifted to a process of ‘talks’ ([tanhua 谈话]) and away from meetings. This happened in two steps, beginning in 2014. The statement in v.2002 that ‘democratic recommendations include recommendations made through voting at meetings and individual cases of recommendations made through talks,’ was changed in v.2014 to ‘democratic recommendations include recommendations made through meetings and individual cases of recommendations made through talks.’ Then in 2019 the order was changed to stress ‘talks and research,’ and ‘individual cases’ was deleted so that v.2019 read ‘democratic recommendations include recommendations made through talks and research and recommendations made through meetings.’

Underscoring the new emphasis on everyday observance and the weakening of democratic recommendation, a new paragraph was added in 2014 to the chapter on observation and assessment ([kaocha 考察]) stating that to ‘prevent votes of recommendation from being treated as equivalent to electoral votes’ in determining persons for observation and assessment ‘comprehensive consideration [shall be given] to democratic recommendations and everyday evaluations, [and] annual evaluations….’ In 2019, this new italicized content was changed to reflect the requirement discussed above for routinized efforts to ‘understand’ cadres such that democratic
recommendations are now to be considered alongside ‘everyday understanding, overall analysis and judgement, and suitability for the post etc.’

Consequently, this further enfeebles the role of democratic recommendation and to institutionalize the use of “virtue” and ‘everyday’ performance as potentially deciding factors. Ultimately, in combination with the insertion of the new Chapter 3 discussed above, this shifts power more decisively upwards and outside of the Party organ or government agency where the selections or appointments are taking place and strengthens the incentive or pressure for cadres to evince, intimate or otherwise perform their “virtuous” and political appropriateness in their everyday work.

4. Concluding Thoughts

The absorption in 2018 of the government’s State Bureau of Civil Servants by the Party’s Organization Department marked a fundamental structural shift both in the Party-government relationship and in the management of civil servants. This move, which gives one of the Party’s most powerful networks of organs direct control over the country’s civil servants, signals the all-embracing nature of the shift in thinking on governing and moulding the country’s body of governors and public servants.

Since the 18th National Party Congress, a “political” tag has increasingly been affixed to a broad sweep of tasks and responsibilities. At the same time, wide-reaching, systematic, and meticulous steps have been taken to institutionalize political indicators such as “political quality” and politicized “virtue” in the laws, rules and regulations that govern civil servants and cadres.

These developments indicate a clear shift away from the division of labour between government and Party in the management of such personnel. In the structure of management, the professional is blended with the political through the absorption of the government structures for managing civil servants. In the detailed institutions, the importance of the professional is weakened in relative terms to the political.

At least three factors can be observed that combine to make the meaning ascribed to political indicators liable to change: first, their inherent vagueness; second, the institutionalization of the incumbent General Secretary’s “Thought,” which means the temporal buffer that creates space for
interpretation by others is removed leaving them open to top-down change; and third, the use of political drives to give them a generally understood but still nebulous meaning. Indeterminate and mutable as they are, these indicators and demands will nonetheless be used to appoint, observe, and assess such people. Indeed, their very nature as vague and open to change from above is part of what shapes their role. These qualities give them a nebulous, boundless air of authority that can never quite be pinned down to a clear definition. They are indefinable yet must be measurable.

Civil servants and cadres must be determined to have strong, passable, or poor “political quality,” to be “politically dependable” or not, or to be judged by the CPC as not only capable but, more importantly, sufficiently “virtuous.” Moreover, there is also a clear trend toward increasing institutionalized emphasis on the day-to-day in making such judgements. The outcomes will directly affect the appointment, promotion, pay, and rewards of civil servants and cadres, and as such they are likely to have a powerful influence on these people’s behaviour in their day-to-day work as they attempt to exhibit the strength of their “political quality.” This is certain to have an important influence on decision-making and policy implementation by civil servants and cadres nationwide. When implementing these newly amended institutions it may well emerge that, in attempting to strengthen professionalism at the same time as requiring demonstrations of political rectitude, something has to give.

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Does Edward Said’s (1978) criticism of what he called “Orientalism” apply to the field of modern Chinese Studies?

The author argues that the relationship between China and the so-called “West” is not one of post-colonial dominance. One remarkable manifestation is the fact that Chinese intellectuals since the mid-80s established an elaborate field of the study of foreign Chinese studies and in doing so reversed the “Western Gaze”. In newer developments Chinese institutions are starting not only to observe but influence foreign Chinese studies, which forces us to review the concept of “Orientalism” in the Chinese context. By discussing these trends, the paper wants to invite a debate on the paradigms of current Chinese studies and whether or not they must change in light of the so-called rise of China.
Orientalism and Current Chinese Studies

By
René Kluge

1. Orientalism and Chinese studies

Does Edward Said’s (1978) criticism of what he called “Orientalism“ apply to the field of modern Chinese Studies? By discussing this question, this paper wants to invite a debate on the paradigms of current Chinese studies and if they must change in light of the so-called rise of China.

The definition of the complex concept of “Orientalism” by Said can be described as threefold: it is first a mode of knowledge production about the so-called “Orient”. “Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient […] is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism” (Said 1978: p. 2). However secondly, at the core of this knowledge production lies the premise of a fundamental difference between “the Orient” and “the Occident” on the one hand or “the East” and “the West” on the other. Said assumes that “the Orient” is not found or explored by Orientalists, rather created. “Orientalism” constructs the “Orient” as a monolithic and unchanging other to “the West” and therefore creates the idea of “the West” as well. The third and arguably the most important (Hallaq 2018) aspect of “Orientalism” is that knowledge production and the creation of “the Orient” does not happen out of sheer inquisitiveness but based on a power dynamic between “Orient” and “Occident”. Orientalism emerges out of a positional superiority of “the West” against “the East” (colonialism) and is at the same time a mode of upholding this superiority. By ignoring or suppressing pre-colonial history, the orientalists; as self-proclaimed experts, became the sole representatives of the colonialized societies. The representation followed a line of repeated negative as well as racial and sexual fuelled stereotypes of backwardness and inferiority.

Orientalism depends for its strategy on this flexible positional superiority, which puts the “Westerner” in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand (Said 1978: p. 9; emphasis added).

1 I will hereafter write “Orientalism” in quotation marks to make clear that it refers to a complex concept. When I am referring to Saids written book with the same title, I will write it in italics – Orientalism.
In the second part of his book, Said looks at the post Second World War academic field and concludes that “Orientalism” did not end with the abolishment of European Imperialism but is rather an ongoing tradition and a knowledge formation that pre-structures modern scholarly work about “the Orient”. He identifies the contemporary field of area studies, which has now shifted its centre to US- universities, as the direct successor of 19th-century “Orientalism”. This shift went alongside the other shift in positional superiority since the US became the dominating power in “the Orient” and replaced European powers in that role (Said 1978: p. 285). “In any event, the new Orientalists took over the attitudes of cultural hostility and kept them” (Said 1978: p. 290).

Said analysed a great number of disparate European and US texts about “the Orient” to reveal the author's relative entanglement with orientalist ideas and explaining how “Orientalism” is transmitted into scholarly work and by that matter reproduced. Therefore, Orientalism is a study about the relationship between knowledge and politics and how it relates to the scholarly field of the humanities. It tries to explain the hegemony that “the West” willed over “the East” but also the hegemonical power that “Orientalism” developed in western academia.

In the now 40 years of its reception, almost every aspect of Said's Orientalism became the object of harsh criticism: His account of “Orientalism” as a mode of knowledge production is considered too broad as well as too arbitrary. He is accused of selecting texts and authors in a self-fulfilling way by picking the ones that suit his assumptions and ignoring the ones that do not. Therefore, “Orientalism” is considered a misrepresentation of the scholarly field of oriental studies, which in the eyes of its defenders is much more nuanced and comprised of different approaches. Much as “Orientalism” is supposed to have imagined “the Orient”, Said is blamed for imagining a euro-US “Orientalism” that in this form never existed (Varisco 2007: p. 22).

Said is also criticized for not discussing the rich efforts by exponents of the colonialized societies to establish counter-discourses of self-representation. The passivity with which “the Orient” had to accept the “Orientalism” of “the Occident” is seen as Said’s invention by omission. Presumably, this is also the reason why Arab intellectuals accepted Orientalism only reluctantly (Macfie 2002: p. 127-129). There is no mentioning of cooperation, approval, opposition, or resistance from “the East” in Orientalism (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2015: p. 113).
Critics also took issue with Said's understanding of “Orientalism” as a phenomenon spanning the late 18th century up until the 1970s and beyond. This is considered to be a rather ahistorical account of western knowledge production. By ignoring the changes in the colonized as well as the colonial societies over the last century and a half, the concept of “Orientalism” is diluted. The Cold War led to a completely new dichotomy between “East and West” under different political paradigms (Varisco 2007: p. 84).

In hindsight, Said's account of “Orientalism” is flawed and gave rise to the use of “Orientalism” as an at times ideological political slogan (Hallaq 2018). However, the lasting impact of his attack on Western scholarship cannot be ignored. His sweeping criticism of a whole academic field became extremely popular and is widely accepted as the starting point of post-colonial criticism (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2015: p. 94). Said was able to show that the exploitation by colonial powers was not solely based on economic and military strength but had a discursive level. The possible heritage of knowledge in the service of colonialism forced scholars in general to rethink their relationship with institutions and power as well as the political implications of their academic work. Orientalism inspired an array of scholarly work trying to identify and purge whole fields of study from (post)colonial stereotypes. Even harsh critics of Said state that his was a necessary criticism and justified:

It is necessary to stress that in many ways Said hardly scratched the surface of the vast sewerage of racist and ethnocentric writing, art, and cinema that for so long has severed an imaginary East from the dominating West (Varisco 2007: p. 18).

Post-colonial criticism has had a ground-breaking as well as problematic influence on the humanities. Additionally, both followers and critics still refer to Orientalism, which has become a seminal text for the field. Therefore, it is relevant to ask whether Chinese studies should be included in Said’s “Orientalism”.

Said himself did not discuss orientalist engagement with China. He justifies this omission with the historical term of “the Orient” that stood for the experience of the French and British world with Islam and the Arabs. For Said, “the Orient” stretches from what is now called the Middle East and the Levante to India (Said 1978: p. 4). Involvement with China influenced European culture significantly. However, in his view, it is justified that this phenomenon can be discussed separately from “the oriental experience”. For the US, however, China and “the Far East” was always a much
more integral part of “the Orient”. His explanation for not discussing China in the second part of *Orientalism* is that after the Second World War, only Arabic and Islamic studies refused to challenge the dogmas of Orientalism in their field, while Asian studies were revolutionized by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CASS) during the 1960s (Said 1978: p. 301). This assertion is questionable: the CASS was a group of mostly graduate students and young scholars who came together to oppose the Vietnam War and to criticize the instrumentalization of their scholarly work for political purposes. Even though some members later became well known Asian Scholars, CASS did not represent the academic mainstream of the field. Moreover, they were not aiming for a thorough reconceptualization of Chinese studies in general. 2

Said’s exception of China (and Japan) from “the Orient” is another example of his arbitrariness and as a hindsight justification for keeping the scope of his undertaking manageable. Strictly following his outline of the concept of “Orientalism”, it is hard to argue why China, or the European-US experience of China should not be part of it. Historically, China was more often than not included in the concept of “the Orient” or, as a geographical counterpart to Europe, mostly subsumed under the term “Asia” (Macfie 2002: p. 14). China was as much “the other” to the European west as was the Middle East.

Even though Said explicitly excluded modern Chinese Studies from his criticism, the well-known US-China scholar Benjamin Schwartz delivered an early defence in 1980 against “Said’s attack on area studies” (Schwartz 1980: p. 100). He agrees with Said that the concept of “the Orient” is a shapeless and oversimplified term. However, he believes that the pitfalls of Orientalism do not apply to modern area studies in general and the China field in particular because these disciplines do not rely on abstract ideas but concrete research that maps out specific local conditions.

Said’s omission and the defence of Schwartz and others may have curbed the influence of post-colonial criticism in the field of Chinese studies compared to other area studies. However, starting from the 90s, *Orientalism* inspired a range of works analysing European and US- knowledge production about China. Most of them explicitly cite Said or refer to the concept of “Orientalism. Qian (1995) researches how a certain vision of China influenced modern US poetry from the 1910s and 1920s. Karen Leong (2005) explores the gendering of Orientalism in the 1930s and 1940s. Adrian Chan (2009) retraces ”Orientalism” back to questions of cosmology between European

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Among others, Daniel Vukovich’s China and Orientalism (2012) stands out. In it, he directly channels Said to criticize western knowledge production about the People’s Republic of China as driven and fuelled by political interests and biases. However, he does not blame the history of colonialism for the biases but the background of the Cold War. What western depictions of China willingly are pushing aside is not the precolonial history of China but the history of the Chinese Revolution since 1949. In Vukovich’s view, contemporary Chinese studies are formed by the paradigm of the modernization theory. Therefore, it is actively negating positive aspects of modern Chinese revolutionary history to depict China as a transitional state in need of western neoliberal reforms. Vukovich subsequently undertakes a Said-style deconstruction of Cold-War-shaped narratives about modern China.

These exemplary studies do substantiate the assumption that the popular and academic perception of China and that images of China are not free of colonial projections and problematic stereotypes. However, most studies are historical in their outlook and do not deal with the fundamental question of how to engage the study of China beyond “Orientalism”. Said saw this as the main problem but shied away from answering it:

Perhaps the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a non-repressive and non-manipulative, perspective. But then one would have to rethink the whole complex problem of knowledge and power. These are all tasks left embarrassingly incomplete in this study (Said 1978: p. 24).

How can area studies proceed and avoid the pitfalls of “Orientalism”? For current China studies, this problem is posed in a very distinguished way. That is because the relationship between “the West” and China is not one of dominance anymore. In Said’s definition the prerequisite for “Orientalism” is the positional superiority of “the West” over “the East” and in case of China, this
superiority is crumbling or even has become non-existent. 1978, the publication year of Orientalism also marked the beginning of the rise of China to a world superpower.

The reform and opening process established the PRC as a major actor in global capitalism. It started in the early 80s with dismantling peoples’ communes, privatising urban land and intensified after the political crisis of 1989 through price liberalizations and renewed emphasis on the market economy. At the end of the 90s most former state-owned companies were privatized. The enormous rural labour force, coming as migrant workers in the cities, were a massive asset for China’s industry and greatly fostered the export-oriented economy (Wang 2016: p. 185-186). Since 2010 China has been the largest exporter of goods (Li 2016: p. 21). In 2005 China overtook the US as the largest contributor to global economic growth, was already the largest energy consumer, and the largest producer of renewable energy (Li 2016: p. 4). Since 2016, China imports more goods from European countries than it exports to them and has become the leading contributor of foreign direct investments in Europe (Li and Cheong 2019: p. 151-153). In the Pacific-Region, the US is no longer the primary military force, having receded this position to China (Lendon 2019). In remissions of fears in the 1950s that the US could lose competition with Soviet Russia, US-media spoke of a “new Sputnik-Moment” (Gardner 2017). The Belt and Road Initiative will expand Chinas worldwide economic, political, and military influence even further (South China Morning Post 2018). However, the shift in positional power between China and “the West” is not only limited to economic and military power but also comprises something called epistemological power – the field of knowledge.

2. The study on foreign Chinese studies

Said (1978) states that “Orientalism” had “no corresponding equivalent in the Orient” (p. 205). There was no academic self-representation by the colonialized culture and no analysis of “the Western other” from the viewpoint of the colony. Only this unequal access to the dominant discourse enabled western orientalists to act as the sole representatives of the oriental culture. Said’s study was viewed as revolutionary among other things because it broke this scientific monopoly that “the West” wielded over “the Orient” and reversed the perspective to scrutinize western academia through the eyes of a post-colonial intellectual (see Varisco 2007: p. 35). The question is whether Chinese studies had a corresponding equivalent in China.

Chinese studies as a subcategory of area studies is to be understood as a specialised interdisciplinary field of research, rather than a scientific discipline (Holbig 2015). Scholars usually have an academic
education in one discipline such as literature studies, history, or sociology but only engage in their research with phenomena of a specific “area”. This definition of “area” does not necessarily have to be a geographical area. Therefore, it provides the possibility of transnational studies. However, it is still the unspoken condition of area studies as an academic field that the scholar themselves is not part of that area. Said (1978) calls this “exteriority” (p. 21). Chinese intellectuals, who were since the 1920s aware of the existence of western Chinese studies, (Mu 2014) described it by the term 汉学 or 中国学, as opposed to the study of China by the Chinese themselves which is called 国学. Here is an example of a definition of Chinese studies from a Chinese perspective:

Sinology [汉学] are foreigners, mainly Europeans and US-Americans who are studying Chinese culture and introduce it to the people in their country. It comprises of travel and missionary reports as well as the academic sinology and the modern Chinese studies [中国学]. Sinology is, therefore, over 600 years old. […] Right now, it is prevalent, but it should not be confused with national studies [国学] (Mu 2014, own translation).

The 1980s saw a peak in engaging with western knowledge in general. And in Chinese academia, it was established what could be translated as “the study of foreign Chinese studies” 海外汉学研究 (Zhang 2018) or 国外中国学研究 (Liang & Du 2019) who describe it as “the re-study of foreign academic research”. The interest in foreign Chinese studies was so extensive that it was called 汉学热 [Chinese studies fever] (Mu 2014).

An essential part of the Chinese study of foreign Chinese studies are translations of western Chinese studies, but also original research is being undertaken. In 2018 the Jiangsu People's Publishing House celebrated the 30th anniversary of 海外中国研究丛书 [The Series on Foreign Chinese Studies]. The series comprises of over 180 volumes with translations of numerous Chinese studies scholars, including Benjamin Schwartz (see Ma 2018). 中国学者

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3 Original Chinese quote: 汉学(Sinology)是外国尤其是欧美国家学者研究和介绍中华文化的学问，历经游记性汉学、传教士汉学、学院派汉学以及侧重研究中国现实问题的“中国学”(China Studies)等几大阶段，至今已有600多年历史。…“汉学”当热，然不可将之混同为“国学”(Mu 2014)

4 Original Chinese quote: 国内学界对国外有关中国近代、现代、当代哲学社会科学领域研究成果的再研究… (Liang & Du 2019)


René Kluge


Moreover, Shi jie hanxue dahui 世界汉学大会 [the World Conference on Sinology] was founded in 2007 and now hosted at the Renmin University in Beijing on a binary basis. 

Before 1949, western and Japanese Chinese studies were sometimes seen as a threat to the national sovereignty of China. For example, the Chinese historian Chen Yuan 陈垣:

> When I read a Japanese article about Chinese history, I feel like someone dropped a bomb in my desk, and I feel obliged to surpass them on the scientific field. (Chen Yuan in Zhong 2010, para. 9, own translation)

However, after the Chinese studies fever, the appraisal became more nuanced: Chinese studies are seen as a mode of exchange between China and the West and as a vehicle for Chinese development. The existence of foreign Chinese studies is seen as proof of the cultural importance of China and an instrument of further strengthening this importance (Zhang 2005). “The research and commentary of overseas sinologists help us to examine our own culture from a new external standpoint” (Zheng 2006, own translation, p. 96).

However, some voices do not want to entrust the exploration of their own culture to the foreign Chinese Studies alone. Mu Dousheng, warns against a hanxuehua 汉学化 [sinologisation] of their national studies. Chinese people should still research their own culture but without the sheer objective approach of science. National studies should serve the national cause and be conducted with a patriotic impetus:

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5 See the historical subpage of the official website of the conference: [http://hantui.ruc.edu.cn/sinologies/Eng/Index/index.html](http://hantui.ruc.edu.cn/sinologies/Eng/Index/index.html) (World Conference on Sinology).

6 Original Chinese Source: 每当我接到日本寄来的研究中国历史的论文时，我就感到像一颗炸弹扔到我的书桌上，激励着我一定要在历史研究上超过他们 (Chen Yuan in Zhong 2010, para. 9).

The value of sinology is not endless. It is essentially a kind of ‘western learning’. It is westerners using western values and academic paradigms to study Chinese culture. To them, Chinese culture is just their object of research. It does not relate to their own life, and they have no emotions invested. [...] However, Chinese people cannot be the spectators of Chinese culture. [...] It is the spiritual lifeblood of people and nation (Mu 2014, para. 5, own translation).  

This is just a glimpse of a vast body of scholarly and translational work conducted under the scope of the Chinese study of foreign Chinese studies: “by now concerning every research topic in almost every discipline in Chinese academia; there are translations of corresponding research by foreign Chinese scholars” (Zhang 2005, para. 6, own translation). This phenomenon is worth much further exploration than the topic of this paper allows. In any case, it challenges the assumption that Said's prerequisite for “Orientalism” does actually exist in China as Chinese intellectuals established a counterpart to western studies of China.

3. Chinese influence on Chinese studies

One could even go one step further; the active engagement by China with foreign Chinese studies is not confined to a passive perception but rather a deepening degree of influence and even interference in the field of Chinese studies.

There are many examples of how the PRC is trying to influence western academic learning. While China is in some instances banning western textbooks in their universities (Chen & Zhuang 2015), most western students of the Chinese language are using textbooks developed and published in the PRC, a primary factor in promoting the use of the simplified characters and the Hanyu Pinyin transcription system. Since 2005 the PRC has established over 1,500 Confucius Institutes (CI) worldwide. The CIs are partly funded by the Office of Chinese Language Council International or Hanban and adhere to Chinese law. They are part of the Chinese propaganda set-up. If the western partner school or university is financially dependent on the CIs for parts of their curriculum, it might be difficult for the institution to allow research and teachings critical of China (see Peterson.

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8 Original Chinese source: 然而，汉学虽有重要价值，但亦不可无限拔高。汉学在本质上是一种“西学”，是西方人用西方价值观念、学术范式来研究中华文化的学问。对汉学家而言，中华文化仅仅是学术研究的客观对象，很难内在于自己的生命，……而中国人注定做不了中华文化的旁观者。因为，……是我们整个国家和民族的精神命脉。 (Mu 2014, para. 5)

9 Original Chinese source: 现在中国学术的任何一个学科的主要研究方向，都可以找到相关的海外汉学的译作 (Zhang 2005, para. 6).
In 2017 the National Association of Scholars conducted a prominent study on CIs and recommended that all US universities close their CIs (Peterson 2017, p. 148).

An incident in 2017 concerning the Cambridge University Press shocked the whole discipline. The publishing house for the reputable journal China Quarterly willingly and upon request by Chinese authorities erased a batch of over 300 articles from their Chinese website. The articles were seemingly chosen by keywords such as “Tiananmen” and “Xinjiang”. One of the most important journals in western Chinese studies became thereby an agent of Chinese propaganda (see Balding 2017).

Greitens & Truex (2018) were able to show that direct repression of foreign scholars by Chinese authorities is happening. Forms of repression include complication or hampering access to research facilities like universities, archives, and libraries, pressuring Chinese contact persons and even denial of visas. However, the scale of these direct repressions where perceived to be much bigger than the actual accounts of repression. This disparity caused 68 percent of questioned Chinese scholars to identify self-censorship as a concern for the field, worrying that scholars might change the direction of their research or publication in fear of repressions.

Those are substantial acts of interference in western academia by China; however, there are also more subtle connections between Chinese studies and Chinese politics. The president of the Renmin-University Ji Baocheng said this in the opening speech of the First Conference of World Sinology:

> A harmonious world needs to draw from every beneficial cultural resource available. The multitude of similar elements in different cultures has provided the basis for today’s dialogue. […] The reason why a harmonious world can exist is because of the differences. […] The term ‘Sinology’ has itself the notion of difference as his premise, which inspires the consensus and the dialogue between the cultures. […] A harmonious world must be a world of dialogue. However, the premise of the dialogue has to be ‘let the other be himself’ and do not force him to become the object of your description (Ji 2007, para. 8, own translation).\(^\text{10}\)

\(^\text{10}\) Original Chinese Source:“一个和谐的世界，需要汲取一切有益的文化资源。而不同文化所包含的诸多相似元素，早已为今天的对话提供了基础。⋯ 一个和谐的世界，可以表征于同嗜、同听、同美；而一个和谐的世界之所以然，却又恰恰是存在差异和不同⋯ “汉学”之谓，本身就是以差异为前提，本身就启发着文化间的共识和对话。⋯ 一个和谐的世界，还必须是一个对话畅通的世界。但是对话的前提是 ‘让他成为他者’，而不是强迫他者作为我们所描述的对象 (Ji 2007, para. 8).
Harmonious World (*hexie shijie* 和谐世界) was at the time the guiding principle for Hu Jintao's foreign policy. A stable and peaceful world order with the US as hegemonic power was in the best interest of China to ensure the ongoing development of the domestic economy. The newfound economic power was to be used to further China’s influence in the world but not to the degree that trading partners would be upset. In concrete foreign policy, China often tried to maintain diplomatic and economic relations with all sides (see Zheng & Tok 2007).

Ji Baocheng puts foreign Chinese studies in relation to the concept of a harmonious world. Scholars of Chinese studies through their research are to further the dialogue between different cultures. By exploring cultural difference, they are to promote understanding of these differences and delivering justifications for them. Ji is trying to instrumentalize foreign Chinese studies as a vehicle for justifying Chinese particularities and China’s special path. The Chinese path in modern history frequently meant deviating from values like democracy and political rights. In the context of the harmonious world, these differences are not to be judged but accepted. The job of the Chinese scholar is to explain and locate them historically.

The demand to not violate other cultures by objectifying them with one’s description is one of the main points of Saïd’s orientalist criticism; Ji’s speech shows how easily it can be turned around.

4. Conclusion

Whether or not one agrees with all aspects of Saïd’s account of “Orientalism”; in light of it, scholars in the field of area studies should be inclined to reflect deeper about the political implications of their research. The arguments for including current Chinese studies in these reflections are more convincing than to exclude it altogether. However, it is credible that the “China” that is currently being researched is very different from the passive object of the colonial gaze that Saïd calls “the Orient”. China is on par with developed countries of the so-called “western world”, and its intellectual community is very much aware of what to them is “foreign Chinese studies”.

Under these circumstances, China watchers and people engaged in Chinese Studies have to answer for themselves under which premises they will carry out their knowledge production. Does the question of “Orientalism” disappear now that China is on a par with the West? Or are orientalist stereotypes still being efficacious and inherited? Is Saïd’s “Orientalism” still the right mode to analyse knowledge production about China or do we need a completely different methodology?
Seeing as the so-called rise of China was mainly a capitalist project, carried out by a rather small neoliberal elite with questionable results for most parts of the Chinese workforce, I would suggest a set of paradigms that incorporates the conflicts between capital and labour interests. The concept of uneven knowledge production seems to be more relevant than ever. However, it is hardly convincing to define frontiers in the globalized world along the lines of nations and cultural areas. When discussing how the Chinese government represses western scholars, it also has to be mentioned that it represses its own intellectual community much more severely. Reframing Said’s account of “East and West” with concepts of class was approached in the past (e.g., see O’Hanlon & Washbrook 1992) as well as recently (e.g., see Wemheuer 2016). So far, the response has not been as extensive as Said’s original account. However, the historical constellation of the rise of China as a capitalist superpower may be the right time to revisit this approach.

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Orientalism and Current Chinese Studies


René Kluge studied philosophy and Chinese studies at Free University Berlin and is currently completing his doctoral studies. In his research he focuses on the Chinese new left, transnational intellectual trends and the history and theory of the international labor movement. He is also a former works council member and active in transnational labor union cooperation between China and Germany.
This paper explores changes in the translation of political discourse after P.R. China was established in 1949. It also explores the possible factors that had the most impact on these changes. To that end, official political discourse after the establishment of China is divided into 3 phases in terms of political leadership: under Mao Zedong (1949-1976), under Deng Xiaoping (1978-1990) and under Jiang Zemin (1989-2002).

Chinese official Political documents in different genres by these leaders and their translations are analysed in relation to the political and social-cultural background and the major influential translation theories in each historical phase. The analysis of political discourse translation for these three phases reveals that the translation of Mao’s work is endowed with Mao’s personal cult and class struggle, so the translation is very faithful to the original, whereas the translation of Deng’s works is more flexible and target culture-oriented due to the political ideology of the time. The political ideology of Jiang’s time also influenced the translation of Jiang’s work. While it is still target culture and target language oriented, it becomes more flexible in its form and still serves the political ideology of Jiang’s time. It is concluded that although the translation of political discourse is very much bound to the political ideology and the sociocultural context of each phase, the translation and translation practice in each phase differ significantly due to other factors such as the translators and the translation theories influential in each historical phase.
Three Phases of Chinese Political Translation after 1949: Similarities and Differences

By
Chen Zhang

1. Introduction

Chinese translation theories and practices have seen great change in the wake of social transformation in China and the development of Western translation studies. Consequently, many academic studies have investigated the development and evolution of translation research and practice in China. Although much research has been conducted on the translation of Chinese political discourse into English (Xu and Mu 2009), this has generally been confined to translation theories of a certain period, with few comparisons made across different political phases and little investigation of the factors influencing political translation (Shi 2012).

This study examines and compares the English language translations of political discourse in each political phase of China after 1949, in the context of their individual characteristics. The paper explores the development of China’s political discourse translations through selected works, with a critical discourse analysis (CDA) framework. It investigates social cultural ideology, the purpose of translation, domain translation theories, and the subjectivity of the translator after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Due to socio-political differences in each political phase, translation practices in China experienced significant changes through the following 50 years. These five decades are divided into three phases, aligning with the changes of leadership; namely, 1) the Mao Zedong 毛泽东 phase (1949-1976), 2) the Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 phase (1978-1990), and 3) the Jiang Zemin 江泽民 phase (1989-2002).

The political discourse of each period was imprinted with characteristics reflecting the changing political leadership. Between the founding of the PRC and 1978, the dominant ideology was characterised by class struggle. With the economic ‘reform and opening-up’ policy (gaiye kaifang 改革开放) (1978), the discourse became much more open and multifarious, with a socialist market economy as the central theme. In Jiang’s era, in the context of growing social contradictions and

* This paper is an adapted version of the author’s thesis as fulfilment for the degree of Master of Arts at Sydney University.
international divisions, Chinese political discourse was marked by concern with social (in)equality and global (in)security, and it responded to these problems with the notion of the ‘Three Representatives’ (san ge dai biao 三个代表). This paper hypothesises that differences in translation of Chinese political discourse are influenced by political and historical characteristics, among other factors. To test this, I examine these influences and the changes in the production of translations in each phase.

This paper first examines the English translation of Chinese official political discourse in each of the three phases, analysing some typical translation features in the works of Mao, Deng, and Jiang. It makes a comparison of the original documents and the translations commissioned by the Foreign Language Press (the official translation agency of the Communist Party of China), as the official translation of a political document is often regarded as the most authentic and reliable (Xu and Mu 2009). As argued by Munday (2001), the official translation of a political document often reflects the most advanced theories of the process of translation.

Vertical comparisons will also be made of the characteristics, similarities, and differences between the official translations in each of the three phases, with the aim of exploring the primary influences on the translation production from lexical, discourse, and socio-cultural points of view, using CDA.

Articles on similar politics and economy topics from each of the three phases were selected for comparison. For Mao’s phase, examples were taken from The Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 4. This contains the largest amount of important work written by Mao himself during the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949), and the translation itself was a significant event in the 1950s. For Deng’s phase, examples were selected from The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2 and Volume 3. The latter is considered the most important part of Deng’s work, as it includes articles on building socialism with Chinese characters. In addition, articles about political reform, the socialist market economy, and the issue of Hong Kong are the major concerns of the phase. For Jiang’s phase, examples were taken from The Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume 1. This is a record of the formation and development of the thoughts of the ‘Three Representatives’.

2. A Critical Discourse Analysis of Political Translations

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a critical approach to the study of discourse that views language as a form of social practice and focuses on the ways in which social and political domination are reproduced in texts and talks (Fairclough 1989, 1992, 1995). It was proposed by Norman
Fairclough in 1989 and henceforward deployed as a method of multidisciplinary analysis throughout the humanities and social sciences. It does not confine itself only to method; the overriding assumption shared by CDA practitioners is that language and power are linked. In this study, CDA is applied as the key methodology in the analysis of the process of translation. This approach facilitates the examination of the discourse from a three-dimensional point of view, using linguistic, social interaction, and social cultural perspectives to analyse changes in official political discourse and the reasons for them.

In his conceptualisation of discourse, Fairclough (1989) developed three levels of analysis; namely, that of (spoken or written) language texts (textual analysis), of discourse practice (processes of text production, distribution, and consumption), and of discursive events as instances of sociocultural practice. According to Fairclough (1989), ‘It is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse that views language as a form of social practice and focuses on the ways social and political domination are reproduced in text’ (p. 20). Accordingly, all texts should be examined in three progressive steps: first is the linguistic description of the text, including analysis of syntax, metaphoric structure, and certain rhetorical devices. Second is an explanation and interpretation of the process in which the text is produced – that is, the text's production and consumption, as well as how power relations are enacted. The third step is the explanation of relationships between sociocultural practice and the production of text.

For Fairclough (1995), text is a product rather than a process. He uses the term ‘discourse’ (p. 39) to refer to the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part. In addition to the text, the process includes the process of production (of which the text is a product) and the process of interpretation, for which the text is a resource (Fairclough 1995). Text analysis is correspondingly only a part of discourse analysis, which also includes analysis of productive and interpretative processes. The language knowledge of the translator, the representation of the natural and social worlds that the translator inhabits, and the values, beliefs, assumptions, and social condition of a particular time all have an impact on the productive and interpretative process of translation (Fairclough 1989).

The linguistic and non-linguistic factors mentioned above shape the social conditions of production in relation to three levels of social organisation: 1) the level of the social situation or the immediate social environment in which the discourse occurs, 2) the level of the social institution that constitutes a wider matrix for the discourse, and 3) the level of the society as a whole (Fairclough 1989). The following diagram (Figure 1) sets out the framework of the three-
dimensional CDA designed to analyse the relationship between texts, processes, and their social conditions and both the immediate conditions of the situational context and the more remote conditions of institutional and social structures.

Figure 1: Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework (Fairclough 1989: p.25)

In this study, the translation analysis of political discourse from source text into target text helps us to depart from the linguistic level to ‘relate the fine grain of linguistic behaviour to politics, or political behaviour’ (Schaffner 2004: p. 119). The translation analysis can be traced through lexical choices; restructuring of text, such as selection reproduction, summarisation, and local transformation (addition, deletion, permutation, substation); and genre selection, such as stylistic and rhetorical formulation of the text production. The translation strategy can thus be examined through this linguistic analysis, which fits the textual analysis level of CDA. On the next level, which is discourse practice, the link between textual analysis and social practice is explored. At this level, the purpose of translation is examined, the (in)visibility of the translator, target reader, translation strategies, and dominant translation theories of the time are considered to further support this. The third level of analysis considers the political background and dominant political
ideology of each of the three phases, which is also the social practice level in the three-dimensional framework.

In the text analysis stage, the Australian-based National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters (NAATI) marking criteria is employed as a textual analysis framework to examine the translation of these political documents in terms of accuracy, resource of language (comprehension of original), resource of language (expression of translation), and technique (translated too literally in some segments and too freely/paraphrased in others) (NAATI 2013).

3. Politics and Ideology of Chinese Political Discourse and Its Translations

3.1 The Mao Phase, 1949-1976

A key feature of the Mao Zedong era was the establishment of a new state and new system in China under the pattern of the two world camps. China under Mao had a new look: the establishment of an independent state, the development of socialist industrialisation, a highly organised and ideological society, the general participation of the public in the political life of the country, the common consciousness of the society as a whole, and the establishment of common values (Brown 2012). The new country, new system, and new society were products of the victory of the Chinese revolution. The factors that contributed to the success of the revolution continued to exert a major influence, influencing the governance of the country and effectively shaping Chinese society during Mao’s phase (Shi 2012).

The ideology of Mao Zedong was first confirmed as the guiding principle of the Chinese Communist Party at the 7th Congress in 1945 (Brown 2012). Several different editions of The Selected Works of Mao Zedong have since been published in China to publicise the philosophy of Mao Zedong prior to the establishment of the PRC in 1949.

†‘NAATI’ is the national standards and accreditation body for translators and interpreters in Australia. It was designed to assist in meeting diverse and changing communication needs and expectations. It sets, maintains, and promotes high national standards for translating and interpreting and implements a national quality-assurance system for accreditation of practitioners who meet those standards.
3.1.1. Translation Activities during Mao’s phase
In the 17 years following the establishment of Communist China (1949-1966), the translation industry developed as a requirement for both international diplomacy and disciplinary development. Translational institutions were established, academic journals published, and translation research conducted (Xu and Mu 2009). However, theoretical translation research remained in its infancy, as empirical research work and research papers were scarce (Xu and Mu 2009) and the focus of translation studies was limited to practice and strategy. During this phase, there were no systematic translation theories to guide translation activities (Xu and Mu 2009). Literature creation and translation activities were a result of inspiration and wit, as classical literature and traditional aesthetics were dominant in the 30 years after 1950. As a result, little attention was paid to the development of translation theories in China. Translators worked according to their own preferences, while readers evaluated the translations according to their own tastes. This aesthetics-oriented principle was dominant for the first 30 years (Cheung 2009).

3.1.2. Translation of The Selected Works of Mao Zedong
Translation of The Selected Works of Mao Zedong began in the 1950s, initiated by Stalin during Mao’s state visit to Russia in 1950 (Liu 2009). Prior to this, Chinese political discourse had seldom been translated into foreign languages (Xu and Mu 2009). The Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volumes 1, 2, and 3 were first translated in the 1950s and published by Lawrence and Wishart Publications. Qian Zhongshu (钱钟书) and Wang Zuoliang (王佐良) were the works’ major translators.

The first translation of Chinese political discourse began with translators gathering together in the Zhong Zhi Hotel in Beijing on 25 October 1960. The translation was conducted in secret and the produced work was considered to be the most unimpeachable and unparalleled translation work (Liu 2009). The translation process followed a strict procedure: 1) first translation, 2) modification of the translation, 3) examination of the translation, 4) finalising of the translation in group discussion, 5) the second modification and embellishment by foreign experts, 6) finalisation by foreign experts, 7) unification of the editions, 8) third finalisation in group discussion, 9) read-through by the finalisers, 10) discussion of questions by experts in China and abroad, 11) last finalisation, and 12) typing and proofreading. The texts were so delicately translated that hours were spent deciding even which article to use, and the translation of a single proper noun could take days (Liu 2009).
The following paragraphs compare excerpts from *The Selected Works of Mao Zedong*—with the original Chinese texts marked as ‘source text’ and the English translations as ‘target text’. They are analysed from lexical, discourse, and socio-cultural perspectives. The lexical-level text analysis considers accuracy, resource of language, and technique, according to the NAATI criteria.

In Example 1, Mao’s writing has a casual and spoken style that is sometimes ironic and humorous. The translation seeks to reproduce these qualities for the target reader. For example, the translation of *jiaopen* (脚盆) as ‘tub’, which contains fish and meat, was intended to maintain Mao’s graceless colloquial style of metaphor.

Example 1
Source text: 太行山、太岳山、中条山的中间，有一个脚盆，就是上党区。在那个脚盆里，有鱼有肉，阎锡山派了十三个师去抢 (Mao 1969).

Target text: ‘The Shangtang area, rimmed by the Taihang, Taiyueh and Chungtiao Mountains, is like a tub. This tub contains fish and meat, and Yen Hsi-shan sent thirteen divisions to grab it’ (Mao 1975).

Although the translators sought to reproduce the original, this translation is more ‘rewriting’, as defined by Nida’s formal equivalence (Nida 1964). The cultural elements in Example 2 below reflect how the ideology of the time emerged in the translation process.

Example 2
Source text: 美国帝国主义者及其走狗国民党反动派 (Mao 1969).


In Example 2, ‘running dogs’ is a very well-known term in translation with a Mao-period gloss. Dogs, in Western culture, do not have the same connotation as they do in Chinese culture, and a running dog is simply a dog that runs. This expression delivers to the Chinese reader of the source text a disdainful impression of a person who helps someone do harm to the general public. Although it could be translated as ‘hatchet man’ or ‘tool’ or ‘flunky’, the original was retained to comply with Mao’s original wording.
There is also evidence that information was selected based on the ideology of the ruling party. For example, in On the Kuomintang’s different answers to the question of responsibility for the war (Mao 1969), a paragraph of Chiang Kai-shek’s announcement is quoted:

**Example 3**

Source text: 这个论点，不是别人的，是第一元名战争罪犯蒋介石的。蒋介石在其元旦声明里说：

中正为三民主义的信徒，秉承国父的遗教，本不愿在对日作战之后再继之以剿匪的军事，来加重人民的痛苦 (Mao 1969).

Target text: ‘It is the argument of none other than War Criminal No.1 Chiang Kai-shek. In this New Year’s Day statement he said: As a devoted adherent of the Three People's Principles and the teachings of the Father of the Republic, I was reluctant to follow the conclusion of the war against Japan with the armed suppression of the bandits and thereby to aggravate the sufferings of the people’ (Mao 1975).

Here, the quotation in the original text is made directly by Chiang Kai-shek. The modest and decent style and traditional manner would impress the Chinese native speaker who read the source text – especially the underlined sentence: ‘中正为三民主义的信徒’. Here, 中正是 the zi 字 (name) of Chiang Kai-shek, which follows an old Chinese tradition. In ancient times, people addressed one another and referred to themselves using zi 字 – rather than ming 名 (name) – to show a sense of modesty and politeness. However, this tradition is absent from the target text, simply replaced by ‘I’, without further explanation. Thus, the target text lacks the flavour of the original and presents the speaker as less genuine and modest – and it is this effect that the target text intended. This is clearly not a faithful translation of the original, nor a fully communicative translation, according to Newmark’s definitions (Newmark 1981). The cultural background is neglected as it does not serve the purpose of the translation. In practice, the purpose of the translation determines the way in which the text is translated.

As the translatability of a text depends on how tightly connected the cultural background of the source language and the target language are and the proximity of the source’s cultural background and the target readers (Munday 2001), the translator plays an active and creative role in the translation process. The translator should regard the source text as a medium through which source culture is revealed, restricting themselves according to the source’s social and cultural background.
The translation process is one of cultural transfer into the target culture expressed by the target text, and the method of translation thus depends on the purpose of the target text.

As such, the neglect of the cultural aspect in this translation strategy is, again, a reflection of the purpose of the translation and the political ideology of the Mao period. Although there is a cultural gap here between Chinese and English, the translator could use footnotes (as in the above examples) to elaborate on what they have chosen to hide in the translation. However, the translator seems to have made themselves visible in the translation here; the original text is thus ‘foreignised’ to express emotion and a political attitude. Accuracy, in NAATI standards (NAATI 2013), is once again neglected; and instead, the purpose of the translation and the political ideology is made primary. The translation positions of the major translators of Mao’s works cannot be found in this translation. The translators reflect the social, cultural and political ideology; they should be either ‘visible’ or ‘invisible’ (as in previous examples) to suit the purpose of translation and the ideology it is designed to carry.

3.1.3. Key Findings

In the above examples, the translations are strongly influenced by political ideology. In Mao’s phase, the purpose of the translation of The Selected Works of Mao Zedong was to introduce and disseminate the experience of socialist construction in China (at the suggestion of Stalin). The target readers were thus those in other countries taking the road of socialism (Yin 2009). Communication with the target readers was not the objective of the translation, which was more source culture-oriented. The translators could be either visible or invisible, depending on the different strategies they applied. The target text might be ‘domesticised’ or ‘foreignised’ (Fairclough 1989), as cultural communication was not considered the purpose of translation. The traces of cultural output appeared more often in the footnotes than in the main translation (Zhang 2013). This could be due to the ‘left’ thinking of the Mao phase and the personality cult that existed around the man himself (Brown 2012), rather than a subjective output of the culture. As we see in the translation of The Selected Works of Mao Zedong, the source text is substantially maintained and literally translated (Zhang 2013).

The translation of Mao’s writing precisely reproduces the casual and coarse writing style, as well as the ironic and humorous flavour of the original text. The translation is faithful to the original on both the lexical and cultural levels. Formal equivalence here outweighs dynamic equivalence.
Although *The Selected Works of Mao Zedong* is a collective work of translation, the main translators’ positions are not reflected in the text. On the textual level, this is because it is a translation of political documents written by Mao himself, most of which point out political directions for the entire country, thus the translation is less subjective. On the contextual level, the political ideology of Mao’s phase exerted many constraints on the process of translation at this time (Zhang 2013).

Finally, although the translators sought to reproduce the original, on the lexical level, the translation process was ultimately one of rewriting due to its purpose. The ideology of the ruling class during Mao’s phase determined the strategies for the translation of *The Selected Works of Mao Zedong*.

3.2. The Deng Phase, 1978-1990

The translations of *The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* were produced under different political conditions to that of Mao’s work. While the latter was produced during the hypersensitive period of the Cultural Revolution, the former emerged in a comparatively looser political environment due to the reform and opening-up policy.

Deng was the core of the Chinese Communist Party’s second generation of central collective leadership. His policies during this period have been named ‘Dengism’ or ‘Deng Xiaoping theory’ (*Deng Xiaoping lilun* 邓小平理论) (Zhai 2015). Deng implemented policies aimed at building socialism with Chinese characteristics, focusing on both material progress and cultural and ethical progress. His major theories include, but are not limited to, his ‘opening-up to the outside world’ policy, the establishment of a ‘market-oriented economy as the primary stage of socialism’, and ‘one country, two political systems’ (Zhai 2015). During this period, China was transformed from a closed country with a planned economy to a more open state, with a booming economy. His theories were embedded in the national constitution as the basic and guiding ideology of the Party, giving cultural and intellectual support to the PRC (Zhai 2015).

3.2.1. Translation Activities During Deng’s Phase

Deng’s official leadership period ran from 1978 until 1990. In this time, the reform and opening-up policy restored the connection between China and the world (Zhai 2015); and as demand increased for communication with the outside world, the Chinese translation industry recovered. The Translation Association of China was established in 1982, at which time China became a member of the International Federation of Translators (Xu and Mu 2009). The academic field of translation studies grew, as global communication became more frequent. Research areas expanded
and their influence deepened. Many academic journals were resumed, and new ones established. Western translation theories, especially linguistic theories, were introduced into China, gradually overtaking the primacy of Russian translation scholarship (Shi 2012). The number of research works also increased in this period. Though the focus remained on translation skills and practice, an increasing number of studies explored applied translation studies and the history of translation (Xu and Mu 2009).

From 1979 to 1988, Chinese traditional translation theories remained dominant, and researchers had only just begun to consider the difference between Chinese and foreign translation theories. However, Western translation theories appeared and began to influence the Chinese tradition (Xu and Mu 2009). Eugene Nida (Nida 1964) and Peter Newmark (Newmark 1981) were famous representatives of the field at the time; and their theories were introduced into China in 1979 and 1981, respectively. Nida’s dynamic equivalence and functional equivalence theories, in particular, had substantial influence (Nida 1964). Western translation theories began to bloom, though they lacked critical analysis and were not yet fully developed (Chen 2000).

3.2.2. The Translation of The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping

The policy of ‘opening-up to the outside world’ made translation an issue of great significance. The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volumes 1 to 3, were translated into many languages. The first English translation was published in 1984 by the Foreign Language Press Beijing, providing what was then the most reliable source of political, economic, and diplomatic information to the rest of the world (CPC Central Party History and Literature Research Institute 2013).

In the translation of Deng’s work, the restructuring of sentences was flexible and the expression lacked the rigidity of Mao’s phase. Translators sought equivalent ways of reproducing a source text and were more likely to adopt a sense of dynamic equivalence and semantic translation to identify the closest natural equivalent of the source language message (Nida 1964).

The following are some examples of the flexible strategies used to translate the word 搞 into English:

Example 1

Source text:  全党讲大局，把国民经济搞上去 (Deng 1993).
Target text: ‘The whole party should take the overall interest into account and **push** the economy forward’ (Deng 1994).

**Example 2**

Source text: 怎样才能把国民经济撑上去？(Deng 1993)

Target text: ‘How can we **give a boost to** the economy?’ (Deng 1994).

**Example 3**

Source text: 一定要把铁路上搞派性活动的里外联系切断 (Deng 1993).

Target text: ‘It is imperative to cut the internal and external connections of individuals who **engage in** factional activities in the railway department’ (Deng 1994).

**Example 4**

Source text: 破坏国家经济建设，在混乱中搞投机倒把，升官发财 (Deng 1993).

Target text: ‘They take advantage of the resulting confusion to **speculate and profiteer**, grabbing power and money’ (Deng 1994).

**Example 5**

Source text: 搞社会主义怎么能等呢？(Deng 1993)

Target text: ‘How can we afford to delay in **advancing** the cause of socialism?’ (Deng 1994).

In these examples, the character 搞 in the source text bears different meanings in different contexts. It appears five times and is translated with five different variations. In Example 1, 搞 means ‘to work on, to propel, and to promote’, but it is translated as ‘push’ in the target text. In Example 2, 搞 has a very similar meaning to 搞 in the first example, but here it is translated as ‘boost’. The difference in the wording is to avoid repetition and to emphasise the slight variation in meaning due to their different contexts. Contrary to the first two examples, 搞 can also have negative connotations. In Examples 3 and 4, for example, 搞 means ‘a misdoing, to speculate, to profiteer’. It is translated here with a flexibility that means the original wording is not taken very seriously; rather, the meanings and connotations seek the ‘naturalness’ of the source text, with the casual style of Deng’s language maintained. Although the parallel effect cannot be obtained for the
term *gao* 搞 as well as formal equivalence, the term is accurately translated and manages a dynamic equivalence and similarity in spirit. The translation here is more target reader-focused and the target text is domesticized.

The functional theories of Hans J. Vermeer and Christiane Nord focus on the choice of translation strategy that must be made during the process to produce a functionally adequate result (Munday 2001). The above examples show that the translation strategy applied in these translations was a dynamic equivalent, rather than a formal one. The source text is domesticized to improve communication. To meet the needs of the target reader, metaphors and idiomatic expressions are employed that are more natural in terms of semantics and lexicon.

Idiomatic expressions cater to the needs of the target reader, according to NAATI standards (NAATI 2013). Here, translators bring their subjectivity into play. According to Mary Snell-Hornby (1995), ‘cross-culture transfer’ means that the key measure of a translation is how meaningful the target text is for the target reader: the translator thus takes an active and creative role in the process. Moreover, the process is a cultural transfer into the target culture, expressed by the target text; thus the method employed depends on the purpose of the target text. The purpose of the translation is therefore demonstrated (Munday 2001).

Comparing this translation strategy with that of Mao’s period, we can conclude that the root of this change was a change in the purpose of translation. Cultural communication was given great attention in Deng’s period in the light of the ‘opening-up’ policy (Shi 2012); and thus, in line with this ideology, translators sought to bridge the cultural gap between the Chinese source text and the English target text (Zhang 2013).

Example 6 illustrates the strategy and style of translation in Deng Xiaoping’s period and invites comparison between the different strategies applied in the Mao and Deng periods.

**Example 6**

**Source text:** 如果中国在一九九七年，也就是中华人民共和国成立四十八年后还不把香港收回，任何一个中国领导人和政府都不能向中国人民交代，甚至也不能向世界人民交代。如果不收回，就意味着中国政府是晚清政府，中国领导人是李鸿章(3)！ (Deng 1993)
Footnote:
Source text: 3, 李鸿章（一八二三——一九零一）, 安徽合肥人, 晚清军政重臣. 一八七零年起任直隶总督兼北洋大臣. 他曾代表清政府主持签订了中英《烟台条约》, 《中法新约》, 中日《马关条约》, 《中俄密约》及辛丑条约一系列割地赔款, 丧权辱国的不平等条约.(Deng 1993).
Target text: ‘If China failed to recover Hong Kong in 1997, when the People's Republic will have been established for 48 years, no Chinese leaders or government would be able to justify themselves for that failure before the Chinese people or before the people of the world. It would mean that the present Chinese government was just like the government of the late Qing Dynasty and that the present Chinese leaders were just like Li Hongzhang (13)’ (Deng 1994).

Footnote:
Target Text: ‘13, Li Hong Zhang (1823-1901), a native of Hefei, Anhui Province, was an important military and administrative official during the late Qing Dynasty. In 1870 he became Governor of Zhili (present-day Hebei) Province and Minister in Charge of the Northern Coastal Provinces. On behalf of the Qing government he presided over the signing of unequal treaties such as the Sino-British Yantai Treaty, the Sino-French New Treaty, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shinomoseki, the Sino-Russian Secret Pact, and the Peace Treaty of 1901 with 11 countries including Great Britain, the United States, Russia, Germany and Japan. Under the terms of these treaties China relinquished sovereignty, ceded territory and paid indemnities’ (Deng 1994).

In the underlined sentence (Renhe yige Zhongguo lingdaoren he zhengfu dou bu neng xiang Zhongguo renmin jiaodai, shenzhi ye bu neng xiang shijie renmin jiaodai 任何一个中国领导人和政府都不能向中国人民交代，甚至也不能向世界人民交代 [Deng 1993: p. 23]), bu neng jiaodai 不能交代 is an idiomatic expression which means ‘to disappoint someone by not accomplishing the task given’. The expression itself comes with a connotation that the subject of this verb bears responsibility and obligations. But the translation ‘no Chinese leaders or government would be able to justify themselves for that failure before the Chinese people or before the people of the world’ is very different. The sense of responsibility and obligation has disappeared; and the sentence is now neutral in its content. Neither accuracy nor lexical connotation is achieved in this translation, which sounds much less harsh to the target reader and is adapted more to the target readers’ code of language. Reflecting the ideology of Deng’s time, the translation of his works is more flexible and target reader-oriented, though political ideology still dictates the communicative purpose of the translation (Zhang 2013).
As seen in the underlined part of the same footnote, some information was added to the target text to explain some historical background to the target reader. This background would be common knowledge to a Chinese reader; thus, again, this is a ‘rewriting’ of the Chinese source text to serve the communicative purpose of the time. The translator becomes ‘visible’ in the domestication of the target text.

3.2.3. Key Findings
The translation of *The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* was more flexible due to the major changes in the dominant political ideology of the time. Translators worked subjectively, using creativity in their choices of words and expressions that reflected the characteristics of the time. The purpose of the translation was to meet the needs of the reform and opening-up policy and to gain mutual understanding with the outside world. The target reader was the international community; and the ideology is reflected by the translations. Translation in this phase became more ‘natural’, as can be seen from the strategies adopted and the lexical choices (Zhang 2013).

In Deng’s phase, although Chinese traditional translation theories remained dominant, Western theories were being introduced into China. Nida’s dynamic equivalence is the most well-known of the theories studied by Chinese scholars (Xu and Mu 2009). Without the restrictions of Mao’s political ideology, Chinese traditional translation theories could be utilised, whilst being aided by Western translation theories. As a result, the translation of *The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* was very different to that of Mao’s works in terms of strategy. The work is more target culture- and target reader- oriented, while some expressions are nevertheless carefully translated and reproduced without loss of the Chinese characteristics of the source text (Zhang 2013).

In the translation of Deng Xiaoping’s work, the restructuring of sentences was more flexible, avoiding the rigidity of Mao’s phase. From early in Deng’s phase, Western translation theories, such as Nida’s equivalence and some cultural theories, were widely discussed. While Western theories were more uncritically accepted during Deng’s phase, translators and language experts began to study them critically during Jiang’s phase.

3.3. The Jiang Phase, 1989-2002
The time of Jiang Zemin was one of deepening reform, a flourishing socialist market economic system, and China’s continued opening-up to the outside world. Jiang Zemin, the core of the
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Chinese Communist Party’s third-generation of central collective leadership, developed his own thoughts with the hope of accelerating economic reform and building a socialist market economy in the primary stage of socialism. He also wished to solve the existing social problems in ethical and cultural life, such as the moral deterioration seen under Deng’s reform (Shi 2012).

3.3.1. Translation Activities in Jiang’s Phase
This phase saw a flourishing of Western translation theories and the development of translation studies in China. With the opening-up to the outside world, academic exchange increased both in quantity and in depth (Xu and Mu 2009). More Western translation theories were introduced from different schools, such as cultural studies, functional studies, deconstructionist theories, and feminism. However, at the same time, these theories and propositions were no longer adopted without question, but now critically analysed. Linguistic theories by Nida and Newmark were still given attention, but researchers began to view them through a critical lens (Xu and Mu 2009).

3.3.2. The Translation of The Selected Works of Jiang Zemin
The Jiang phase shared the basic political ideology of Deng’s phase, while reform and opening-up was deepened. China enjoyed better international standing, with richer and more common communication. However, it also began to face the consequences of Deng’s opening-up policy. According to Shi-Xu (2012), ‘Especially recently, against the context of growing social contradictions and international division, contemporary Chinese political discourse is markedly concerned with social (in)equality and global (in)security’ (p. 97).

The political translation of this period was even more flexible than that of the Deng phase. Translators became more visible in domesticating the target text to reflect the purpose of the process.

Example 1
Source text: 上海的同志在发言中提到了‘打中华牌’、‘世界牌’，走联合开发的路子 (Jiang 2006).

Target text: ‘In their speeches, representatives of Shanghai proposed creating Chinese brands and world brands and working for development through cooperation’ (Jiang 2010).

A striking change can be seen in Example 1. In the source text da Zhongguopai, shijiepai 打中国牌.
世界牌 means ‘to develop domestically and internationally’, and the phrase dapai 打牌 means literally ‘to play cards’. However, in the target text, it is treated as ‘creating Chinese brands and world brands’.

The translation of political discourse in the Jiang phase shifted its focus from sensitive subjects, due to the side effects of the opening-up policy.

Example 2

Source text: 在这里，我要向所有为香港平稳过渡作出贡献的英国朝野人士表示感谢 (Jiang 2006).

Target text: ‘Here, I would like to express my thanks to the British nationals, both within and without the government, who have contributed to the smooth transition of Hong Kong’ (Jiang 2010).

Example 2 is a very typical purpose-oriented and cultural-based translation. It reflects the political ideology of this era, which aimed to minimise political and social differences and problems. The expression Yingguo chaoye renshi 英国朝野人士 was translated as, ‘To the British nationals, both within and without the government’. China and Britain are countries with very different political systems. Britain adopts a constitutional monarchy; the party that wins a majority of seats in the House of Commons forms the government as the ruling party, while the second largest party takes the role of the opposition (Yan 1999). In contrast, China is a one-party state. The term Yingguo chaoye renshi 英国朝野人士 is thus a concept from a foreign culture. The translation does not consider the foreignisation or domestication of the concept in the source or target culture. Although this should be translated as ‘the ruling party and the opposition’, it is translated in a vague manner. This is due to concerns of patronage, rather than cultural difference. The language and cultural gap are dealt with according to the purpose of translation and the ideology of the ruling class. Although the term is translatable through the cultural gap, the translator served the ideology of this period. The cultural differences between the target readers were unimportant. The purpose of the translation and political sensitivity were the dominant factors which determined the target text.

Example 3 is from Speech at the ceremony to mark the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Deng 1993). Emperor Daoguang’s reign in the Qing Dynasty was supplemented with a time range, as was the Treaty of Nanking and the Convention of Peking.
Footnotes are not used here, unlike in the translations of Mao and Deng’s work.

Example 3

Source text: 从秦代到清代道光年间，中国一直对香港实行管辖，行驶主权。十九世纪中叶，英国两次发动鸦片战争。迫使腐败无能的清政府签订《南京条约》和《北京条约》。(Jiang 2006).

Target text: 'From the Qin Dynasty (221-2006BC) to Emperor Daoguang’s reign in the Qing Dynasty (1820-50), China always exercised jurisdiction and sovereignty over Hong Kong. Following the two Opium Wars waged by Britain in the mid-19th century, the British government forced the corrupt and incompetent Qing government to first sign the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 and then the Convention of Peking in 1860’ (Jiang 2010).

3.3.3. Key Findings

In Jiang’s phase, the translation of political discourse became more flexible and purpose-oriented. This phase shared the basic political ideology of the Deng phase, while it also began to face problems arising from the opening-up policy. The production of translation thus became politically sensitive and target text-oriented. Accuracy became less important, and serving the purpose of conveying ideology became the primary goal. Cultural differences were diminished during this period, and the target text was further domesticated either because the ruling class intended to blur politically sensitive concepts or through catering to the target reader (Zhang 2013).

Strategies remained purpose-driven, reflecting the ideology of the ruling class. Political translations in this phase were even more flexible than in Deng’s time. Translators became more ‘visible’ in domesticating the target text according to the purpose of the translation (Zhang 2013). In this case, the subjectivity of the translator was dominant in the translation of Jiang’s work.

During this phase, Chinese traditional translation theories gave way to Western schools of thought, as theories from different Western schools were introduced into China and Chinese translation scholars began to treat them more critically. Under the influence of the political ideology of the period, the translation of The Selected Works of Jiang Zemin was more flexible in terms of strategies applied. Although political translation in this phase seems more flexible in its form, political ideology still directed the process of translation such as through using distortions to avoid politically sensitive concepts (Zhang 2013).
4. Concluding Thoughts: New Models of Political Translations

Yin Chengdong (2009) claims that the official translation of *The Selected Works of Mao Zedong* is the highest quality of any other leader’s official translation since 1949 because it is the collective work of the most gifted translators and language experts. However, this paper applies culturally oriented translation theories to argue that the work is representative of the ideology of the period: a purpose-driven translation that neglects many other elements that should also have been taken into consideration, according to Fairclough (1992). In the translation of Mao’s work, lexical choices and sentence structures, as well as target readers and their culture, should have been given more attention to achieve dynamic equivalence. Although the lexicon and style are more delicately translated for *The Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, dynamic equivalence and cultural orientation are not achieved because the work is so strongly influenced by the ideology of Mao’s phase.

The translations produced during Deng’s phase appear more compatible with the source text, as they are more in accordance with both Chinese traditional translation criteria and Western cultural theory (Zhang 2013).

Translation of political discourse in Jiang’s phase was conducted in a rougher manner than in the other two phases considered here. Although the primary ideology of this time can be described as harmonious, the social problems emanating from Deng’s phase had begun to influence translation in Jiang’s time (Shi 2012).

The political documents examined in this study are measured using the standard of the NAATI criteria (NAATI 2013). On this basis, the greatest accuracy is seen in Deng’s translation, with dynamic equivalence best achieved in this work. The translation of Mao is more formally equivalent, as this work was constrained by Mao’s personality cult and ‘left’ thinking, while the translation of Jiang’s work does not suggest equivalence was a primary consideration and is rather more sensitive to political concerns (Zhang 2013).

Regarding syntactic choice, the translation of Mao’s works clearly strived to maintain Mao’s syntactical style and structure and imitate the spoken tone employed in most of his original works (Yin 2009). However, the translations of Deng and Jiang’s works were more flexible in both syntactic style and tone, employing more idiomatic expressions. The translators introduced their own subjectivity to the style, and the resulting target text is more target reader-focused (Zhang 2013).
From a discourse practice and social practice point of view, the purpose of the translation of Mao’s works was to introduce to the outside world the experience of building socialism in China (Yin 2009). However, the translation of Mao’s works was not target reader-focused, as the translators were constrained by the social cultural ideology of Mao’s time. His personality cult and the ‘left’ thinking of the society had a substantial influence on the text production. This explains why it is the only era in which social political ideology contradicted the purpose of the translation. In Deng and Jiang’s translations, the purpose serves the ideologies of their respective times (Wu and Zhang 2013).

Due to the factors cited above, the translators were ultimately more invisible in Mao’s phase, though traces of them can be identified where amendments were needed to ‘correct’ contradictions between the translation and political ideology. In the translation of Deng’s work, the translators had more room to incorporate their own subjectivity, thus idiomatic translations appeared and the resulting texts cater more to the language habits of target readers. However, in the translations of Jiang’s work, the translations seem overly flexible, either due to inappropriate translations or because of the political sensitivities they sought to avoid.

Neither classical Chinese translation theory criteria nor theories mentioned by the major translators of Mao’s work are clearly reflected in this work, as political ideology overwhelmed all other concerns. However, in the translation of Deng’s work, the dynamic equivalence proposed by Nida is carefully applied. For Jiang’s translation, Chinese scholars were beginning to apply cultural and functional translation theories more critically (Xu and Mu 2009), and the purpose of the translation – which served the political ideology – was made primary. As a result, translation in this phase was more flexible even than translations of Deng’s work.

In summary, Table 1 below details the most influential factors in each of the three phases, under the framework of CDA (Fairclough 1992). Five elements are cited; namely, social, cultural, and political background and ideology; the purpose of the translation; the target reader; the translators’ subjectivity; and mainstream translation theory (Fairclough 1992).

The table shows that the greater the focus on political ideology, the less attention is given to factors such as mainstream translation theories, the target reader, and the translators’ subjectivities. This is true in each of the three phases, according to the specific features of each period. Thus, each phase is given a name corresponding to the dominant characteristic of its political translations.
As the maintenance of Mao’s personal writing style was reflective of the political ideology of his time, political translations of this period can be described as employing the ‘loyalty model’. Political translations under Deng’s phase took all features into consideration, representing a ‘balancing model’. In Jiang’s phase, the ruling class intended to soften politically sensitive concepts while also catering to the target reader, while translators became overly powerful and dynamic equivalence was not achieved. Thus, the translation method of this phase can be described as the ‘reforming model’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CDA</th>
<th>Mao</th>
<th>Deng</th>
<th>Jiang</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural analysis</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discourse analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mainstream translation theories</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target reader</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose of translation</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>Translator’s visibility</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>Text analysis</td>
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<td>Translation strategy</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>Loyalty model</td>
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<td>Balancing model</td>
<td>Reforming model</td>
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Table 1: Different models of political translation under the critical discourse analysis (CDA) framework (own research).

Table 1 shows that, in Mao’s phase, the sociocultural and political background and ideology and the purpose of translation were the factors that drove the translation strategy. Other factors indicated in Table 1 were secondary to these. Although traditional Chinese translation theories remained dominant, the translation theories of the primary translators of the work could not be brought fully into play due to the requirement of maintaining Mao’s personal writing style. The translators are invisible in the process, their subjectivity overwhelmed by the political ideology of the period. The target reader is thus, in turn, placed into a secondary position.

However, in Deng’s phase, all six factors are considered. The purpose of the translation was to open-up and communicate with the outside world, as the political ideology of Deng’s phase was more tempered. Translations of this period see more dynamic equivalence, attempting to balance both source reader and target reader. Chinese traditional theories continued to dominate, while
Western translation theories were slowly being introduced. Translators became visible, their subjectivities reflected in the texts. Traces of translation strategies can also be identified, with influences by both traditional Chinese and Western scholarly thought (Chen 2000).

In Jiang’s phase, following the changes of political ideology from Deng’s period, translation served the purposes of the opening-up policy and sought to diminish various social problems. As a result, translation became even more flexible, as shown in Chapter 3. Mistranslations even arise in the efforts to avoid politically sensitive concepts. Although more diverse streams of Western translation theory began to play a more prominent role during this time, few traces of corresponding strategies can be found in Jiang’s translation. The translators are very visible, with text occasionally either overly or casually translated. For this reason, two yeses are given for translator visibility in Jiang’s work (Table 1).

Although, in previous examples, flexible translations sought to cater more to the target reader, some of the meaning and flavour of the original texts would still inevitably be lost. Although meaning can be achieved on the linguistic level, a deeper level of meaning – with domestic values, beliefs, and social representations that carry ideological force – is not necessarily delivered (Venuti 1998). The target reader, again, is placed in a secondary position, as Jiang’s work has neither formal equivalence nor dynamic equivalence.

In sum, the translations of Chinese political discourse in the Mao, Deng, and Jiang eras were all primarily driven by the ideological states of the Communist Party of China during each historical period. Although factors such as sociocultural difference, the purpose of translation, the visibility of the translators, and the different translation theories and strategies all had an impact on the production of the text, political ideology was the overriding concern, with all other factors expected to serve this.
References


Chen Zhang is a PhD candidate in Translation and Chinese studies with the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, The University of Sydney. Her research area is mainly in translation studies of political and literary genres and also comparative translation studies. She also has a broad research interest in Chinese political and cultural studies from the perspective of how political and sociocultural peculiarity are represented in languages and also Chinese teaching as a second language. Chen is also a teaching fellow at the University of Melbourne, RMIT University and Monash University. She is engaged in the teaching of fundamental Chinese, Chinese literature, Chinese translation, and Translation for professional purposes and also participates in curriculum design.
A critical review of the history of the discursive formation of Sino-Indian relations suggests that the largely negative mutual perceptions of the Chinese and Indian public and media are opposed by the optimistic discourse of the two nations’ political and economic elites. This is accompanied by a juxtaposed, binary discourse of the bilateral relationship between members of the liberal and realist camps in academia. While the former largely emphasises mutual economic cooperation, the latter argues that future tensions are inexorable due to the difficult past and territorial issues. A critical discourse analysis is applied to numerous academic, political, and journalistic sources, as well as 20 semi-structured interviews with Indian and Chinese exchange students in both countries, to understand the degree to which they conform with the dominant discursive speech formation. The results confirm a strong difference between state and academic/public perceptions. In contrast, the interviews with exchange students appear to mix characteristics of both, leaning towards cooperation. They indicate a stronger ontological security fixation on the Indian side with regard to China than vice versa and a strong power imbalance in favour of China. Although the students made frequent use of mutual stereotyping, they were generally optimistic and critical of the prevalent negative discourse and mutual lack of knowledge and trust. The students tended to emphasize efforts to improve mutual ties through economic and cultural cooperation, exchanges, and the solution of the border issue.
Sino-Indian Mutual Perceptions

Intercultural Students’ Discourse on Ontological Security and Identity

By

Lukas Nagel

1. Introduction and Research Gap

In recent years, both China and India have come to be considered rising powers, becoming the focus of a great variety of scholarship, comparisons, and predictions (e.g., see Lal 2009; Manson 2010; Ratha and Mahapatra 2015; Freeman 2018; Roy-Chaudhury 2018). It has become commonplace to draw parallels between China and India as the ‘greatest civilisations in the history of the human race’ (Goh 2006: p. 263), the ‘two oldest continuous civilisations in the world’ (Lal 2009: p. 44), ‘ancient political and cultural powers’ (Manson 2010: p. 86), and even ‘glorious ancient civilisations’ (Huang 2005: p. 631). It is also common to juxtapose China and India in a systemized manner in terms of population, territory, literacy, GDP, Gini coefficient, exports, industrial output, and so on, in schoolbooks (Huang 2005: p. 632), debates (Lal 2009: p. 42), and online discussion. Roy-Chaudhury (2018: p. 99) argues that while Sino-Indian relations are ‘well researched’, the mutual views of both nations are still inadequately understood.

It has been said that the media coverage of Sino-Indian relations is both ‘overly optimistic’ and ‘overly pessimistic’ (Goh 2006: p. 265) and supports ‘old and often distorted views’ of the bilateral relations (Bhattacharya 2019: p. 262). Academic literature on Sino-Indian relations has often led to a binary discourse, with oversimplified and contested linguistic terms, as described by Coleman (2013), juxtaposing a relationship of ‘friend versus foe’. In terms of international relations (IR) theory and policy analysis, this has often resulted in an oversimplified division between a liberal-

1 The well-known journalist Edgar Snow may have been the first to declare China and India the ‘oldest continuous civilisations in the world’, noting their ‘close religious and cultural ties’ (Snow 1944).

2 The blogs and websites on which it is common to find heated nationalist debates over which country is ‘greater’ include http://country-facts.findthedata.com/compare/12-122/China-vs-India and http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/10/comparing-india-and-china.

3 Many of these works have been severely criticised because they are often based on populist and overly simplified notions of economics and politics that lead to dubious relativism, stereotypes, and simplistic assessments (Ma and Feo-Giet 2014; Bardhan 2010).
optimistic and a realist-pessimistic explanation of the contemporary political and economic realities. The realist camp predicts an inevitable power rivalry between the two, while the neo-liberalists believe in growing multilateral cooperation and interdependence (Panda 2013: p. 669; Lamy 2011: p. 117). This division into two main camps has led to an analytical cleavage or ‘paradigm war’ (Holslag 2010: p. 3), resulting in black and white imagery that has influenced countless academic publications, often cynically labelled as ‘Dragon and Elephant airport books’ (Ma and Feo-Giet 2014: p. 3). Furthermore, popular analyses often try to use the countries as representative case studies to decode the overall relationship between authoritarianism and democracy and different development paradigms (Bardhan 2010). The use of India as an example of democracy and of the PRC as an authoritarian regime has inspired discussion, especially in relation to comparisons of their economic and political success (Lal 2009: p. 43).

Recently, there have been calls to ‘set the record straight’ (Bhattacharya 2019), apply a ‘ground-up approach’ in place of ‘high politics’ (Guyot-Rechard 2017: p. 5), focus on bilateral perceptions (Roy-Chaudhury 2018), and introduce fresh ways of understanding Sino-Chinese relations (e.g. Lintner 2018; Sen 2018).

Thus, this paper argues that the contemporary bilateral relations between China and India are characterized by a misleading binary academic discourse of realist pessimism and liberal optimism. This research seeks to add a humble contribution to the growing body of alternative critical research. Within the countries themselves, the political and economic elites still tend to emphasize a neo-liberal relationship and cooperative discourse. The tone of the media and public polls in the two states reveals that general perceptions among the respective populations remain critical, highly sceptical, and rather pessimistic. It is crucial to note, however, that while exchange and communication occur at the political level, interpersonal contact between Indian and Chinese citizens remains extremely limited.

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5 It has been argued for some time that many Asian nations face a strategic dilemma, named the ‘Asian paradox’: they rely primarily on the US and its allies of Japan and India for security, but on China for their economies (Karim and Islam 2018: p. 287). Soft power could be a valid strategy for improving Sino-Chinese relations (Karim and Islam 2018: p. 298). Again, this places India and China on two extremes of a spectrum; yet it also reveals a crucial sphere that is often neglected: culture and mutual exchange beyond security and trade.
6 This simplified relationship between political system and economic success has been challenged by a number of scholars (e.g. Huang 2011; Bardhan 2010).
One of the most consistent groups in Sino-Indian exchange are students who have lived and studied in both nations. This study seeks to identify how these individuals view the bilateral relations and whether their perceptions indicate cultural reflexivity, differing from the mainstream. Since the number of exchange students is limited, this group has been largely understudied. This study intends to contribute to fill this gap by asking the following question:

*How far do Chinese and Indian students abroad conform with the dominant discursive formation of contemporary Sino-Indian bilateral relations or differ from it to make sense of their intercultural experiences?*

A critical discourse analysis (CDA) was conducted for the current work to deconstruct intercultural students’ perceptions of bilateral relations based on political psychology.

### 2. Literature Review and Theory

#### 2.1. Ontological Security

The incorporation of ontological security theory (OST) into political science generally – and IR in particular – is fairly recent, but it has quickly produced a diverse body of academic literature (e.g., Kinnvall 2004, 2007; Steele 2005, 2008; Mitzen 2006; Krolikowski 2008; Rumelili 2015). These works have largely been inspired by the writings of Anthony Giddens (1991). He defines OS as something that goes beyond the traditional concept of physical safety; namely, a ‘sense of continuity and order in events, including those not directly within the perceptual environment of the individual’ (Giddens 1991: p. 243). According to this approach, OS provides the individual with a positive discourse about the self and identity to avoid ‘existential anxiety’ and maintain psychological sanity, and it works on a collective level as ‘a protection of future threats’ (Giddens 1991: p. 38-40).

Theorists of IR have explored this approach to analysis of politics at the state level. It is not only individuals who seek OS, but also collectives and even states. Mitzen (2006), for example, argues that OST in relation to states can explain apparent anomalies in bilateral relations not explainable by a focus on physical security.

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*This application does not go unchallenged. Critical voices on the applicability of ontological security for IR include Jackson (2004), Croft (2012), and Krolikowski (2008). The latter, for example, argues that the recycling of social theories from the individual level and usage in the discourse of the state-as-a-person is problematic, yet largely accepted and often appears without a critical stance (Krolikowski 2008: p. 109).*
Due to complex global changes, many collective group identities have lost relational ties that in the past gave them OS (Giddens 1991). One strategy for coping with these tremendous challenges is to ‘demodernize’ (Pathak 1998: p. 22), to turn back time and return to a safe place in which identity is well-defined and the world apparently simpler – or as Catarina Kinnvall puts it: collectives go back to ‘an imagined past’ (Kinnvall 2004: p. 744), which may often result in identifying an ‘other’ who does not submit to the main narrative and is thus seen as a threat (Kinnvall 2004: p. 2007).

With the strengthening of capitalist forces and the corresponding weakening of the nation state, the latter often reinvents its legitimacy by providing OS (Krolikowski 2008: p. 124). Other groups may compete for the most compelling narrative; and consequently, the state, radical movements, and other groups (exchange students, in the current paper) often stand in opposition to one another and literally ‘compete’ for the trust and loyalty of the people via diverging discourses (Kinnvall 2004: p. 743). This study applies OST to explore the discourse of a small number of Sino-Indian intercultural students as members of a larger diaspora of nationals.

2.2. The Autobiographical Self and the Process of ‘Othering’

As clarified above, OS asserts that the self relies on a dominant, autobiographical narrative. Accordingly, state actors become attached to this identity to make sense of their own politics in the chaotic sphere of international relations (Delehanty and Steele 2009: p. 531).

The general narrative of a collective or individual self relies largely on practices and discourses that differentiate “us” from “others”. Thus, OS too is reliant on a variety of “identity markers” that distinguish the “self” from the “other” (Rumelili 2015: p. 56). By juxtaposing one’s own constructed identity characteristics with those of others, the “self” and the “other” are constructed in a symbiotic interdependence (Ogilvie and Ashmore 1991: p. 286). Bauman (2003) argues that this leads to linguistic couples that juxtapose the normal/abnormal, ordinary/bizarre, domestic/wild, familiar/strange, and so on.

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8 Benedict Anderson (1983) has first coined this in ‘Imagined Communities', in which he asserts that individuals of a nation perceive themselves as part of a larger group, even though they will never directly have any contact with most of its members.
In relation to the state or citizens of a nation, other insights from social identity construction indicate that individuals tend to prefer “their” own chosen group over “outgroups”: membership of a group gives an individual a sense of belonging and raises their self-consciousness. Hence, each member of the collective has an interest in improving the status of their own group in comparison to the “other” because this will positively affect them and increase OS (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Hogg 1992). However, some argue that the process of “othering” may also be linked to the “demonising” of the other – or, in other words, projecting the negative traits onto the other that distinguish it from the “in-group” (Volkan 1997: p. 113; Murer 1999).

It is argued that OS is especially strong when related to a narrative of national pride or honour that is being challenged, as the myth of national salvation is often put into contrast with painful events in the national history that are embedded in collective history: ‘Humiliation is thus one of the modes used to draw ethical boundaries between self and other, between domestic and foreign’ (Callahan 2004: p. 203).

Volkan (1997: p. 36) describes these national humiliations as ‘chosen traumas’, which serves as a key concept in the CDA of the interviews of this study. Chosen traumas comprise a negative psychological recollection of events that befell the group in the past and they are usually linked to intense feelings. Some note that this process (Murer 1999) may lead to the conclusion that ethnic, religious, and national conflicts are timeless. ‘Chosen glories’ (Volkan 1997: p. 81), on the other hand, are the other side of the coin: boosting a groups’ self-esteem and pride, often in opposition to the “other”, who was humiliated. Both variations of historical narratives are typically surrounded by myths (Kinnvall 2004: p. 755).

3. Definitions and Relevance
As a society consists of diverse socio-political groups with very different identities and interests, a dominant narrative hardly ever goes unquestioned. Huysmans (1998), for example, studied the threat to group identities by internal others, and Delehanty and Steele argue that the gendered, largely masculine, autobiographical narrative of the state may be challenged by internal groups that have a more “feminine” identity, which can relate to or oppose dominant narratives (2009: p. 527-528).

* Kinnvall (2004: p. 671) gives examples of where an idealized ‘national character’ is very much related to gender. It is further argued that these anti-mainstream narratives frequently draw on more ‘feminine’ characteristics of human conduct – such as cooperation, peace, mutual respect, trust, and friendship – in resistance to a pessimist, conflictual discourse (Ruddick 2001: p. 196).
The growing influence of diaspora communities should be seen in the context of an increasingly globalised world, with the boundaries becoming ‘porous and fuzzy’ (Kinnvall and Svensson 2010: p. 285).

3.1. Influence of Diaspora Communities

In the context of rising migration, the definition of a “diaspora” is widening. Weinra (2010: p. 74) concludes that the original definition has been changed in response to a growing body of research, ‘framing diaspora as almost any population on the move and no longer referring to the specific context of their existence’. It has also been proposed that “professional” communities abroad can also be considered diaspora: ‘For example, science diasporas are communities of scientists who conduct their research away from their homeland’ (Burns 2013: p.1). One “new” diaspora group, with increasing influence on the discourses in their home countries, is international students, a growing population engaged in a diversity of cross-cultural exchanges (Wang et al. 2015: p. 52).

3.2. International Students as Agents of “Intercultural Understanding”

Like other migration-related terms, “international student” has many different definitions, notably in relation to the required time spent abroad. While UNESCO (2019) makes no such reference and simply defines international students as people who ‘crossed a national or territorial border for the purpose of education and are now enrolled outside their country of origin’, the migration data portal (2019) cite two criteria: the individual must hold a ‘non-resident visa’ and they must be pursuing ‘a tertiary degree (or higher) in the destination country’. Both definitions apply to the participants in this study.

The number of exchange students between China and India, however, is very striking for how low it is, especially when we consider that these are the most populous countries in the world and both have a strong focus on education. In 2011,10 just 3,000 Chinese students were studying in India (compared with 100,000 in the US). Indian exchange students in China numbered approximately

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10 Unfortunately, it was not possible in November 2019 to obtain more recent data from Chinese or English websites on the absolute number of Chinese students in India. Websites such as Migration Data Portal, UNESCO’s Institute for Statistics, and Project Atlas give numbers for the number of Indian students in China, but not vice versa. Moreover, the official website of the Chinese embassy in India appears to be poorly maintained: it rests on a non-secure, non-verified server; statistical numbers are nowhere to be found; and the last entries under ‘China-India Relations’ and ‘Education Cooperation’/‘Science and Technology Exchanges’ are from 2006: in.china-embassy.org rer
13,000 in 2015 (Daily News and Analysis 2015), 18,171 in the academic year 2016-2017 (Embassy of India in Beijing 2019), and 23,000 in 2019 (The Economic Times, 7 October 2019).

It is frequently argued that the “international experience” results in intercultural competences and sensitivities for students. However, studies have produced mixed findings. Some indicate that contact and mutual learning in optimal conditions has a very positive impact on prejudice reduction among individuals and groups (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Moline 2009). However, it has also been observed that negative contact more substantially increases biased attitudes than positive contact reduces them (Barlow et al. 2012) and that studies abroad can reaffirm preconceived stereotypes (Coleman 1998). Moreover, an ‘international sojourn’ as a ‘temporary between-culture stay’ (Ward et al. 2001) can be a traumatic event that may induce a multitude of cultural and mental problems (Brown and Holloway 2008; Meier and Daniels 2011; Kim 2001). For this study, both positive and negative experiences and perceptions of international students as part of growing scientific diasporas are of importance.

4. Data Collection and Methodology

Various sources are analysed for this study, including academic publications, public polls, newspaper outlets, and diplomatic press statements. Due to time and budget constraints, the interview sample comprises a total of 20 interviews, which were collected in India and the PRC in Mumbai, Delhi, Shanghai, and Beijing, at six universities, between February and April 2015. Purposive sampling aimed to find exchange students in both countries who had each studied in the other respective country.

Public and private universities, academic tutors, language schools, cultural organisations, and private individuals both in China and India were contacted either with an explanatory email or by telephone, introducing the research. The network was then expanded using a snowballing system. The interview consisted of a semi-structured questionnaire of five sections and 38 questions. A gender balance was achieved. The interviews lasted 70-100 minutes each and were thoroughly recorded. The data was then transcribed, coded, and analysed using CDA.

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11 The conduct in the field was based on the precise application of research ethics of the “Guidelines for Master Thesis” by the Centre for East and Southeast Asian Studies at Lund University, Sweden.
4.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

The definition and usage of “discourse analysis” is not unchallenged in academia (Wetherell 2001; Cameron 2001). Consequently, many different schools of thought on discourse analysis as method and theory have emerged. Cameron (2001: p. 11-12) describes a coarse division between the two primary definitions: first, discourse as ‘language in use’, standing in the tradition of linguistics; and secondly, discourse as ‘practices which systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault 1972: p. 49), centring on the power/knowledge nexus in social life.

The method of CDA is applied to uncover ‘hidden agendas’ (Cameron 2001: p. 123) and various layers of collective presuppositions, showing what can be said in certain social environments and the limits of what can be thought (Moses and Knutsen 2007: p. 218-219). Focusing on the role of language as a power resource in relation to ideology and socio-cultural change, CDA lends itself to this research design, since it is interdisciplinary (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). It is “critical” because it looks at the (hidden) interconnection between language and elements of social life, it is committed to ‘progressive social change’ (Fairclough 2001: p. 230), and it has an emancipatory ‘knowledge interest’ (Habermas 1971). Another crucial aspect of CDA is its effort to analyse the ‘order of discourse’, with the intent to understand which discourses are either dominant/mainstream or marginal/oppositional (Fairclough 2001: p. 235), which properly suits the purpose of this study.

4.2. Research Limitations

Clearly, the conclusions from this small-scale research project are limited by its sample number, time, and space; thus, the conclusions do not claim to support larger generalisations.

Additionally, it is noted that the interviews were conducted almost exclusively in English and not in the native languages of the participants. Although all the interviewees were able to express themselves confidently in English, some of the Chinese individuals were less linguistically sophisticated. To counter this, parts of the interview were then continued in Mandarin, with the questions having been translated into Chinese prior to the interviews.

5. Competing Discourses and Interpretations of Mutual Relations

Following India’s assertion of independence in 1947 and that of the PRC in 1949, the prevailing discourse on Sino-Indian relations in the early 1950s was ‘Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai’ (Hindi for 'Indian and Chinese are Brothers’) (Lal 2009: p. 41-42). The agreement on the famous five principles of
peaceful coexistence clearly indicated communalities in the two nations’ political attitudes (Siddiqi 2009: p. 61). However, the 1962 war dramatically worsened relations, largely due to the disputed border shared by China and India in the post-colonial era. The war ended with the defeat of the Indian forces. As a result, ‘Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai’ was cynically changed to a discourse of ‘Hindi Chini Bye Bye’ (Lal 2009: p. 42), indicating an intensified rivalry and the appearance of radical “othering” through an “enemy” image (Siddiqi 2009: p. 62).

The first half of the 1970s saw further souring of bilateral relations in response to the improvement of Chinese-Pakistani relations (and support in the 1971 war), China’s active propaganda campaign against India, and the support of dissident groups within Indian territory (Goh 2006: p. 267). A number of high-level talks took place in the 1980s, laying the groundwork for bilateral meetings that were primarily concerned with a solution to the border issue (Goh 2006: p. 268). A joint press communiqué referred to ‘peaceful and friendly’ cooperation and propagated a non-violent solution to the border issue (Siddiqi 2009: p. 63).

A more determined diplomatic effort to improve the Sino-Indian relations was seen in the 1990s, with crucial meetings between high-ranking politicians. The early 2000s are generally viewed as another period of deepening relations, underscored by a multitude of mutual agreements and high-level talks (Goh 2006: p. 270-273). The 2010s, however, saw an increase of Indian troops at the Chinese-Indian border (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2016), and a two-month standoff at Doklam in 2017 led to renewed tensions, with China warning India not to repeat the mistakes of the 1962 war (Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Yan Shugang 2017). Eventually, both sides peacefully withdrew their troops (Mastro 2018: p. 140).

Recently, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir has further complicated the bilateral relations, as is shown below.

5.2. Bilateral Problems and Security Issues

The 1962 Sino-Indian war and territorial issues deeply affected mutual perceptions and discourses. It has not been forgotten in India that China’s armed forces marched into Indian territory despite

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12 The principles were as follows: (1) mutual respect for one another’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) non-interference in one another’s internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence (Mansingh 2007: p. 122).

13 Among them are Chinese Premier Li Peng (1992), Indian President Ramaswami Venkataraman (1992), former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao (1993), and former Chinese President Jiang Zemin (1996).
the 1954 Panchsheel agreement (Panda 2013: p. 687). The undeclared war ended with the defeat of the Indian troops, a face-loss for Nehru, and a strong blow to the young Indian nation – Manson calls it a ‘humiliation’ (2010: p. 86). Basharat Peer (2010) has noted that the ‘memory of the 1962 war with China’ and ‘talk of the Chinese interference and aggression [is] everywhere'. For India, this event seems to fit the definition of a “chosen trauma”, strongly remembered and embedded in collective memory.

The India-US/Sino-Pakistani security nexus concerns both sides. Since the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement, there has been a growing fear in the PRC that India could become an ally in a US-led coalition of democratic countries (a network running ‘from Japan to India’) in the area, threatening Chinese interests in the future (Krishnan 2010). Similarly, India is concerned by the Pakistan-China relations, which have emerged since Pakistan sought to establish better ties with the PRC in the 1960s (Siddiqi 2009: p. 60-72). The Indian public remembers with bitterness that China backed Pakistan in the 1965 Pakistani-Indian war (Goh 2006: p. 267). Almost half (45%) of all Indian citizens say they view Pakistan as the main threat to India, with only 6% citing China (Pew Research Center 2014a). In 2016, more than 40% of Indians saw China’s influence in terms of territorial disputes and its relationship with Pakistan as ‘very serious’ (Pew Research Center 2016).

It is important to note that neither China nor India perceive one another as key threats. As shown in the table above, China sees the US as its primary opponent and India is most concerned with Pakistan (Pew Research Center 2014b). Therefore, it is an indirect threat perception due to being an ally of one’s key competitor that renders the Sino-Indian relations so fundamentally complex.

The 2017 standoff between Chinese and Indian troops at Doklam can thus be explained as an effort by Beijing to contain an increasingly confident India and as a reaction by India intended to show strength in memory of the 1962 war (Panda 2017). Moreover, the 2019 withdrawal of special
rights in the Indian Union of Jammu and Kashmir Union by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has resulted in an unheard reaction from the Chinese side, criticising ‘human rights violations’ (Malik 2019). One Chinese spokesperson argued that India giving special status to Ladakh ‘challenged China’s sovereign interests’, which was immediately rejected by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), arguing that it was an internal affair and did not affect the line of actual control (LAC) with China (Rajagopalan 2019).

5.3. Ontological Security, Identity, and Othering

Depictions of India as poor and disorganised as a result of its immature democracy serves as a stark contrast and negative “other” for the PRC, with its self-image as a successful and orderly regime. Accordingly, most Chinese people fall back on a set of negative images and concepts when thinking about India, among them the disastrous living conditions of the lower castes and the defeat in the 1962 border war. China has undergone a variety of fundamental and often violent and traumatic identity changes and has been described as an insecure actor with ‘rigid basic trust’, or low trust in multilateral agreements and with foreign nations (Krolikowski 2008: p. 117).

A culture of remembering national humiliation is essential to Chinese nationalism and encompasses the so-labelled “century of humiliation” (1839-1949), that began with the first Opium War (1839-1842).

The traumatic partition of Pakistan (1947) and the resulting extensive migration and communal violence set the conditions for a long-time antagonism between the two nations (Kinnvall and Svensson 2010: p. 276). Kinnvall (2004) argues that the Hindu-Muslim conflict is a defining ‘chosen trauma’ for India (p.755). Like China, India retains a crucial ‘civilizational exceptionalism’ in its biographical narrative and, therefore, its understanding of OS (Chacko 2014: p. 331). The fondness of the US for democratic India as a strategic partner also derives from India being an alternative to China, which is seen as a threat: ‘India is the un-China’ (Elliot 2006). To conclude, Guyot-Rechard (2019: p. 1) argues convincingly how the physical closeness between the two ‘alternative political project[s]’ leads to competitive, mirroring othering between China and India and the ambition to prove superiority over the other – which smoothly reconfirms theories from group psychology (e.g., Hogg 1992; Volkan 1997: p. 113; Murer 1999).

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6. Dominant Discourses on Mutual Relations

Perceptions of power are crucial and shaped by leaders in both nations to project certain images (Johnston 2003). Foucault claims that language is power and that those who wield the ability to produce discourse have the power to make it “true” (Foucault 1980: p. 201). Even though it is often assumed that ‘liberal-pluralistic’ societies offer more space for open discussion and competing discourses (Panda 2013: p. 686-687), various studies in China show that Chinese nationalistic discourses are by no means uniform (Krolikowski 2008: p. 129).

6.1. Discourse on the State-level

Their undeniable similarities in history and demographics have meant that the Chinese Communist Party has, in the past, framed India as the “failed other”, in a stark juxtaposition to its own system and identity, to legitimize its own rule (Huang 2005: p. 632). However, recent official government-level discourse has been predominantly and intentionally positive, using formulations that are almost identical to those of the late 1990s. The emphasis on historical and cultural parallels has produced the neologism “Chindia” (China plus India), which is widely used in reference to the discourse of neoliberal cooperation (Panda 2013: p. 688). Neo-liberal ideas of economic interdependence and mutual complementarity are stressed, with both countries urged to ‘deepen’ their ‘strategic mutual trust’ (Embassy of the PRC 2014).

Jagannath Panda (2013) observes that both the economic and political elites in India have decided to engage with China (p. 687). While this engagement on the political level is described as “cautious”, with the discourse of the “rise of China” widely acknowledged and unavoidable, the industry strongly stresses the economic opportunities. The term “Chindia” was first coined by Indian politician Jairam Ramesh to express the economic interdependence and argue that China is the “world factory” (agriculture, manufacturing), while India is the “world office” (IT, software, service industry). This promotes the belief that the nations’ economies share a complementarity (Siddiqi 2009: p.72), an arguably flawed presupposition that is often quoted in academia (e.g., Sidhu and Yuan 2003; Siddiqi 2009; Sen 2018) and has recently been challenged.16

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15 In his 2018 book, Sen (p. 478) explains this focus on the state-level as follows: ‘[…] the civilisational narrative became a refugee for those seeking alternatives to the discourse of rivalry and conflict’.

16 Pranab Bardhan, for example, challenges common ‘myths’ about China and India in his popular ‘Awakening Giants. Feet of Clay’ (2010); while Yasheng Huang argues in ‘The myth of economic complementarity in Sino-Indian relations’ (2011) that the complementarity is fantasy based upon political will and that the two economies are more competitive than complementary.
The official level currently refers to what has been termed a ‘strategic and cooperative partnership’, which includes economic ties and the intention to ‘promote peace and development in Asia and the world as a whole’, where there is enough ‘space […] for the simultaneous development of India and China’ (Indian Ministry of External Affairs 2015). Despite the re-emerging border issues, political leaders appear determined to maintain an optimistic message. ‘China and India are opportunities, not a threat, to one another’, Xi allegedly said during a meeting with Modi in June 2019, while Modi tweeted that the two should continue to strengthen their economic and cultural ties (Lee 2019). In contrast, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign affairs strongly criticised Modi’s move in Jammu and Kashmir, opposing the incursion into India’s territory and claiming that India has ‘continued to undermine China’s territorial sovereignty’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2019).

6.2. Academia, Media, and Public Perception

It has been noted that the tendency in domestic Sino-Indian security analyses is hawkish and realist in nature, leading to biased and worst-case assumptions (Sidhu and Yuan 2003: p. 170). However, many Chinese scholars believe that India is inferior to the PRC, since it lacks the economic qualifications necessary for a great power and which they believe China to have. However, they also acknowledge that India is stronger in other areas, such as human rights and multilateral negotiations (Raman 2011: p. 348).

The majority of Indian academics and think-tanks are more sceptical and often depict the PRC as a security concern, especially when it comes to securing its borders. A strong focus by the Indian strategic community on the “China threat theory” prevails and has led to some fatalist prognoses (Manson 2010: p. 92). Paul (2018) argues that the ‘rivalry is unlikely to end anytime soon’ (p. 5) and concludes that ongoing Indian mistrust towards China is evident in the heightened military presence in the South China Sea and strategic partnerships with the US, Vietnam, and Japan. State-controlled media in the PRC have been increasingly influential, with anti-Indian coverage that is likely to signal the Chinese policy elite’s scepticism towards friendly relations with India (Manson 2010: p. 97).

In 2013, Panda observed that the media in India was painting the PRC as a threat (Panda 2013: p. 687). India has recently focused on problems related to the Belt and Road (BRI) initiative and its geo-political significance (Sachdeva 2018), while External Affairs Minister Jaishankar has re-
emphasized that India is concerned with the project due to questions of territorial integrity (ANI 2019). Anti-Chinese sentiments are routine, with some media drawing on nationalist concepts and requesting that New Delhi resist “imperialist” China and put pressure on it to guarantee a free Tibet (Manson 2010: p. 92). Recent media outlets in both countries often focus on the unsolved border issues, referring to 1962 and recent clashes at the border in nationalist tones (Lintner 2018).

It is clear that the largely positive discourse at the state level has not won over the general population in either country. Mistrust and scepticism prevail, with views of Chinese and Indian people regarding one another being consistently negative. Furthermore, polls suggest that the Chinese public’s threat perception of India is rising (Zhu 2009). A 2009 poll by the Global Times revealed that a startling 90% considered India a ‘principal threat to Chinese security’ (Zhu 2009).

Another survey from 2012 indicated that 62% of citizens had views of bilateral cooperation with India that were largely ‘unfavourable’, while 23% had primary ‘favourable’ perceptions. However, 39% saw Sino-Indian relations as cooperative and only 24% as hostile (Pew Research Center 2012).

India’s discourse and policy approach on China has been inconsistent over the years under the rule of different political parties. Nonetheless, the predominant perception of China by Indian people seems to remain that of a ‘competitor or rival’ (Panda 2013: p. 686-687). According to an older Pew Research survey (2012), 44% of Indian citizens held an unfavourable view of China. Favourable views of China peaked in 2015, with 41%.
There has since been a dramatic fall, reaching 26% in 2017 (Centre for Strategies and International Studies 2017) and just 12% in 2018 (Pew Research Center 2018).

7. Findings from the Interviews

7.1. Chinese “Othering” and Identity

Economic and career-related considerations were the primary reason for Chinese students coming to India. Of the 10 Chinese interviewees, four cited the lower Indian university fees as a reason for their decision, and five said that they hoped the experience would be beneficial for their future job prospects. Six students said the experience had been overall a positive one and had substantially enhanced their knowledge of Indian culture. Only one student claimed to have had predominantly negative experiences, and the remaining three students gave a somewhat mixed answer, without a clear position. For example, Ln. 17 compared it to a toxic relationship with a man:

> When I say I love India, it’s half-half true. [...] It’s like love. Like,… because… you love him, so sometimes you are angry with him.

This may also explain why the students were very eager to describe Indians and the positive Indian mentality, rarely hesitating before voicing positive statements.

Three interviewees made positive mentions of Indian curiosity and pacifist behaviour, notably in Indian people’s treatment of animals. 18 Among the most neutral and interpretable labels for India and its customs were “diverse” (5), “incredible” (5), “mysterious” (3), and “funny” (3). Most prominent was the diplomatic observation that India and China were very “different” (7). However, a majority of six said that they found India “polluted” and “dirty”, four called it “poor”, and seven said that “rape” was a big problem in India and they were concerned about women’s safety, which left a negative impression.

Consequently, the Chinese students made ample usage of antithetic “othering”. There were a number of adjectives that stood in direct contrast to the description of a Chinese identity. Ogilvie

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17 All names are abbreviated for privacy reasons.
18 Rather entertaining were the personal anecdotes of some students regarding animals, usually cows, walking in the streets. They often related this to Indians’ religiosity and pacifism, as well as the country’s underdevelopment. The reactions ranged from amusement to shock, with Chan reporting: ‘[Then] the cow is walking in the road. It’s very dangerous! … Once I saw an elephant on the highway – I was shocked!’
and Ashmore (1991) argue that the “self” and the “other” are often constructed through a juxtaposed ‘symbiotic interdependence’ (p.286). The Chinese students participating in this study frequently relied on these “dichotomies” (e.g. normal/abnormal; familiar/strange, and eventually us/“other”) (Coleman 2013: p. 25). Both positive and negative stereotyping occurred. Initially, four students argued that Indian people were not materialistic, but genuinely spiritual or “religious” (6), while the same students complained that their fellow Chinese citizens thought only about money and possessions. Five contrasted Indian people as happy and Chinese as unhappy, which was often given as an explanation for Indians being satisfied with less. Among the most common dichotomies for Indians/Chinese was “chaotic” (3)/ “in order’ (4), “unpunctual” (4)/ “punctual” (3), “slow” and “inefficient” (both 3)/ “efficient” (2), “reliable” (3)/ “unreliable” (4), and “lazy” (3)/ “hard-working” (7). Li said,

‘[…] the society in India … they don’t follow order. It’s crowded and chaotic – 乱! In China, you have regulations and people follow it or they will be punished’.

Negative statements were often accompanied by ellipses and hesitations. This can be explained by the interviewees’ awareness that those answers bore the risk of appearing xenophobic. Another strategy was that labelled by sociologist Erving Goffman (1981) as acting as a “relayer”. In this strategy, negative stereotyping is attributed to others, thereby avoiding being personally related to the statement, while still being able to include it in one’s own discourse, and thus signalling agreement (Cameron 2001: p. 149).

19 乱, Mandarin for chaotic.
The majority found Indians hospitable (7) but had also experienced bias and discrimination. Four reported Indian people being irritated by Chinese people coming to India to study, with two reporting that people “teased” them and argued that they were there because India was more developed than China. The students reported that it was common to be asked whether they knew Kung Fu or Jackie Chan (4).

The experience abroad had a certain impact on identity and political values. India’s political system was perceived as ineffective and slowly developing, which seemed to reinforce an attachment to the “superior” Chinese authoritarianism. Impressions of the “ineffective” Indian mentality were transferred to the political and economic level and seen as intrinsically interlinked. Many expressed “disappointment” (8) regarding the infrastructure and transportation, which they frequently related to corruption.

Moreover, some students were clearly very sceptical of the notion of the Indian system as a genuine democracy, often contrasting it with the “original” model from the “West” or the “US”. Xy. claimed that,

‘Even Indians think their democracy is kind of wrong. It’s not like the Western style. They are not so successful in democracy’.
Five students defended the Chinese Communist party’s authoritarianism and another six voiced a critical stance on Indian democracy and asserted their re-evaluation of the Chinese system. It was commonly said that ‘India can learn from China’. Ln. said,

‘Before I came here, I thought the Chinese government is bad, because we are not free. […] India now is like China before – they can grow faster. But the [Indian] government is not working, they just give show, but no funding’.

Interesting to note is that two students suggested a “combined” political system that intertwined the “best parts” of both, which indicates that the Indian system was both criticised and taken as inspiration. L. said,

‘[From my] point of view, I would like to combine [them] together because China needs democracy but India needs central power. […] To take advantage from both’.

7.2. Chinese Ontological Security

Some students stated that the PRC did not genuinely consider India to be an equal, saying that most Chinese citizens admired the “West”. Accordingly, seven were surprised by the Indian “obsession with China” as a competitor and the remembrance of the 1962 border war, and they argued that Chinese nationalism was rather directed towards Japan (5) or the US (2). Bl., for example, said,

‘1962, the war between India and China. […] At the time, we never thought about India. We were looking at America. Also today, yes, we compare [ourselves] with America. But India always compare[s itself] to China… mostly [in terms] of [the] military.’

Xy. declared that,

‘They feel more humiliation in their heart. They say they have been defeated by the Chinese’.

Ln. suggested an interesting analogy for the two nations:
‘You know, [it is] like children. If you lose, you will really hate him. Next time, I will fight with him again, but I will win. Like that. They just always look at China. […] They train [their] army, because maybe one day we will have war between China and India’.

The interviews offered first indices for a ‘chosen trauma’ (Volkan 1997: p. 36) from the Chinese perspective. The Chinese interviewees gave strong evidence for a negative psychological recollection of the 1962 war experienced by their Indian acquaintances. A culture of remembering and the interest in discussing the matter with Chinese nationals seemed strange to them precisely because the PRC has moved on.

7.3. Chinese Perceptions of Bilateral Relations

To conclude, eight of the students said that the mutual perceptions was those of “friends”, and most (7) held very optimistic views about the bilateral relations, expecting those in the future to be based on “cooperation”. However, three students raised concerns about future conflicts (“war”) between the two nations, and six argued that a solution of the border issue was crucial to ensuring continuing relations.

There was a very strong impression among the Chinese students of a fundamental lack of mutual knowledge (5). Seven stated that ‘mutual understanding’ and cultural exchange were important to protect future relations. Six were very critical of the Chinese media (C.: ‘They cover rape, living conditions, the border issue, and air pollution’) and mentioned that the coverage on China in the Indian media saw an equally negative bias. Xy. said,

‘[People] read a lot about India, the news in China on India [is] negative’.

The neo-liberal notion of Sino-Indian economic complementarity was another concept deemed fundamental to explaining the bilateral relations. Four participants directly related to this, including Ln.:

‘For manufacturing, we are good. […] But India is better for software. China needs India. […] They need each other, not fighting.’

There were strong references to a structural belief in a globalised, neo-liberal world and growing interdependence, a discourse very much in line with the agenda promoted at the state-level.
7.4. Indian “Othering” and the Impact on Individual Political Identity

The majority of Indian nationals were studying in the social sciences, most commonly Chinese language and culture. Their overall perceptions were very positive. All ten participants described their time in the PRC as “good” and eight said they would recommend the experience to their fellow nationals. Some found Chinese people “humble” (3). The most prominently cited positive attributes were related to attitudes to work, with six arguing that the Chinese are very “hard-working”, “disciplined” (3), and “punctual” (3).

On the negative side, there was an impression that Chinese people were racist and discriminated against foreigners (and even fellow nationals) on the basis of ethnicity, especially skin colour. Nami used ellipses to make a point which, paradoxically, ultimately made her sound somewhat racist herself:

‘And… I don’t know if that’s appropriate to say or not, but they are a little… you know – they discriminate!’

Closely related was the notion of seven students that Chinese were “self-centred” and “ignorant” of other cultures and nations (except for a number of ‘Western, developed’ countries) and thus chauvinistic. S. described them as “racist” and connected this with a cultural-historical argument:

‘Chinese mentality is very similar to the name: Zhongguo [chin. ‘China’ or ‘Middle Kingdom’]. They still have that mentality, that “We are the centre of everything”.

Five students described China as “obsessed” with the “West”. As an example, F. referred to teachers in university classes giving examples:

‘[They] always start with the US. Always meiguo [chin. ‘America’, 美国]! When it comes to India, then they kind of feel a superiority complex’.

Antithetic “othering” did occur, but only to a limited degree. Five students described Chinese people as submissive and judged them as uncritical of hierarchies and authority, which some Indian students juxtaposed with their own people, who “questioned everything”.

A notion remarked upon by both groups of interviewees was that Chinese people are very “materialistic”, whereas Indians are more spiritual. Chinese/Indians were thus contrasted as “hard-working” (8)/ “lazy” (2), “disciplined” (4)/ “chaotic” (2), and “homogenous” (2)/
“heterogeneous” (2) by the Indian students, which was very much in line with the Chinese narration.

All ten interviewees were explicit that there was a fundamental lack of mutual knowledge and trust, especially among the “common people”. Many blamed the negative media coverage in both countries and the censorship in China. Concerning the “average Indian”, S. argued that,

‘…some of them view China as enemy only… because of the war or the conflict we had before in 1962. They think that they eat cockroaches and snakes and stuff’. 

The students were not sure what to think about the “common Chinese” perception of India, as their personal experiences apparently often contradicted their other impressions:

‘You know I feel that people in China really have little knowledge about India. They usually think about us – you know – enemies. Towards me, they were always good’ (Nami).

During the interview, the students sought to construct a long tradition of mutual ties by referring to historical commonalities such as both countries being “ancient civilizations” (6) and their early contacts via Buddhism, but the differences were also prominent. The students had also had to cope with discrimination. V. had met Chinese people who had told her that India was an example of a “failed democracy”:

“Democracy” – they always say ‘hen luan, hen luan!’ [chin. for ‘chaotic’, 菱]’

The interviewees’ ethical and political values were apparently strongly undermined by the shock that many felt when they ‘realized’ the countries’ respective differences in development and economic success. When asked about the biggest difference between China and India, S. exclaimed,

“The development! I think India would take another 30 years to reach that, frankly speaking”

Eight students asserted that China was much more developed than India, with its people enjoying higher living standards. Some, like F., attempted to challenge the uncomfortable notion of the development gap by shifting focus to India’s achievements in the category of social justice:

‘GDP doesn’t say [everything] about a country. Right now, there is also GNH [gross national happiness], so these things – freedoms, human rights, women’s empowerment…’.
Despite some mocking the Chinese as submissive and uncritical of the CCP, five shared the view that ‘India needs to learn from China’. Economic success on the national level was often explained, first, by reference to the diligence of the Chinese people. The second explanation was more complex and concerned the core of the political Indian identity as democratic and anti-authoritarian. I.e. said that the Chinese just ‘followed blindly’, while Indians ‘[go] crazy about a single bad thing happening in [their] society’, concluding cynically:

‘Hey, possibly that’s the reason why they have achieved […] so much [laughs]. Just doing what they are told [laughs].’

Interestingly, this often resulted in the imagining of an alternative “combined” political system, based on democratic human rights but with a stronger, more authoritarian leadership. Most of the students were very hesitant to express these views, and they often used the “relayer” strategy (Cameron 2001: p. 149) to refer what were likely to be their own thoughts to others. I.e., for example, claimed that,

‘People think that there is a strong leader in power who can handle things better and that’s kind of a good thing actually’.

7.5. Ontological Security and the 1962 “Chosen Drama” of Indian Students
Su. said that most Indians viewed China extremely negatively and explained how his friends suspected him of being a China-obsessed ‘panda-hugger’:

‘Most Indians would say they are “dragon-hunters”. I’d, say, rather be a critical “panda-hugger”’.

His statement hints at the juxtaposition of China and India’s autobiographical selves at the state-level that explains their ambiguous relations and long-time attachments (Krolikowski 2008: p. 113-114). However, he suspected that most Indians viewed China as an enemy, thus his own liberal attitude and intercultural discourse alienated him from his friends, who shared a hostile discourse.

This reflects the paradox and confusion created by the competing discourses for many Indians from different social locations and political milieus. Strong evidence emerged during the interviews that the 1962 border war matched the definition of a “chosen trauma” (Volkan 1997: p. 36). All ten students referred to the conflict, often early in the interviews and before historical relations had been addressed:
'The 1962 war … that was a humiliation for India. […] Because presently, we are still [wrangling] with those issues’ (Adya).

All the students made it very clear that the war was strongly remembered in India and that it was the one issue that prevented a genuine political approximation. Many referred to the Indian ‘defeat’ as a strong ‘humiliation’ and observed an Indian ‘obsession’ with the conflict. Su. believed that,

‘It’s stuck in our minds and we refresh it every year through media or a new academic book. […] They love it. ‘They’ is the Indian street, the mainstream. They love the drama’.

B. offered an almost “schoolbook” explanation for a “chosen trauma (or: drama)”, when asked about the most important historical events:

‘Of course, [the] 1962 war. [The] Indo-Sino war. It’s not much of an issue, but Indians still remember the war. Chinese don’t. I asked a lot of Chinese when I was in China – they did not know! […] I think it has to do with the losing side. The losing side always remembers!’

7.6. Indian Discourse on Bilateral Relations

The general assessment of contemporary and future Sino-Indian ties was very optimistic. Nine of the ten interviewees voiced a belief in a steady improvement of the partnership on various levels, especially economic and political. However, many also expressed apprehensions, with B. referring to the current relations:

‘… I mean political exchanges are growing, economic exchanges are growing, businesses are flourishing in both countries. […] I think that’s pretty much it – it has not [reached] the cultural and people-to-people level yet’.

Five students were optimistic about the “strong” Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi administrations and cooperation between them, expressing a hope that this would eventually solve the border issue.

Most of the Indian students referred to essential elements of the political and economic neo-liberal discourse propagated by the elites in the two countries: economic complementarity, deepening interdependence, and rational decision-making by state actors. This was often based on “first-hand experience” and, with this knowledge, a self-perceived rise in the social power axis, which gave the
students ("us", the "educated") the self-confidence to discredit the pessimistic discourse of the unknowledgeable "uneducated people" ("them"): 

‘Euh … the people who are not educated, they still consider China as a threat because of the war that we had with China. But the people who are educated, they know the value of China and the importance of India-China friendship…’

Consequently, this strongly rejected a conflictual discourse and stressed cooperation, peace, mutual respect, trust, and Sino-Indian friendship (Ruddick 2001: p. 196).

8. Conclusion

The objective for this research was to question the degree to which Chinese and Indian students abroad conform with the dominant discursive formation of the contemporary Sino-Indian bilateral relations or differ from it to make sense of their intercultural experiences. The critical review of the history of the discursive formation in both nations of the postcolonial bilateral relations shows that it is dominated by two opposing bilateral discourses – namely, liberalism and realism. The opposing discourses appear to carry on and are still reflected in the contemporary academic cleavage (Goh 2006; Holslag 2010).

First, analysis of the discourse on the state level reconfirms the notion that it is overall positive, mostly emphasising economic cooperation and friendship. Interestingly, there are indications that this could be changing: while the statements made by the strong-men Xi and Modi at their occasional meetings remain positive, these appear to increasingly contradict the official stances of their respective foreign ministries.

Academia and media perceptions in both countries remain primarily nationalist and hawkish in nature, with a focus on unsolved historical and contemporary issues, specifically the unsolved border issues. This correlates with the lingering negative perceptions of the ‘other’ among citizens in both countries.

This analysis of interviews with exchange students from the two nations suggests that the overall discourse on bilateral relations operates within the dominant discursive formation. However, the collected qualitative data are certainly limited by the small number of interviews, the urban setting in which they took place, and the fact that perceptions are tangible and change over time. Moreover, the interviews were conducted primarily in English, which may have influenced the responses.
To summarize, the rhetoric was found to be very positive, idealistic, and associated with neoliberalism, despite the occurrence of mutual and partially chauvinistic stereotyping. The students largely distanced themselves from the hostile notions of the realist camp, which they assigned to the populist media and the ignorance of the “uneducated” man and woman. However, frequent “antithetic othering” (hard-working/lazy; materialistic/spiritual; homogenous/diverse; disciplined/chaotic) worked on a binary basis (Ogilvie and Ashmore 1991; Coleman 2013) to allow the construction of the national self through the differentiation of the “other” on the basis of “identity markers” (Rumelili 2015).

Surprisingly, the majority of these attributes proposed generally positive notions of the Chinese “identity”, something interviewees on both sides reproduced. One the one hand, this meant that the intercultural encounter and inevitable comparison was a strong blow to the feeling of Indian OS in relation to “Indian democracy”, Indian identity and the state’s autobiographical narrative in the anarchical and chaotic sphere of international relations (Delehanty and Steele 2009). On the other hand, the Chinese students were reassured by the (unsuccessful) “Indian (economic) experience”, applying a rhetoric that reasserted their trust into the Chinese authoritarian system and discursively reproduced China as the superior brother who would gladly educate the disobedient sibling if he would only listen. This created a discourse that often verged on chauvinism.

However, a number of Indian students and some Chinese stressed India’s progress in the fields of rule of law and political freedom. There was even the shared fantasy of a political hybrid model that would combine the strong Chinese leadership with Indian social rights.

Accordingly, the majority of the students in both nations constructed a highly elitist discourse on Sino-Indian mutual relations. It was striking how strongly both interview groups supplemented this largely economic discourse with a more “feminine” (Delehanty and Steele 2009; Ruddick 2001) and idealistic plea for intensified cultural exchange, interpersonal contact, stronger learning from and about each other, and restraint of biased media – all of which they regarded as crucial for meaningful improvement of bilateral ties.

While the number of exchange students between China and India is limited, it is growing. This small study suggests that these individuals’ intercultural experiences and voices are in stark contrast
to the negative discourse among the general public, replacing the notion of inexorable conflict with one of peace, cooperation, and trust. It might be suggested that cultural exchange and contact between the two nations decreases the potential for escalation and “othering”.

This has potential for a positive change, especially if these young academics become “influencers” on various levels of society. However, this would require a dramatic increase in the numbers of exchange students and, therefore, political will to achieve this. However, with the escalation of the border issue, it is questionable if this will take shape, particularly as the positive discourse on the state-level might be at a crucial point of change and a change of leadership is expected in the near future.

References


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This article assesses the evolution of the relationship between the Chinese Party-State and Chinese State-Owned Enterprises as a result of political and economic reforms between 1992 and 2003. Based on the premise that economy is a fundamental component of society, and that economic enterprises constitute social organizations, this investigation merges the heuristic framework of “state and society” scholars with the subject matter of economic historians and political economists, synthesizing a qualitative longitudinal analysis of Chinese state-economy relations. More specifically, this article focuses on shifts in the relationship between the Chinese Party-State and three national oil companies (NOCs) – China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), Sinopec, and China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC).

Applying Margaret Pearson’s (1999) heuristic framework of state-society relations to the evolving relationship between the Chinese Party-State and the NOCs, this investigation reaches two core conclusions. First, following Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 southern tour and subsequent reforms, the State-NOC relationship shifted towards relative clientelism, with noteworthy pluralist characteristics. Second, following the 2003 establishment of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), there was a bifurcation of the relationship between the Chinese Party-State and economic society, whereby SASAC enterprises like the NOCs experienced a corporatist turn, and the rest of economic society continued to enjoy a clientelist-pluralist relationship with the Party-State. Notably, however, this post-2003 “bifurcation” of Chinese state-economy relations remains imperfect, as evidenced by the “creep” of corporatism into the nominally “private” economy through the expansion of hybrid firms.
Releasing the Small and Seizing the Large:

Seminal Changes in China’s State-Economy Relationship from 1992-2003 and Beyond

By

Jackson Neagli

1. Introduction: Applying the “State and Society” Heuristic to Chinese Economic History

The restructuring of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been a core aspect of China’s post-Mao Reform and Opening period (gaige kaifang) (Lo 2019; Naughton 2015). The period between Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 “southern tour” and the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003 constituted a particularly rapid and fundamentally pathbreaking period of change for China’s SOEs. While economic historians and political economists have spilled a great deal of ink analysing the reform and restructuring of China’s SOEs (e.g. see Naughton 2015; Downs 2008; Lewis 2007), another core group of scholars, largely composed of political scientists, has concerned themselves with a more abstract line of inquiry – the evolving relationship between the Chinese state and Chinese society over the past several decades (e.g. see Perry and Wong 1985; Wakeman 1993; Rowe 1993; Howell 1994; Rankin 1997; Wright 2010; Guo 2014).

This article responds to a research question which has already received substantial academic treatment: How has the relationship between the Chinese Party-State and Chinese SOEs – in particular, China’s state-owned oil companies – evolved as a result of political and economic reforms that occurred between 1992 and 2003? Based on the premise that economy is a fundamental component of society, and that economic enterprises constitute social organizations, this investigation merges the heuristic framework of “state and society” scholars with the subject matter of economic historians and political economists, synthesizing a qualitative longitudinal analysis of Chinese state-economy relations. By applying the state and society framework to observations from the economic history and political economy fields, this article offers fresh insights towards the nature and implications of China’s 1992-2003 reform efforts as they relate to the shifting relationship between three prominent state-owned corporations and the Chinese Party-State.
In concrete terms, this article focuses on shifts in the relationship between the Chinese Party-State and three national oil companies (NOCs) – China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), Sinopec, and China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) – from 1992 to 2003. These three firms, operating in the same strategic sector, were selected for several reasons, outlined under the “case justification” heading of the methodology section.

This paper adopts the heuristic framework outlined by Margaret Pearson’s typology of state-society relationships (Pearson 1999). In applying Pearson’s framework of state-society relations to the evolution of the relationship between the Chinese Party-State and CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC from 1992 to 2003, this investigation reaches two core conclusions. First, following Deng’s southern tour and subsequent reforms, the Chinese state-NOC relationship shifted towards relative clientelism, with noteworthy pluralist characteristics. Second, following the 2003 establishment of the SASAC, there was a bifurcation of the relationship between the Chinese Party-State and economic society, whereby SASAC enterprises like the NOCs experienced a corporatist turn, and the rest of economic society continued to enjoy a clientelist-pluralist relationship with the Party-State.

The following section briefly outlines the article’s research methodology. Next, the paper highlights prominent applications of the state and society approach in China studies scholarship, and outlines Margaret Pearson’s typology of state-society relations. The third section explores political economy analyses of China’s Reform and Opening; and distinguishes these approaches from the state and society framework adopted in this investigation. The fourth section presents a historical overview of the Chinese Party-State’s economic reform and restructuring efforts from 1992-2003. Fifth, Pearson’s analytical framework is used to analyse the historical facts of China’s 1992-2003 economic reforms, with the goal of identifying salient changes in the state-NOC relationship. The final section concludes by underscoring the importance of adopting sufficiently flexible iterations of the state and society framework in future research.

2. Methodology

This article’s methodology integrates three core components. First, the existing state and society literature is reviewed, with particular emphasis on Margaret Pearson’s heuristic framework. Second, economic history scholarship pertaining to China’s Reform and Opening from 1992-2003 is utilized to create historical context for the application of state and society theory. Third, state and
society theory are deployed to analyse the historical facts of China’s economic reform from 1992-2003, particularly with respect to changes in the Party-State’s relationship to CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC. This application of state and society theory evaluates changes in the explanatory power of Pearson’s five ideotypical models of state-society relations as applied to the state-NOC relationship between 1992 and 2003.

By utilizing state and society heuristics to analyse findings from Chinese economic history scholarship, this article offers fresh insights into the implications of China’s Reform and Opening, particular with regard to China’s national oil companies. Additionally, this investigation’s application of state and society theory is specifically designed to address shortcomings in the state and society framework: by limiting the application of state and society theory specifically to the Chinese state-economy relationship this investigation elides fetishization of politically-oriented Eurocentric civil society, an unfortunate characteristic of some early state and society research.

This article focuses on the shifting relationship between the Chinese Party-State and China’s “big three” NOCs – CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC. The reason for this focus is twofold: First, it privileges precision over generality – given the vast size and heterogeneity of the contemporary Chinese economy, sweeping generalizations about the entire state-economy relationship are often as misleading as they are enlightening. Second, China’s NOCs are extraordinarily influential international economic actors, meaning that while conclusions regarding the NOCs may not be generalizable (except to other ministry-level SOEs in strategic industries), they are valuable in their own right.

Of course, there are also drawbacks to the article’s methodology. As indicated above, interaction between the Party-State and China’s NOCs is not necessarily representative of the overall state-economy relationship. Lastly, this article draws heavily upon secondary sources, and exclusively upon English-language scholarship.

2.1. Case Justification: Why National Oil Companies?

China’s modern NOCs were cobbled together from government assets during the reform years of the 1980s, with the intention of stimulating oil production by decreasing political interference in the industry (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). China National Offshore Oil Company was incorporated in 1982, and granted purview over China’s offshore oilfield exploration and development, as well as the administration of production sharing agreements with foreign
corporations (Francisco 2013: p. 9). In 1983, Sinopec was formed from downstream assets of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry (MPI) and Ministry of Chemical industry, and CNPC was incorporated in 1988 using the MPI’s upstream assets (Zhang 2004). Together, CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC are responsible for the bulk of China’s domestic oil production, refining, and import activities.

Since the 1950s, the key political imperative of China’s petro-industrial complex has been self-sufficiency. Mao’s push to develop domestic extraction and refining capability paid off in 1965, when China attained self-sufficiency in oil production, the gold standard of energy security (Zhang 2004). Although China’s rapid developed outpaced its domestic oil production capacity in 1993 (when the PRC became a net oil importer), the Party-State continues to place a premium on energy security, and NOCs have taken state-directed steps to guarantee that the flow of petroleum to Chinese consumers continues uninterrupted (Francisco 2013). NOCs have strategically enhanced the diversity of China’s crude suppliers to improve import security (Pascual and Zambetakis 2010: p. 31; Tessman and Wolfe 2011; Yergin 2006: p. 13), often with the support of “resource diplomacy” efforts executed by the Party-State (Francisco 2013: p. 50). Additionally, China’s NOCs strategically invest in resources and infrastructure that circumvent the Strait of Malacca, through which approximately 80% of China’s oil imports flow (Odgaard and Delman 2014). The so-called “Malacca Dilemma” – China’s reliance on imports through the Strait, a key choke point guarded by the U.S. Navy – has animated Chinese energy security strategy since at least 2003, when Hu Jintao brought it to public salience (Yergin 2012). China’s NOCs also frequently invest in so-called “pariah states” sanctioned by Euro-American governments, where international competition for oil resources is less fierce (Nötzold 2012: p. 139; Yetiv and Lu 2007: p. 209).

Thus, China’s petro-industrial complex, and the state and economic actors operating within it, have undergone a remarkable transformation over the past 70 years. The massive size of China’s oil industry (China is the world’s largest oil importer, and second-largest consumer) (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2015), oil’s status as a “strategic industry,” the importance of oil consumption in China’s rapid economic development, and the corresponding relationship between NOCs and the Chinese state make China’s oil industry a unique case for the application of the state and society framework. Rather than taking an unrepresentative sample from a far larger field – the entire universe of Chinese economic actors – this investigation narrows its scope by considering the most influential players in a largely idiosyncratic industry. Finally, the unique nature of the Chinese petroleum industry has already attracted a substantial body of research from diverse
disciplines, providing fertile historical background information to which the state and society framework can be applied. Thus, China’s petro-industrial complex and the three core firms which occupy it, present an ideal venue for the application of the state and society framework to Chinese economic history.

3. An Introduction to State and Society Theory

In 1994, Elizabeth Perry published an article in *The China Quarterly* heralding the arrival of a new heuristic paradigm in China Studies: the “state and society” approach (Perry 1994). According to Perry, this third generation of scholarship had been first identified by Harry Harding in 1984 (Harding 1984), and was reflected in the subsequent publications of preeminent scholars including Christine Wong (Perry and Wong 1985), Jeffrey Wasserstrom, (Wasserstrom and Perry 1994) Jonathan Unger (Unger and Barmé 1991), Andrew Walder (1988), Vivienne Shue (1990), and Harding (1987) himself.

The state and society approach, as applied to Chinese studies, is distinguished by its rejection of the binary between the totalitarian and pluralist models which animated the first and second generations of Chinese studies scholarship (Perry and Wong 1985: p. 704). Instead, Perry posited, this third generation of scholarship initially appropriated European frameworks of state society relations (in comparison to Soviet-inspired totalitarianism and American-inspired pluralism) to analyse a rapidly reforming People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Perry and Wong 1985: p. 704). In doing so, various scholars began to utilize more nuanced and abstract theoretical frameworks like corporatism, clientelism, state capitalism, and civil society to describe and explain Chinese social, political, and economic phenomena (e.g. see Wakeman 1993; Rowe 1993; Howell 1994; Pearson 1999). Such research has inspired also more recent work by other scholars (e.g. see Nathan 2016; Wright 2010; Guo 2014; Pringle 2017; Fewsmith and Nathan 2019).

Early state and society scholarship typically sought to measure the reality of Chinese social, political, and economic reform against a platonic ideal of European “civil society.” Especially in the 1990s, “civil society” was frequently cast as a panacea for China’s social, political, and economic ills (Kenny 2016), and scholars quantified the success of reforms based on Chinese society, polity, and economy’s approximation of idealized European civil society.
Almost as soon as it was popularized, however, the state and society framework was criticized for its failure to divest the platonic ideal of “civil society” from its Eurocentric connotations (Kenny 2016). As a result, the state and society framework was attacked as orientalist, casting western-style civil society as intrinsically superior to purportedly “premodern” state-society arrangements (Kenny 2016). These attacks were supplemented by the incisive criticism of Rowe (1993), who pointed out that there is no term analogous to “civil society” in modern Mandarin Chinese. To Rowe, this indicated that civil society was not a social fact of the modern Chinese experience, and that state and society theory’s extrinsic imposition of the civil society construct was entirely baseless.

This investigation deploys the third generation of Chinese studies scholarship in a manner designed to inoculate it against eurocentrism and orientalism. First, rather than attempting to analyse the entirety of the state-society relationship, this article focuses explicitly on the interplay between state and economy, with a particular focus on three important firms over a short time period. Second, this article subscribes to an interpretation of the state and society theory which posits that no singular model of state-society relations ever perfectly describes China at any given point in time. Instead, the relative explanatory power of particular models (i.e. totalitarianism, pluralism, clientelism, civil society, and corporatism) fluctuates as state-society relations shift over time.

To introduce the heuristic models of state-economy relations deployed in subsequent sections, this article relies on Margaret Pearson’s (1999) typology of state-society relations as applied to the China studies context. Pearson outlines five distinct models of state-society relations: totalitarianism, pluralism, clientelism, civil society, and corporatism. Pearson’s typology is not the most current, nor is it the most detailed, but it is used here because of its balanced and cogent elucidation of five widely accepted models of state-society relations.

Pearson’s heuristic categories are introduced as “off the rack” approximations of common state-society relationships. The main thrust of this investigation subsequently seeks to chronicle the fluctuations of each of these five heuristics’ explanatory power with regard to the relationship between the Party-State and CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC from 1992-2003. Pearson’s heuristics are valued primarily for their generalizability, parsimony, and clarity, rather than their objective accuracy – future research would benefit from the application of alterative models of state-society relations (i.e. heuristic typologies designed by other scholars), as divergent findings would help reveal the strengths and weaknesses of different analytical approaches.
Pearson’s (1999) totalitarianism model entails the state’s complete dominance over society. Totalitarianism assumes that a monolithic Chinese Party-State rules from the top down, granting no genuine autonomy to non-state social actors (p. 23). The totalitarian state is completely immune to dissension and factionalism, both within the central state and between different levels of government (Pearson 1999: p. 23). Claims that the Chinese state has been characterized by pure totalitarianism at any point since 1978 are undermined by persistent factionalism at the highest levels of state leadership (Pearson 1999: p. 23), as famously documented by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988: pp. 46–47).

Pearson’s pluralist model of state-society relations focuses on social groups as the fundamental building blocks of society. Pluralism assumes that the state does not intervene to privilege any social group over another: in a pluralist system, different interest groups and individuals freely compete to gain access to the state and assert their individual group interests (e.g. see Walzer 1983). Pearson (1999) dismisses the pluralist model’s applicability to the Chinese case in part because truly pluralist state-society relations preclude the existence of the patron-client networks that undeniably pervade Chinese business, politics, and social life (p. 23). This investigation concurs, finding that when and where Chinese state-society relations take on pluralist attributes, they are often accompanied by the interpersonal horse-trading characteristic of clientelism.

Pearson’s (1999) clientelist model of state-society relations is founded on the existence of informal personal relationships between individuals within the state structure, and those governed by it. A fundamental aspect of clientelist relations is the existence of social or political inequality between the patron and the client (Briquet 2007: p. 95). Subordinate non-state actors can leverage clientelist relationships in order to influence state policy, while Party-State actors can utilize their monopoly control over the distribution of state resources to incentivize policy compliance (Briquet 2007: p. 96; Pearson 1999). Thus, the discretionary dispensation of public resources is an intrinsic characteristic of clientelism (Briquet 2007: p. 96). Pearson (1999) identified several implications of clientelist state-society relations during the late 1990s, all of which are relevant to this investigation. First, within the clientelist model of state-society relations, if the Party-State’s perceived authority or legitimacy declines, then the ability of the state to induce certain behaviours from social actors will also decline (Pearson 1999: p. 34). Thus, as reform and opening grants certain actors autonomy from the state, and as the state’s total authority over the distribution of physical resources decreases, clientelist state-society relations will further weaken (Pearson 1999: p. 35). Conversely, however, Pearson theorizes that partial marketization strengthens informal clientelist relations by
empowering influential state actors to oversee important transfers of state assets into the nascent private sector (Pearson 1999: p. 36).

Pearson’s civil society model of state-society relations draws from modernization theory’s hypothesis that economic reforms necessarily create pressure for political liberalization (Pearson 1999: p. 25). According to this model, political liberalization contributes to the development of independent civil society organizations, powerful non-government actors which defend rights and freedoms from state encroachment (Pearson 1999: p. 24). However, modernization theory’s assumption that economic liberalization necessarily leads to political liberalization has not withstood the test of time, especially in the Chinese case, exposing a critical flaw in Pearson’s “civil society” model.

Pearson bases her model of corporatist state-society relations on Philippe Schmitter’s (1974) definition of corporatism. According to Schmitter (1974), corporatist states create or license artificial social units (like SOEs) to represent the interests of a particular base of constituents (pp. 93–94). These units are granted the sole authority to represent their functional area at the state level in return for directing resources towards important state projects and allowing state actors to control the selection of the units’ leaders (Barndt 2008: p. 140; Schmitter 1974: pp. 93–94). Corporatism is set apart from the pluralism, clientelism, and civil society models by the fact that it is foisted upon society by the state – like totalitarianism, corporatism is a fundamentally top-down model of state-society relations (Pearson 1999: p. 36). Social organizations licensed by the state are expected to subjugate their individual interests (and those of their constituents) to the national interest, or risk losing their state-endowed power (Pearson 1999: p. 37). In a corporatist system, “interest groups” are merely intermediary institutions licensed by the state to carry out state goals, enforce state policy, and co-opt potential non-conformers (Barndt 2008: p. 140; Pearson 1999: p. 37). Pearson raises a key issue with the application of the corporatist model to the contemporary Chinese context: it is unlikely that the complex interrelation between Chinese state and society is characterized by the singular lens of corporatism (Pearson 1999: p. 41).

Margaret Pearson’s critique of the corporatist framework is generalizable to the other four frameworks she proposes: in the complex context of modern Chinese state-society relations, it is highly improbable that any single model will be sufficiently descriptive. This essay resolves Pearson’s critique by treating the above models as five ideal types, each of which can present certain characteristics even when a different model predominates. This allows for a much more nuanced understanding of China’s state-economy relationship.
4. The Political Economist’s Approach to China’s Reform and Opening: Distinctions from the State and Society Framework

Political economists have produced a formidable body of research regarding China’s Reform and Opening, much of which focuses on the 1992-2003 timeframe highlighted in this investigation. A great deal of China-oriented political economy scholarship, which often draws heavily from development economics and world systems theory, debates the existence and nature of the so-called “China Model” for economic growth and development. This section summarizes several prominent political economy analyses of China’s Reform and Opening, with the intention of drawing a distinction between the political economy and state and society disciplines as deployed to analyse China’s reform era.

Shaun Breslin (2011) assesses the identification of a unique “China Model” for economic development, ultimately asserting that the PRC’s trajectory is not fundamentally different from a typical strong state “Listian” development path. Though Breslin admits that unique circumstances have contributed to China’s miraculous growth, he asserts that China’s economic dynamism is not the result of an idiosyncratic development model, but rather a garden-variety statist model with certain Chinese attributes (Breslin 2011: pp. 1323-1324). Whereas neoliberal advocates of the “Washington Consensus”1 assert that China is in a stage of incomplete liberalization, Breslin finds the Party-State’s guidance over economic policy is an important feature, not an oversight, of China’s development strategy (Breslin 2011: pp. 1328-1331). Gerard Strange (2011), however, problematizes Breslin’s characterization of China’s development. He asserts that the PRC is a “Post-Listian” state (p. 544) that defies neoliberalism through its actions in international organizations like the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization, while simultaneously encouraging foreign direct investment and export-led growth (Strange 2011: pp. 549-554). Strange ultimately characterizes China’s development model as market-oriented capitalism, albeit with a distinct opposition to neoliberal economic policies advocated by the “Washington Consensus” (Strange 2011: pp. 556-557).

Jamie Peck and Jun Zhang (2013) analyse China’s economic miracle using the “varieties of capitalism” framework: they claim that, although state socialism is a core characteristic of China’s

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1 The “Washington Consensus” refers to the package of neoliberal ‘best practices’ for economic development that emanated from prominent American government agencies, Washington, D.C. based think tanks, and international organizations in the 1990s (Williamson 1990). The neoliberal reforms proposed by the “Washington Consensus” have been criticized for attempting to impose a “one size fits all” guide to economic development, which arguably contributed to the Latin American Economic crisis of the 1980s (Breslin 2011: pp. 1337-1338; Williamson 1990).
development model, China is now by and large a capitalist economy (Peck and Zhang 2013: p. 367). Although some aspects of China’s current political-economic superstructure align with liberal market economies, and others are better described by the coordinated market ideotype, Peck and Zhang ultimately find that China’s current state-economy relationship may not fit anywhere within the “varieties of capitalism” continuum (pp. 360-365). Ultimately, Peck and Zhang (2013) disagree with Breslin, concluding that China’s economic evolution has not accorded with any extant strategy or model, and has largely occurred on Beijing’s own terms (pp. 374-375).

Andrea Boltho and Maria Weber (2015) outline the core features of the “East Asian Development Model,” and assess China’s development strategy in comparison with those of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Despite identifying important differences between China and its neighbours (for example, China’s relatively weak industrial policy and rapidly rising income inequality), They conclude that, in an international comparative context, China’s development strategy is closely aligned with those of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (Boltho and Weber 2015: pp. 277-278). Sebastian Heilmann and Leah Shih (2013) offer supporting evidence for Boltho and Weber’s conclusions by documenting China’s adoption of Japanese-style industrial policy since the late 2000s. They find that four key coalitions of Chinese policymakers advocate for divergent strategies of economic development: market liberalization, industrial policy, indicative planning, and imperative planning (Heilmann and Shih 2013: pp. 18-19). While market liberalization has reigned supreme since 1992, they find that market liberals have increasingly collaborated with advocates of Japanese-style industrial policy since the Hu-Wen administration’s ascension in 2003 (Heilmann and Shih 2013: pp. 11-14).

There are fundamental differences between the political economy perspectives outlined above, and the state and society framework as it is applied in this investigation. Political economists attempt to document the evolution of China’s state-economy relationship, and characterize that shift using existing theories of economic organization and development models: state socialism, market socialism, neoliberal capitalism, keiretsu capitalism, state capitalism, developmental capitalism, socialism with Chinese characteristics, and so on (e.g. see Peck and Zhang 2013; Boltho and Weber 2015). The state and society perspective, on the other hand, frames the evolution of the state-economy relationship more broadly, and with reference to relatively more abstract heuristic ideotypes, i.e. totalitarianism, pluralism, clientelism, civil society, and corporatism (e.g. see Pearson 1999; Rowe 1993). Whereas the political economy framework often adopts a comparative approach, weighing China’s development against existing economic systems through heuristic
devices like the “varieties of capitalism” framework (Peck and Zhang 2013), modern state and society scholars adopt abstract heuristics, and use inductive, as opposed to comparative, analyses (e.g. see Wakeman 1993). Both perspectives have advantages and disadvantages: the political economy perspective is useful for assessing and contextualizing China’s Reform and Opening vis-à-vis other economies but is bogged down by debates over the idiosyncratic nature of China’s unique development process (Breslin 2011; Strange 2011). Meanwhile, the state and society approach is adept at identifying subtle changes that may not be revealed through comparison to existing economic systems, and analysing the implications of those shifts within China’s unique institutional ecosystem, but is not immediately useful for predicting future challenges or identifying inefficiencies based on the experience of other states (Howell 1994). This investigation utilizes the state and society framework because it aims to analyse subtle shifts in a narrow, singular aspect of China’s state-economy relationship, and does not offer predictions of future challenges or assessments of current inefficiencies.

5. Historical Overview: General Changes in the State-Economy Relationship from 1992-2003
In order to understand the significance of the watershed shift in Chinese state-economy relations that took place between 1992-2003, it is first necessary to have a general understanding of the post-Mao social, political, and economic reforms that began when Deng Xiaoping assumed paramount leader status in the late 1970s. In 1978, nearly 100% of Chinese industry was controlled by state-owned firms (Naughton 2018: p. 343). Under Deng’s leadership, the Party-State took economic modernization as its principal goal, and new corporate forms, including foreign firms and Sino-foreign joint-ventures, began cropping up across the PRC’s “special economic zones” (SEZs) (Zhao 2001: p. 343). Zhao Ziyang’s “dual track” and “contract responsibility” systems, implemented in 1987, not only allowed for the entry of non-state economic actors, but also allowed SOEs to devote excess production capacity towards the production of non-plan goods, and do business with private firms (Song 2015: p. 184). The emergence of new non-state enterprises constituted the creation of a new form of social organization, and thus required a shift in the Chinese Party-State’s relationship to a rapidly changing society (Howell 1994: p. 197).

In 1989, however, the transition of state-society relations from relative totalitarianism under Mao (Zhao 2001: p. 42) to Deng’s more pragmatic framework came to a grinding halt. Many conservative leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attributed the pro-democracy
demonstrations of Spring and Summer 1989 to Deng’s relaxation of Mao-era totalitarian control, as well as the “contagion” of foreign influence that had contaminated China due to Deng’s “open-door” policy (Moise 2014: p. 84). Conservative elements of the CCP affected a short-lived “crackdown,” which largely reflected a panicking CCP’s scramble to consolidate legitimacy rather than a long-term return to totalitarianism (Moise 2014: p. 84; Zhao 2001: p. 47). This conservative revanche set the stage for Deng’s 1992 southern tour, marking the formal beginning of the period analysed in this paper.

In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping embarked on a 5-week tour of several special economic zones in Southern China. The SEZs, which Deng had established a decade prior, embodied the liberalizing ideals of Deng’s post-1978 Reform and Opening project, and Deng’s 1992 endorsements of the SEZs jump-started reforms after two and a half years of conservative stagnation (Naughton 2018: p. 100). Deng’s southern tour was seen as the formal beginning of the “privatization” era of Chinese economic reform (e.g. see Song 2015: p. 188; Wright 2010). Indeed, Deng’s call for a “socialist market economy,” echoed throughout the southern tour, has been described as a “euphemism for capitalism” (Li 2008: p. 64). The 1992 14th Party Congress elaborated on Deng’s message by calling for property rights reform and legitimizing the privatization of SOEs (Li 2008: p. 64), as well as formally endorsing Deng’s “socialist market economy” as a legitimate goal of reform (Qian 2000: p. 15). Deng Xiaoping’s appointment of Zhu Rongji to oversee economic policy also reenergized reform efforts: whereas Zhao Ziyang had been reluctant to privatize SOEs, and preferred to foster competition through the entry of new non-state economic actors or foreign joint ventures, Zhu Rongji was a proponent of downsizing the state sector and privatizing SOEs to deepen the reform process (Naughton 2018: p. 104).

With SOE performance declining across the board in the early 1990s, renewed calls for economic liberalization led reformers to formulate strategies intended to boost state enterprise performance through restructuring (Song 2015: p. 188). In November 1993, the “Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure” was formally adopted by the 14th Party Congress (Qian 2000: p. 15), largely in response to poor SOE performance (Song 2015: p. 188). This set of reforms aimed to clarify the muddled system of property rights surrounding SOEs (which many reformers believed to be the cause of their poor performance) through the complete privatization of small and medium enterprises, and by delineating the Party-State’s regulatory obligations from its management responsibilities in larger enterprises (Song 2015: p. 188). In 1994, the NPC adopted the Company Law, allowing SOEs to reorganize as limited liability companies,
and in some cases to list on domestic stock markets (Naughton 2015: p. 114). “Corporatization” was intended to increase SOE performance by aligning the interests of the firm’s managers with those of its owners – however, the 1994 Company Law preserved a modicum of state control over SOEs, asserting the Party-State’s right to appoint members to remaining SOEs’ boards of directors (Naughton 2018: p. 345).

Corporatization was taken a step further at the 15th Party Congress in 1997, when the CCP endorsed the strategy of “seizing the large, letting go of the small” (zhua da fang xiao), privatizing all SOEs save for “national champion” juggernauts under the slogan “seizing the large, letting go of the small” (Milhaupt and Zheng 2015). After the endorsement of zhua da fang xiao, local authorities were encouraged to take reforms into their own hands – however, due to the poor economic performance of SOEs during the mid-1990s, devolved “owners” of SOEs often encouraged privatization to defend local coffers from bloated and inefficient enterprises (Naughton 2018: pp. 116–117). In 1998, Zhu Rongji took reforms further by abolishing the central government’s industrial ministries, responsible for the ownership and oversight of some of the state’s largest SOEs (Naughton 2015: p. 48). As a result, China’s largest SOEs, including the “big three” NOCs, effectively functioned without central ownership for five years, until the formation of SASAC in 2003.

In March 2003, the SASAC was created to administer Party-State control over the PRC’s remaining state enterprises. SASAC is situated under the State Council, the highest organ of state administration in the Chinese political system (Saich 2011: p. 119). Therefore, SASAC’s formation brought China’s largest SOEs directly under the supervision of the commanding heights of the Chinese Party-State. Since its formation, SASAC has largely succeeded in stabilizing and recentralizing Party-State control over China’s largest SOEs (Naughton 2015: p. 50). The SOEs not brought under SASAC control in 2003 were passed down to local governments – as during the zhua da fang xiao reforms of the previous decade, local governments often privatized the former state enterprises (Naughton 2015: p. 48).

SASAC control over remaining SOEs is primarily exercised through the appointment of Party loyalists to firms’ boards of directors. The chairpersons of China’s 53 SOEs with “vice-ministerial” rank are all appointed directly by the Organization Bureau of the CCP Central Committee (Naughton 2018: p. 351). Because the Party-State holds a majority stake in almost all SASAC enterprises, there is usually no pushback against CCP nominations to the boards of SASAC SOEs.
or their subsidiaries (Naughton 2015: p. 61). Unsurprisingly, corporate chairpersons appointed by the Organization Bureau face long-run career incentives to pursue CCP interests over those of SASAC or their enterprise itself (Naughton 2015: p. 61). As Erica Downs (2010) notes, while SASAC formally exercises control over China’s “core” SOEs, in reality, the imposition of the nomenklatura system onto corporate boards constitutes the most powerful instrument of Party-State influence over the uppermost strata of China’s economy.

When SASAC was created to manage China’s 196 largest SOEs, one of its professed goals was “corporate governance reform” – ostensibly, the reorganization of SOEs in accordance with the 1994 Company Law (Naughton 2018: p. 349). However, SASAC’s implementation of corporate governance reform has been excruciatingly slow, especially among SASAC firms operating in protected or strategic industries like oil and gas (Song 2015: p. 197). The plodding pace of corporate governance reforms among SASAC firms operating in strategic industries is probably intentional – since the formation of SASAC, China’s strategic SOEs (especially the NOCs) have been increasingly deployed as “instruments of government policy” (Naughton 2015: p. 64), and the Party-State is reluctant to hand over control of these strategic enterprises to independent corporate boards. In addition to improving corporate governance, SASAC is also tasked with concentrating SOEs in areas with national security, natural resource, or natural monopoly characteristics: In 2006, Li Rongrong, head of SASAC, reiterated the Administration’s commitment to maintaining full control of enterprises in seven sectors, including oil (Naughton 2015: p. 57).


This section applies the state and society framework, as elucidated in the second section, to the historical facts presented above. What follows is an analysis of Chinese economic history that is premised on how the relationship between the Party-State and three NOCs changed following three watershed events: the 1992 southern tour, the 1997 affirmation of zhua da fang xiao, and the 2003 establishment of SASAC.


To understand how the 1992-2003 institutional reforms affected the Chinese Party-State’s relationship to CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC, it is first necessary to understand the importance of energy security to the CCP. In the 21st century, economic development is largely predicated on the uninterrupted consumption of fossil fuels (Li 2016: p. 16). As demonstrated by the global economic
crises of 1974-1975 and 1980-1982, impediments to oil consumption can have excruciatingly dire consequences for capitalist economies (Li 2016: p. 16). Given that CCP initiatives are often animated by the fear of a crisis of legitimacy, and that continued economic performance is a core aspect of the Party’s current legitimacy, it follows that the Chinese Party-State will generally take political action to guarantee steady access to oil at reasonable prices for China’s domestic market (Nötzold 2012; Calabrese 2004).

State-NOC relations were frequently characterized by clientelism from 1978-1989, as documented by Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg’s (1988) seminal study of political factionalism within China’s petroleum sector. This system of clientelist state-society relations was bolstered by the fact that the chief “patron” the clientelist state, Deng Xiaoping, had connections to China’s petroleum industry (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: p. 84), and likely maintained informal relationships with NOC executives after attaining “paramount leader” status. Throughout the 1980s, however, the incorporation of China’s NOCs injected elements of corporatism into the state-society relationship. Each of the NOCs was effectively handed monopoly control over a sector of the oil industry (onshore exploration and development for CNPC, offshore exploration and development for CNOOC, and refining for Sinopec) in exchange for allowing their leaders to be appointed by the state and accepting state guidance on high-level decision-making (Lewis 2007: p. 11; Zhao 2001: pp. 8–9). During the 1980s, the Nomenklatura system allowed the CCP’s organization department to ensure the alignment of Party and NOC interests by appointing Party loyalists to key positions within the three NOCs (Downs 2008: p. 123). The State Council also retained the ability to directly influence the marketing, pricing, and investment decisions of the three NOCs (Zhao 2001: p. 27), further evidencing the extent of corporatist controls over the infant NOCs.

However, the Party-State’s corporatist control over the NOCs deteriorated rapidly after 1992. Administrative authority over the NOCs was transferred from the State Council to the Ministry of Energy (MOE) in 1988, which was abolished less than five years later in the wake of the southern tour (Zhao 2001: p. 8). Following the abolition of the MOE, the NOCs, which had retained ministerial rank within the Chinese state bureaucracy, often circumvented the anaemic oversight of the State Development Planning Commission, State Assets Management Bureau, and State Economic and Trade Commission (Naughton 2015: p. 48), dealing directly with CCP elites to negotiate production targets, price levels, and resource distribution (Downs 2008: p. 129). Because China’s NOCs retained their ministerial status, and many CCP elites had close ties to the powerful
“petroleum faction” (Downs 2008: p. 134), the 1992-2003 era in State-NOC relations came to be characterized by extreme clientelism.

The introduction of clientelist state-society relations, especially in the absence of complete marketization, has the potential to foster rampant corruption (Pearson 1999: p. 35). In China, this “clientelist shock” was precipitated by Zhao Ziyang’s 1987 “dual track” and “contract responsibility” systems, and widespread corruption soon followed. New corporate “social groups” frequently sought to maximize profits by extracting state protection and resources through informal channels (Zhao 2001: p. 49). However, these “social groups” still required Party-State permission to operate within the PRC (Zhao 2001: p. 50). This was not the rise of pluralism, but instead the ad-hoc creation of a new clientelist-corporatist mode of state-society relations, whereby the Chinese Party-State exercised ultimate control over emergent “social” organizations, often through purpose-built “semi-official” organizations (Howell 1994: p. 204), which themselves had a corporatist relationship to the Chinese state.

As the Party-State’s monopolistic control over domestic resources has become increasingly diffuse over the course of post-1992 reforms, some scholars contend that the relationship between Chinese state and economy has become pluralistic (Lampton 2014: pp. 95–96). In 1998, Sinopec, CNPC, and CNOOC were restructured into vertically-integrated oil companies, and their most attractive assets were repackaged into subsidiary corporations that were subsequently listed on the New York and Hong Kong stock exchanges (Naughton 2015: p. 55). The Chinese State retained majority equity ownership of the three NOCs’ foreign subsidiaries (Downs 2008: p. 123), but neither these subsidiaries nor their NOC parent companies were required to pay dividends to the central government until 2007 (Milhaupt and Zheng 2015: p. 679). That the core NOCs were operating without central supervision in competitive foreign markets indicates that a degree of pluralism may have been injected into the State-NOC relationship prior SASAC’s formation in 2003.

The State Council’s ability to manipulate NOC behaviour through investment controls also declined during the 1990s, largely due to the NOCs’ retention of earnings generated by their subsidiaries in international stock markets (Milhaupt and Zheng 2015: pp. 678–679). The weakening of the State Council’s investment controls was compounded by the general collapse of state supervision over the NOCs during the 1990s, most obviously manifested by the abolition of the Ministry of Energy (Naughton 2015: p. 48). Additionally, the compensation of SOE executives
through performance-based salaries (perceived as an important step towards corporatization) made high-level NOC personnel less accountable to the CCP Organization Department, further attenuating Party-State Control over the NOCs (Milhaupt and Zheng 2015: p. 680). The central Party-State’s gradually decreasing ability to control NOC investments and executives evidences the declining explanatory power of clientelism, and rising explanatory power of pluralism, to describe Chinese State-NOC relations in the late 1990s.

Thus, from 1992-2003, the relative financial independence and political clout of China’s NOCs (and their patrons) often allowed NOCs to put their corporate interests before those of the Party-State (Downs 2008: p. 125). The NOCs’ pursuit of their corporate interests was facilitated by the emergence of a hybrid pluralist-clientelist State-NOC relationship, in which influential patrons of the NOCs granted the NOCs more autonomy than had been afforded to them under the largely corporatist state-NOC relationship of the 1980s. The policy shifts that made the “clientelization” of the state-NOC relationship possible had in turn been caused by a broader push for economic liberalization and reform by Deng Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji following the 1992 southern tour.

Despite the undeniable emergence of pluralist elements in the state-economy relationship after 1992, the Party-State’s retention of the right to appoint members to SOEs’ boards of directors (as stipulated by the 1994 Company Law), as well as the outsized influence of CCP members within the Chinese economy (Goodman 2016) indicates that clientelism continued to dominate state-NOC relations from 1992 to 2003. Chinese businesspeople generally understood that their success was dependent on keeping a low profile, cultivating good relations with local officeholders, and making sure that their commitment to national development was beyond reproach (Naughton 2018: p. 339). Further, the Chinese Party-State maintained strong controls over domestic banking and finance – as a result, maintenance of clientelist relationships with influential financial officials remained an important condition of success for Chinese firms (Naughton 2018: pp. 340–341). Given the persistent clientelist elements of China’s post-1992 “socialist market economy,” it is not surprising that as of 2007, one-third of China’s 800 richest individuals were members of the Chinese Communist Party (Hart-Landsberg 2011: p. 69).

6.2. The Party’s Over: 2003 SASAC Formation and the Return of Corporatism

In March of 2003, the era of pluralist-clientelist State-economy relations came to an end for CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC with the creation of the SASAC. The foundation of SASAC constituted a fundamental bifurcation of the state-economy relationship: whereas most Chinese firms continued
under the clientelist-pluralist state-economy relationship pioneered after 1992, following SASAC’s formation in 2003, China’s largest state-owned firms found themselves back under the corporatist umbrella of the commanding heights of the Chinese Party-State. For CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC, the establishment of SASAC predicated an unequivocal return to corporatism. The most obvious manifestation of this “corporatist revanche” is that SASAC now holds roughly a 70% stake in each of the “big three” NOCs (Francisco 2013: p. 19). As with other large SASAC firms, the CCP’s Central Organization department also continues to appoint the board members of the NOCs, and individuals appointed to executive positions at NOCs are almost always members of the CCP’s Central Committee, officials who can be trusted to support party interests (Downs 2010: p. 75). The “revolving door” between the highest echelons of the Party and the NOCs’ executive boards ensure that the NOCs’ corporate goals remain aligned with those of the Party-State (Downs 2010: p. 76).

Firms under SASAC supervision tend to act in ways that set the foundation for China’s continued economic growth and fulfill important national policy goals (Naughton 2015: p. 63). In the case of China’s NOCs, these activities often take the form of acquiring oil and gas resources internationally and ensuring their secure delivery to the PRC — indeed, Chinese officials have publicly acknowledged that China’s NOC’s are required by the state to enhance China’s energy security by acquiring foreign hydrocarbon assets (Downs 2010: p. 81). The classic example of China’s NOCs “going out” to secure oil and gas resources in pursuit of State interests is CNOOC’s failed purchase of the US firm Unocal in 2005, for which CNOOC received massive loans at preferential interest rates from its SASAC parent company (Naughton 2015: p. 63). However, there are plenty of additional examples of the Party-State deploying its NOCs to pursue state objectives since 2003, such as insulating Chinese markets against market fluctuations and supply disruptions by purchasing equity in foreign oil reserves (Francisco 2013: p. 36), granting loans-for-oil deals to states subject to American sanctions (i.e. Iran and Sudan) (Nötzold 2012: p. 139), undermining American interests in the Middle East by pursuing arms-for-oil deals with Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (Yetiv and Lu 2007: pp. 209–210), and attempting to circumvent the strait of Malacca by developing LNG and pipeline infrastructure in India and Pakistan (Rafiq 2015; Shaikh et al. 2016).

The Party-State’s repeated deployment of its NOCs to achieve strategic objectives, in conjunction with SASAC’s majority ownership stakes, speaks to the corporatist nature of state-NOC relations in post-2003 China. The Party-State protects NOCs’ natural monopolies and allows them to retain large portions of profits in exchange for supporting national security objectives and allowing the
CCP to appoint influential members to their boards. The NOCs are not alone in this regard. Like the NOCs, many SASAC firms’ profitability is premised on the preservation of natural monopolies. As a result, these firms’ success is predicated on the state’s maintenance of sufficiently high barriers to entry in their respective industries, a core attribute of corporatist state-society relations.

There are indications, however, that the post-2003 “bifurcation” of the state-economy relationship – that is, the retrenchment of corporatism for SASAC firms and continued pluralism-clientelism for private firms – remains incomplete. The CCP’s adoption of “shareholding companies” as a form of state ownership most clearly evidences the “imperfect bifurcation” of the state-economy relationship. Despite the fact that firms not enveloped by SASAC were spun off to provinces, and often subsequently privatized, state-owned shares of strategic industries (including oil and gas) have actually increased in recent years (Song 2015: p. 199), due to the CCP’s endorsement of “shareholding companies” as a vehicle of state ownership (p. 193). State-owned “shareholding companies” – often un-corporatized, SASAC-level parent firms – allow SOEs to purchase hefty (or even controlling) shares of potential competitors. As a result, many modern “private” corporations are actually “hybrid” enterprises: subsidiaries of SASAC firms characterized by a high degree of state ownership (Goodman 2016: p. 8). The Party-State’s enabling of centrally controlled SOEs to purchase controlling stakes in private actors constitutes the “creep” of corporatism into Party-State’s relationship with the private economy.

7. Conclusion: The Critical Importance of “Spectrum-like” State-Society Frameworks

This article has conducted parallel literature reviews of Chinese studies scholarship from the state and society and economic history fields and applied the state and society framework to the evolution of China’s State-NOC relationship from 1992-2003. Application of the state and society framework to the Party-State’s shifting relationship with CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC reveals two primary conclusions. First, following the 1992 southern tour and subsequent reforms, the state-NOC relationship evolved towards a clientelist-pluralist framework. Second, after SASAC’s establishment in 2003, there was a bifurcation of the relationship between the Chinese Party-State and economic society, whereby SASAC enterprises like the NOCs have experienced a corporatist “revanche,” but other economic actors continue to enjoy a clientelist-pluralist relationship with the Party-State. Importantly, however, the post-2003 “bifurcation” of Chinese state-economy relations remains imperfect, as evidenced by the “creep” of corporatism into the nominally “private” economy through the expansion of hybrid firms.
This article’s analysis demonstrated that the clientelist and pluralist models of state-society relations had the greatest explanatory power over state-NOC relations from 1992-2003. After the incorporation of SASAC in 2003, the state-economy relationship in general remained relatively unchanged (clientelism and pluralism continued to dominate), while the explanatory power of the corporatism model eclipsed that of the clientelist and pluralist models in the specific case of state-NOC relations.

This investigation’s finding that the post-2003 bifurcation of Chinese state-economy relations remains incomplete illustrates the critical importance of adopting a “spectrum-like” framework when using a state and society-based theoretical approach. Rather than viewing typologies of state-society relationships as concrete categories, future scholarship should be careful to view them as ideotypes; benchmarks on a sliding scale of relationships between the state and society. The use of a less flexible heuristic framework will undoubtedly result in a reductive analysis of state-society relations by failing to consider trace elements of one ideotype when another predominates, thereby reducing the accuracy and explanatory power of the model.

References


Jackson Neagli graduated Summa Cum Laude from Rice University in Houston, Texas with a B.A. in Asian Studies and Policy Studies. At Rice, he was fortunate to conduct research under the masterful guidance of Dr. Steven Lewis, C.V. Starr Transnational China fellow at the Baker Institute for Public Policy. Subsequently, Jackson was awarded a Marshall Scholarship to read for an M.A. in Chinese Studies at SOAS, University of London, where his dissertation studied “semi-public” WeChat accounts as covert vectors of Party-State influence. He is currently an LLM student focusing on international arbitration at the University of Edinburgh. Jackson’s passion for Chinese studies began while living in Hong Kong as a small child, and he continues to draw inspiration from the Hong Kong people’s struggle for universal suffrage and meaningful democracy.
This paper examines the challenges posed by China’s increasing anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Asia-Pacific, which are aimed at limiting the access and operational capabilities of rival militaries in the region. It discusses how and why China is building up its military, and shows that, following the logic of the security dilemma, this development has negative implications for the security balance in the Asia-Pacific. Subsequently, it investigates the consequences for American security interests in particular, such as the defence of Taiwan and freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific. It debates the strengths and weaknesses of the two dominant counters being considered by the American military: AirSea Battle (ASB) and or a blockade through the concept of Offshore Control. Lastly, this paper demonstrates that China’s increasing A2/AD capabilities have had a ripple effect on the rest of the Asia-Pacific, driving up military expenditures and leading to closer cooperation between American allies as the security dilemma would predict.
China’s A2/AD Capabilities and American Security Interests in the Asia-Pacific

By
Xiaoxue Jiang Martin

We will make it our mission to see that by 2035, the modernisation of our national defence and our forces is basically completed; and that by the mid-21st century our people's armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces.


1. Introduction

The Xi administration of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as indicated by the quotation above, has ambitious goals for its military in the coming years. Its military modernisation has been observed uncomfortably in the United States. Although the American military is still vastly superior to China’s and the United States easily outspends its rival on its military budget (Tian et al. 2019: p. 2), China’s rise affects the balance of power negatively for the hegemon. In particular, China’s increasing anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Asian region are a cause of concern, as they could directly limit American power projection in China’s periphery (Friedberg 2014). This undermines the security network of alliances that the United States has built up in Asia, as its ability to conduct operations in the region will be obstructed. This paper will tap into the debate on how to best respond to the challenge posed by China’s increasing A2/AD capabilities, examining the following research question: Why and how is China increasing its A2/AD capabilities, and how should the United States counter them to protect its security interests in the Asia-Pacific?

First, it will shortly explain the security dilemma in international relations, which will be used to discuss the effects of China’s military build-up on the Asia-Pacific. It will discuss China’s motivation in modernising its military, the development of A2/AD capabilities until now, and the prospects of its success in the near future. Based on this assessment, the paper will examine the impact of China’s A2/AD capabilities on American security interests in the Asia-Pacific, and how

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1 A2/AD is an American military construct that does not have a direct equivalent in Chinese military jargon (Lanteigne 2016; Yuan 2016). Its closest approximation is the Chinese concept of ‘active strategic counterattacks on exterior lines’ (ASCEL), but as there is no consensus on whether ASCEL is analogous to A2/AD, this paper will only use the latter term.
the United States should subsequently respond. It will analyse the two main counters that have been proposed by strategists, namely AirSea Battle and a naval blockade, and evaluate their strategic strengths and weaknesses. Lastly, it will summarise the main arguments of the paper and indicate avenues of further research.

2. The Security Dilemma and China’s A2/AD

This paper will show that China’s growing A2/AD capabilities and the American responses to it are a classic illustration of the security dilemma as outlined by defensive realist Hertz (1950). According to this concept, the anarchical international environment forces states to rely mainly on their own military capabilities to ensure their survival and safeguard national security (Liff and Ikenberry 2014). States that feel insecure have no other choice but to increase their military might, as they cannot depend on a higher authority to prevent military aggression from other states. However, this would shift the balance of power, pushing other states to focus on upgrading their military as well. Even though the initial increase in military capabilities was purely intended for self-defence, the other states necessarily have to assume the worst and interpret the development as indicating possible future military expansionism. After all, it is difficult to determine whether a posture, weapon, or military action is motivated by offensive or defensive intentions in an environment of uncertainty. The more unclear the difference between offensive or defensive intent, the more intense the security dilemma will be. As Jervis (1976) wrote, “an increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others” (p. 186), leading in a security spiral where overall security deteriorates, and an arms race ensues. Next to an arms race, a security dilemma can also have alliance formation as consequence, as states band together to protect themselves from a common threat (Jervis 1978). This paper will use the security dilemma to explain why China’s increasing A2/AD capabilities indeed had these consequences in the Asia-Pacific.

3. China’s Military Modernisation and A2/AD

The Chinese government initially started modernising the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1979, alongside its economic reforms to reintegrate China into the world economy (Cooper III 2018; Mahnken 2011). The direct drive for modernisation was the PLA’s disappointing performance in the Third Indochina War, as it failed to achieve the strategic objective of forcing Vietnamese troops out of Cambodia (Bhartendu 2008). In addition, the Taiwan Strait crises painfully repeatedly confronted the PLA with its inferiority to the American military.² Moreover, American power

² Though Taiwan has had a separate government since 1949, the People’s Republic of China views Taiwan as a breakaway province. After losing the civil war with the CCP, the ruling Kuomintang was forced to flee to Taiwan and
projection, uncomfortably close to Chinese territory poses a constant threat to Chinese security and constrains potential Chinese ambitions to pursue more expansionary or aggressive foreign policy. The crises underlined the necessity to strengthen the Chinese military, so that it could more effectively defend its interests in the region.

In 2015, the Xi administration initiated a new push for extensive military restructuring and modernisation (Defence Intelligence Agency 2019; Lague and Lim 2019b; Saunders et al. 2019). It aims to both ensure the PLA’s loyalty to the Communist Party and Xi himself, to fight corruption within the PLA, and to translate China’s growing economic power into military strength. The ultimate goal, from the Western perspective: to contest American supremacy in Asia. However, Fravel and Twomey (2015) disagree with the view that China’s military strategy is primarily aimed at countering intervention of the United States. Rather, they argue that China’s military modernisation has more general goals than specifically undermining the American military. Indeed, China’s increasing participation in the global economy means that it also has a stake in shaping the international order, for which protection of Chinese territory and power projection are necessary. Furthermore, military modernisation is integral also to the Chinese Dream, that envisions a rejuvenation of the Chinese nation so that it can no longer be bullied into submission (Wang 2014).

Still, though they might not be solely and primarily aimed at the United States, it is a fact that China’s A2/AD capabilities are increasing, and that they endanger American interests in the Asia-Pacific. It is nearly impossible to determine whether they have defensive or offensive purpose, especially as they are shrouded in secrecy for security reasons. As opposed to conventional coastal defence, A2/AD has the potential to provide new capabilities that would drastically change the security balance in the region. A2/AD thus not only increase China’s security and ability to defend itself, it also enables offensive capabilities such as reunification with Taiwan. This intensifies the security dilemma concerning A2/AD. Specifically, A2/AD refers to the “use of weapons and establish the Republic of China (ROC) there. The Taiwanese government has since continued to claim it is the true legitimate governing body over Taiwan and mainland China, contradicting the CCP’s claim that Taiwan belongs to the People’s Republic of China. Reunification with Taiwan is therefore one of the long-term objectives of the CCP. While the United States officially recognises the CCP’s rule of China, the American government continues to foster informal relations with the ROC and has signalled it would come to its aid in case of an invasion from the mainland. This was also the case in the Taiwanese Strait Crises, a series of conflicts between the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) in 1954-1955, 1958, and 1995-1996. Thanks to American intervention on behalf of the ROC, in which it demonstrated the damage its military could do to the clearly and inferior PLA, for all three crises the PRC was forced to back down. The crises demonstrated a humiliating difference in military power, as well as the American ability to effectively obstruct the CCP’s foreign policy objectives. For more information on the crises, see Albert (2019), Reynolds (2000), or Council on Foreign Relations (2017).
supporting systems and operations to counter the efforts of a foreign force to access a specific region or contested area (A2); and to deny effective operation of that force in a specific geographic area of interest (AD)” (Heath et al. 2016). As Kazianis (2014) notes, A2/AD are particularly effective against technologically superior adversaries. American power projection relies on nearby military bases on land, as deployment from more distant bases runs into logistical obstacles. A2/AD thus exploits the American military’s reliance on sea lines of communication, forward basing, information networks, and depots. It also benefits from the technological progress in missile technology, which have helped to tip the balance in favour of defence over offence in a certain territory.

Assessments of China’s military modernisation reveal that it is indeed well on its way in improving its A2/AD capabilities (Cooper III 2018; Department of Defense 2019a). China has made significant advancements in both offensive and defensive reconnaissance and strike missions and systems, which allow A2/AD: “locating and striking an opponent’s targets, while denying the enemy information and defending vital Chinese targets against attacks” (Friedberg 2014: p. 28). It has been particularly proficient in updating its artillery. For example, the PLA’s Army Rocket Force (PLARF), which oversees the PRC’s land-based ballistic missiles, has been able to significantly expand its inventory and upgrade its capabilities every year (Department of Defense 2018; 2019a). Among other, it has activated new Dong Feng-26, an intermediate-range ballistic missile dubbed the ‘carrier-killer’, that has a range of around 4000 kilometres and can strike both naval and ground targets in the western Pacific Ocean (Miller and O’Hanlon 2019). It is the first Chinese conventionally armed ballistic missile that can threaten the American military base in Guam, as well as other bases in the area. The Dong Feng-26, and its anti-ship version, could also work as a powerful deterrent against operations of American aircraft carriers, keeping the US Air Force on the ground. However, their success depends on whether China manages to develop the missiles to realise their full capabilities, and on countermeasures placed by the United States.

China’s A2/AD capabilities are thus mostly missile-centric, but China’s military has invested heavily in long-range maritime and air weapons systems as well. In 2015, under the Xi administration’s push for military reform, the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) was established to amplify China’s cyber and space power, as well as its capabilities for electronic warfare. Investments in A2/AD include anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and precision-guided conventional ballistic missiles, but also submarines, aircraft carriers, anti-satellite weapons, mines, cyberwarfare, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) (Bonds et al. 2017;
Department of Defense 2019a). These investments have paid off: it has become significantly more difficult to penetrate China’s airspace, specifically around the crucial area of Taiwan (Heginbotham et al. 2015; Department of Defense 2018). The Chinese navy, too, has seen substantial improvements, and is expected to account for a significantly larger share of future military outlays (Lague and Lim 2019a).

China’s increasing assertiveness in the East and South China Sea under President Xi, where its territorial claim contests that of the Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Taiwan, should be seen in light of these developments (Scobell 2018; Defense Intelligence Agency 2019). In a militarisation of the South China Sea, China is actively reclaiming land and building artificial islands to construct military bases and strengthen air and sea power. However, although in these specific fields China’s military capabilities have improved, truly successful A2/AD requires highly integrated air power, sea power, and space power approach. As the Defence Intelligence Agency (2019) found, joint warfare and logistics are still significant weaknesses in the PLA. As such, China still faces high barriers towards complete A2/AD in its immediate neighbourhood, and its A2/AD capabilities as of now are still a manageable threat as long as the United States responds appropriately.

3. American Counters to China’s A2/AD Capabilities

China’s build-up of A2/AD capabilities has significant consequences for American security interests in the Asia-Pacific. Broadly, it hinders three general goals of American strategic planners: to maintain conventional military superiority in all aspects of warfare; to maintain its military’s access to combat zones; and to maintain the openness and accessibility of the global commons (Kazianis 2014; Posen 2003). Free access to the Asian air and seas is crucial to ensure the free trade flows from which the American economy benefits greatly. Chinese control over the China Seas is therefore highly undesirable. Furthermore, it is a prerequisite for the United States to live up to its international commitments and come to the aid of its allies if necessary. A2/AD undercuts the basis of American alliances, possibly causing countries to start accommodating Chinese demands in fear of possible military action. China’s A2/AD capabilities could thus undermine the United States’ stabilising presence in the Asia-Pacific to counterbalance China’s rising power. As the security dilemma poses, regardless of the actual offensive or defensive intent of China’s A2/AD capabilities, they decrease American security and force the United States to develop its own military in response.
Two possible counters in particular dominate the strategic debate: AirSea Battle (ASB), or a blockade through the concept of offshore control (OSC). Alongside these two main options, the United States should encourage and aid allies to improve their own military capabilities and decrease their reliance on American military presence. However, regardless of its allies’ military capabilities, American military power projection remains indispensable to counterbalance China’s rise in the region. Therefore, this section will weigh the strengths and weaknesses of ASB and OSC, which are opposing approaches to the A2/AD problem.

3.1 AirSea Battle (ASB)

AirSea Battle is a concept that involves an initial strike on China’s A2/AD capabilities, including radars and missiles, seeking to destroy or handicap them to protect American freedom of movement in the air and sea (Johnson 2017; Kearn Jr. 2014). ASB is intended to signal deterrence, assuring American allies and discouraging Chinese aggression, as well as provide a plan of action in case deterrence proves unreliable. The US Navy and US Air Force started joint work on the concept in 2009, after Secretary of Defence Robert Gates tasked his department to how to address the ‘China challenge’ (Torsvoll 2015). ASB was then officially endorsed in 2010 as important to maintaining American freedom of action.

The first authoritative analysis of the concept after its further development was provided by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments’ report *AirSea Battle: A Point-Of-Departure Operational Concept* (Van Tol et al. 2010). The early conceptualisation of ASB envisioned four initial lines of operation, which are to be executed in parallel. First, to endure Chinese initial attacks and contain possible damage to the militaries of the United States and its allies. Second, in a ‘blinding campaign’, the military would target Chinese battle networks and interrupt ISR. Third, a ‘missile suppression campaign’ would disable long-range strike systems, and lastly, the United States would seize the initiative in the non-land warfighting domains. In the words of the Department of Defence (2013), ASB seeks D3: to Disrupt Chinese Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and ISR; to Destroy A2/AD capabilities; and to Defeat Chinese employed weapons. Since its initial development the concept of AirSea Battle (ASB) has evolved significantly over time. ASB has since been morphed into the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) in 2015 (Heginbotham et al. 2015; Hutchens et al. 2017). Despite its new conceptualisation to include the US Army and the US Marine Corps into joint coordination, this counter still mainly relies on air and sea operations. However, it expanded to address ally capabilities as well, encouraging a multilateral rather than a unilateral response to A2/AD.
While its specifics are classified, much can be derived from the available information on ASB to analyse its strengths and weaknesses. First, ASB exploits A2/AD’s vulnerability of reliance on reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) technologies, specifically the centrality of radar to its success. Without radar, China will not be able to effectively locate forces entering its island chain, undermining the basis of A2/AD. Furthermore, it makes use of the active emitter characteristics of radar, which indicate its location. ASB also provides a flexible approach towards Chinese aggression, from low-level conflict to direct strikes into the Chinese mainland (Torsvoll 2015). However, the success of this direct confrontation is constrained by technical limits. Biddle and Oelrich (2016) show that in the near future, military technology is expected to develop in favour of the defender as it will become easier to conceal possible targets that the blinding and missile campaign of ASB seek to damage. Offence is set to become more problematic over time, which the writers argue will “make it more difficult to sustain air or surface-naval operations near enemy-controlled landmasses without systematically outspending one’s enemy” (p. 41). While the American military can boast superiority in air and sea power, it will be increasingly difficult to overcome China’s dominance in land power from which it will protect its A2/AD and resist ASB. The offence-defence military balance in this scenario is not sufficiently balanced in favour of American offence, meaning that the success of ASB cannot be guaranteed. ASB would push American military to substantially increase its investments in technology and force the United States to drastically outspend China for a sustained period of time. Additionally, its main logic is deterrence by punishment, which does not provide the same security as deterrence by denial, as the 2018 National Defence Strategy recognises (Gallagher 2019; Torsvoll 2015). Indeed, the United States has to convince China that it has the ability to disrupt its A2/AD, which might only stimulate its enemy to further invest in its own capabilities.

This scenario would exemplify the security dilemma, showing that the increase in China’s military capabilities decreases the United States’ security. No matter whether China’s military build-up is motivated out of self-defence or to enable expansionism, the United States is forced to assume the worst and increase its own capabilities as well. This would lead to a security spiral, in which ASB could trigger an expensive arms race as China and the United States attempt to improve their A2/AD and A2/AD destruction capabilities respectively. Rather than escape the security dilemma, opponents argue that this response would move China and the United States further down the security spiral towards imminent confrontation.
Even worse, this method of countering China’s A2/AD faces a high risk of uncontrolled, possibly nuclear, escalation, as it is centred around offensive attacks (Johnson 2017: p. 281). This has led to resistance from American allies, whose support is crucial for ASB’s success as the American military will need to operate from bases in allied countries. This creates political difficulties to implement ASB. According to Biddle and Oelrich (2016), ASB is a disproportionate and unsuccessful counter to the limited threat of A2/AD, as they contend “the A2/AD threat at the heart of this debate is real, but limited” (p. 48). Especially in popular media, the possibilities of China’s A2/AD development are overstated, and the United States does not have to fear its extension over great distances if the United States and its allies invest in their own A2/AD capabilities and continues to modernise its military. This provides no solution to China’s A2/AD threat for nearer territories, including Taiwan, but the authors argue that ASB will not be able to remove this at an achievable cost either (Biddle and Oelrich 2016: p. 14).

3.2 Offshore Control (OSC)

The second possible counter against China’s A2/AD capabilities, is Offshore Control. consisting of a naval blockade to block China from the sea-lanes crucial to its international trade and the access to resources needed for its military operations (Hammes 2012; Mirski 2013). It was proposed in 2012 by those in the Pentagon that disagreed with ASB, mainly by T.X. Hammes, who envisioned a blockade to be a more feasible counter in matching ends, ways, and means (Torsvoll 2015). OSC supporters argue it is more realistic in its assessment of the necessary American capabilities, basing its operations on already available American assets. Rather than a direct fight between the American and Chinese army, this method effectively harms the Chinese economy, industrial capacity, and military mobilisation. As ‘economic strangulation’ rather than direct strike on Chinese mainland, it was deemed less likely to escalate into damaging conflict than ASB. It was also specifically designed to undermine a pillar of legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, namely its ability to ensure economic prosperity for its people. The Chinese government would then face pressure to initiate diplomatic negotiations with the United States. As opposed to ASB, where its mainland infrastructure would directly be damaged, OSC “allows higher probability for China to declare victory (saving face) and end the conflict” (Hammes 2012: p. 11).

OSC would impose concentric rings around China, where the United States would confront all ships it deems illegally operate in the inner ring, turning it into a maritime exclusion zone (Hammes 2012; Torsvoll 2015). It would make use of maritime geography, which limits trades to a restricted selection of sea lanes. For this objective, the American military would employ mines, attack
submarines, as well as intelligence and intervention from the US Air Force. In the outer ring, well away from China’s A2/AD capabilities, the United States could operate even more freely and include all its forces to block ships from sailing to China. Here, OSC plays to the dominance of the American navy of the China’s, which does not yet have blue water capabilities (Wu 2019: p. 672). OSC is prepared for longer conflict and uses it to its advantage to allow time for conflict resolution through negotiation. It is also argued to be more effective in its deterrence, as it is more transparent and realistic than ASB, and the US Navy can already demonstrate its feasibility through peacetime exercises to assure allies and discourage China.

However, this method, too, faces obstacles. First of all, US Navy would have to be significantly expanded and improved in capability to impose a blockade on such a large area, especially now that China is building military bases and islands in the South China Sea. This could again further an arms race between China and the United States, exacerbating the security dilemma. Furthermore, the blockade will not only impact the Chinese economy, but could have costly consequences for the global economy as well (Collins 2018; Collins and Murray 2008). In this way, it will indirectly damage American economic interests. Moreover, it could invoke more aggressive foreign policy, as it will inflame nationalist sentiments in the Chinese population and help rally support for the Chinese government. In this way, it could be seen as just as escalatory as ASB. For all this trouble, China could attempt to work around the blockade through land-based trade with Russia and other allies, decreasing the effectiveness of the blockade. Therefore, this method might end in a stalemate as well. Opponents argue that the political will to impose a blockade might only be summoned in the case of an acute threat, as economic warfare that damages the American economy would not easily gain support. However, the ongoing current trade war between the United States and China, which certainly harms sectors of the American economy, casts doubt on these protests. American allies, too, will not be eager to have OSC affect their economy and remain ill-protected from Chinese attacks. However, its creator Hammes indeed specifically designed OSC as last resort and acknowledges that it is not meant to be as flexible as ASB.

4. China’s A2/AD and Security in the Asia-Pacific

China’s increasing A2/AD capabilities are not only affecting American security interests, but also has broader implications for the security balance in the Asia-Pacific. For many of China’s neighbouring states, its growing military might is no more welcomed than by the United States. After all, the states in the Asia-Pacific rely on American military alliances and freedom of navigation in the seas and skies for their prosperity and safety, both of which are endangered by China’s
A2/AD capabilities. Moreover, China’s actions in the China Seas have reignited the disputes over the area, angering the countries in the Asia-Pacific with competing territorial claims. The Xi administration continues to assert that China can rise peacefully despite its military build-up (Herrick et al. 2016). However, this message is undermined by Chinese militarisation of the China Seas and its belligerent rhetoric towards Taiwan. As Liff and Ikenberry (2014) wrote, “the pace and scale of Beijing’s military build-up, its tendency to dismiss other states’ concerns, and its low transparency about actual spending, capabilities, and intentions seem to be exacerbating regional tensions and, consequently threat perceptions vis-à-vis Beijing” (p. 88).

In response to the fears of China’s rise, the Obama administration announced a Pivot to Asia in its foreign policy in 2011 (Clinton 2011). Later named the Rebalance to Asia, this signalled the government’s intent to rebalance its resources to Asia in reflection of the changing balance of power and the importance of regional stability to American interests. Under the Pivot, the Obama administration relocated thousands of marines to Australia, and increased efforts to strengthening partnerships with allies in Asia to check Chinese power. This trend continued under the Trump administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy (Department of Defence 2019b). For example, the United States has agreed to stage joint exercises with the Indonesian special forces unit again, after years of limited cooperation under a ban imposed to punish human rights abuses by the special forces (Ali and Nilufar 2019). Military ties between Taiwan and the United States are growing closer as well, as exemplified by the recently signed Taiwan Travel Act that allows high-level American officials to visit Taiwan (Chung 2018). In 2018, an American aircraft carrier was granted permission to visit Vietnam for the first time, most likely in response to China’s maritime assertiveness (Ali and Brunnstrom 2019). The visit was meant to reinforce American presence in the region and set a precedent for future visits, with another port stop scheduled for later this year. The United States has been improving its military ties with the Philippines as well under increased tensions in the South China Sea. In April 2019, Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jnr even explicitly named the United States as the Philippines’ only military ally (Lopez 2019). Meanwhile, it should be noted that China’s economic ties with its Asian neighbours have only grown closer over time, as countries struggle to balance their economic dependence on China with their military concerns (Woetzel et al. 2019: p. 54; Wuthnow 2019).

In addition, China’s increases in military spending have been followed by increased efforts of Asian-Pacific states to build up their own forces, as the security dilemma predicts. Accordingly, military spending in Asia grew at a higher rate than in other regions in the world (Tian et al. 2019).
2019; p.9). The United States has actively pushed for this, as this development reduces the security burden of the United States. For example, the United States is selling 34 Boeing-made ScanEagle drones to Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, which will allow for more advanced intelligence operations in the South China Sea region to contain Chinese activity there (Stone 2019). Taiwan has been requesting new arms sales from the United States, which is pursuing to sell more than 2 billion USD in weapons to the island and has been approving arms deals at an increasingly faster rate (Stone and Zengerle 2019; Chung 2018). The Asian-Pacific states have also grown closer military ties among themselves in response to China’s growing power. For example, in 2018 Vietnam and Australia officially established a strategic partnership, formalising closer cooperation between their militaries (Pearson and Vu 2019). Together, the new allies also made a statement to criticise China’s actions in the South China Sea in August 2019. These examples show that stronger military alliance formation is indeed a result of China’s increasing A2/AD capabilities, as the security dilemma concept poses.

5. Conclusion

This paper has assessed the following research question: Why and how is China increasing its A2/AD capabilities, and how should the United States counter them to protect its security interests in the Asia-Pacific? It showed that China’s military modernization started focusing on A2/AD capabilities after the PLA suffered several embarrassing defeats, which demonstrated the need to reduce American military superiority over China. A2/AD then sought to change the balance of power by limiting the access and operational capabilities of the American military in the region. It was seen as a defensive response to American freedom of navigation operations in the China Seas, intended to push back its military presence. The United States worries more about the effect of China’s A2/AD on China’s aims of reuniting with Taiwan, in which American intervention in the conflict would be constrained. While the exact extent of China’s A2/AD capabilities is unclear, it is certain that they will significantly increase in the near future, and that they will pose a threat to American security interests in the Asia-Pacific if left unchecked. After all, regardless of whether the A2/AD capabilities are intended for defensive or offensive and expansionary purposes, under the security dilemma the United States is forced to build up its own military in response.

Therefore, the paper also analysed two possible counters to China’s A2/AD: ASB and OSC. AirSea Battle is the more offensive of the two and was proposed first. Although it has evolved since its conception, it still seeks to address the A2/AD challenge by directly taking out the systems and weapons that it is based on. It makes use of A2/AD reliance on radar, which as active emitter gives
away its location and is therefore vulnerable to strikes. Furthermore, it provides a flexible approach, proposing actions from low-level to high-level conflict involving direct strikes into the Chinese mainland. This is also one of its main weaknesses, as ASB could easily escalate into wider conflict because of its offensive nature. Its main logic of deterrence by punishment has been criticised, as well as the technical limits it faces to be effective, its significant cost, and the possibility of leading to an arms race. Its opponents therefore deem it a disproportionate answer to the challenge of A2/AD. They therefore propose a second counter: Offshore Control, or a naval blockade. This is intended to wear out the Chinese economy and its military capabilities by limiting access to international trade and energy and raw materials, forcing the Chinese government to accede to negotiations. However, OSC might be ineffective, as China could work around the blockade through land-based trade. Furthermore, rather than decreasing the CCP’s legitimacy, it could help rally nationalistic support for the government in the face of a common enemy, stimulating more aggressive foreign policy.

Though neither ASB nor OSC are perfect counters to China’s A2/AD capabilities, in the long run OSC poses the less costly option, with the least risk of hurting overall American strategic objectives of limiting conflict in the region. On the other hand, ASB is more politically feasible, as OSC would face opposition to its costs on the American economy. However, both counters require further American military build-up, which in turn could drive further Chinese investment in military capabilities, illustrating the security dilemma that encapsulates states in the anarchical international environment. Meanwhile, this paper has shown that China’s increasing A2/AD capabilities have had a ripple effect on the rest of the Asia-Pacific, driving up military expenditures and leading to closer cooperation between American allies as the security dilemma would predict. Further research is needed to elaborate upon the solutions to OSC’s and ASB’s weaknesses, and to research possible ways to escape the security dilemma.
References


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